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Credit Extended by Federally Sponsored Agencies, by Type of
Financial Aid, 1917—1953
(in thousands)
VOLUME DURING YEAR OS ATYEAR
Direct Stock Direct Stock
















1932, 269,231 .. 1,251,496
1933 437,765 $ 2,430 1,448,807 $ 2,430
1934 1,116,777 89,405 90,086
1935 774,717 11,999 2,457,862: 77,017
1936 643,629 3,895 75,038
1937 701,269 4,824 2,605,222, 76,146
1938 659,708 2,419 2,553,518, 75,788
1939 675,932 2,558 2,455,823 75,370
1940 783,039 1,301 2,447,710 61,445
1941 996,943 21,464 81,498
1942 1,129,827 1,920 2,243,345 81,621
1943 1,381,886 621 2,054,839 76,090
1944 1,427,758 538 1,796,109 63,587
1945 1,460,500 596 1,672,174 55,491
1946 '1,766,148 292 1,734,354 46,034
1947 2,147,955 225 1,946,615: 34,918
1948 2,397,843 '30 2,124,791 29,139
1949 2,210,826 115 2,091,773 22,296
1950 2,807,950 965 2,633,573 15,728
1951 3,192,420 1,015 2,875,279 11,371
1952 3,309,383 100 3,046,164 7,596
1953 3,258,486 640 3,101,541 4,946
Based on data shown in Tables A-4 to A-6. For greater detail see Tables A-25
to A-27 inclusive. Types of financial aid are defined, as to amounts included, in



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a Covers loans for financing exports of agricultural surpluses, livestock market-
ing, and the storage and marketing of agricultural commodities, except those
made to the Commodity Credit Corporation.
b Covers loans to railroads; loans, and immediate participations in loans, to
business enterprises (including those engaged in defense production); loans to
business enterprises through mortgage loan companies and banks; loans to the
fishing industry, to mining, milling and smelting companies (including those en-.
gaged in defense production), and to processors or distributors of farm products
subject to processing taxes; loans, and immediate participations in loans, to
manufacturers of prefabricated housing,authorized under Sec. 102 of the
Housing Act of 1948 and Sec. 4(a) (1) of the RFC Act as amended; loans on
rationed articles and commodities; Contract Settlement Act loans; loans and
purchases of participations in connection with the transfer of certain functions
of the Smaller War Plants Corporation to the RFC, effective January 28, 1946;
loans under Sections 302 and 714 of the Defense Production Act of 1950; and loans
under Section 409 of the Federal Civil Defense Act. Outstanding amounts of
loans to business and mining enterprises in 1947 are estimated by linear interpola-
tion of repayments for the period July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948.
Represents loans to banks and trust companies, to closed banks through
mortgage loan companies, and to livestock credit corporations; loans on assets
of closed banks; loans to trustees, liquidating agents, and conservators of closed
banks and trust companies; and loans to insurance companies, building and loan
associations, mortgage loan companies, credit unions, joint stock land banks, and
agricultural and livestock credit corporations.
d Covers construction loans to public agencies for defense and non-defense
projects; loans to drainage, levee, and similar districts; loans to establish state
funds for securing repayment of deposits of public moneys in banks and other
depositories; loans to refinance obligations of public school districts; and loans for
payment of teachers' salaries, for self-liquidating public works, and for relief
and work relief under the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 as
amended. Outstanding amounts of construction loans to public agencies in 1947
are estimated by linear interpolation of repayments for the period July 1, 1947
to March 31, 1948.
eRepresents loans to repair damage caused by floods and other catastrophes.
f Refers to amounts authorized and commitments outstanding under agree-
ments to participate with private lenders on a deferred basis in loans to business
enterprises (including those engaged in defense production), to transportation
companies other than railroads, and to manufacturers of prefabricated housing.
The (deferred) participations made through blanket agreements ,are included, as
are those connected with Contract Settlement Act loans; with loans made in
connection with the transfer of certain functions of the Smaller War Plants
Corporation to the RFC, effective January 28, 1946; with loans under Sections
302 and 714 of the Defense Production Act of 1950; and with loans under Sec-
tion 409 of Federal Civil Defense Act.
gCoversloans on, and subscriptions for, preferred stock of insurance companies











laneou8 Vendee Rural Agricul- Bu8i-


























1944 9,294 .. $1,568
1945 9,470 $1,238 $3,910 71,181
1946 13,832 29,853 49,387 1,092,891
1947 17,127 $130g 86,634 47,344 1,558,700
1948 22,161 1,133 18,561 21,347 927,580
1949 27,742 3,111 7,564 9,468 726,004
1950 33,792 6,716 $6,342 7,970 8,572 1,663,721
1951 87,347 12,191 103,095 5,930 14,968 2,124,245
1952 34,851 12,082 67,522 2,615 11,199 1,588,885











Agricul— Busi- Vendee Rural
YEAR Purposesa Accts.b Areasc tured nesse Housin.gf

























1944 123,125 .. .. h
1945 116,379 Ii h h $ 250,000
1946 114,506 h $30,654 $51,024 1,200,000
1947 115,554 h 64,531 88,098 2,600,000
1948 125,562 $ 1,239 77,736 92,876 3,300,000
1949 139,676 4,173 79,154 85,657- 3,800,000
1950 157,270 10,453 $6,342 79,709 80,636 5,100,000
1951 175,238 21,633 108,000 75,938 83,106 6,750,000
1952 188,637 31,891 167,000 70,967 82,542 7,700,000
1953 208,002 41,111 274,684 65,562 :67,780 8,980,000
Data were supplied by the Veterans' Administration or compiled from Finance, Guaranty
of Loans (Office of Assistant Administrator, Veterans' Administration, 1946—50 Supplement,
pp. 28—32), Housing Statistics Handbook (Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1948, p. 130)
and the Sixth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, (1952, p. 145).
Volume of loan guarantees for agriculture and for business was estimated for 1945 by
deducting from the cumulative amount of guarantees through January 194.6 an estimate of
the amount guaranteed in January, and for 1946 by adding the January 1946 estimate to the
(continued on next page)
385APPENDIX A
TABLE A-b(continued)
February—December amount. Volume of loan guarantees for housing in 1944 and 1945 was
estimated by assuming that the amount guaranteed from November 1944 through March 1945
was evenly distributed over the period. All data on outstanding amounts of guarantees
1945—1953 were estimated. For the agricultural and business sectors, estimates were obtained
by deducting cumulated amount of guarantees-paid-in-full loans, plus the cumulated amount
of net claims paid, from the cumulated amount of guarantees. or insurance on loans closed.
Estimates of outstdnding guarantees on housing loans were prepared by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration.
aRepresentsloans to holders of United States Government and National Service Life
Insurance policies based on the amount of paid-up insurance. Excludes loans arising from
federal guarantees of premiums on commercial private life insurance policies held by service-
men as provided under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. As of June 30, 1953 out-
standings on such loans were less than $500,000.
b Covers purchase money mortgages and real estate sales contracts made in connection with
the term sale of properties acquired through foreclosure of VA-guaranteed business, farm,
and home loans.
Represents direct loans to veterans for purchase or construction of housing in small
towns and rural areas and for construction or improvement of farm houses as authorized under
the Housing Act of 1950.
d Refers to the amount of VA's commitments on loans made by private financing institu-
tions to veterans for purchase or improvement of farm properties and guaranteed (or insured)
under Title III, Sections 502 and 507 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944.
eRefersto the amount of VA's commitments on loans made by private lending institutions
to veterans for the establishment or expansion of business enterprises and guaranteed (or
insured) under Title III, Sections 503 and 507 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act.
f Refers to the amount of VA's commitments on home mortgage loans guaranteed (or in-
sured) under Title III, Sections 501, 505, and 507 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act.
gCumulativefrom 1945 through February 29, 1948.
Ii Data not available.
386APPENDIX A
TABLE A-li
Home Owners' Loan Corporation Lending Activity, 1933—1950
(in thousands)











1933 $ 141,604 .. $ 141,520 ..
1934 2,240,162 .. 2,366,463 ..
1935 596,631 $ 19,846 2,897,162 $ 19,846
1936 128,533 105,775 2,765,098 125,621
1937 33,703 80,999 2,397,646 206,475
1938 109,135 8,921 2,168,100 214,801
1939 203,196 4,385 2,035,716 211,453
1940 166,448 1,720 1,955,572 194,264
1941 84,323 1,613 1,776,918 175,167
1942 53,838 598 1,566,971 152,311
1943 73,534 .. 1,338,102 63,286
1944 41,816 .. 1,091,363 34,551
1945 5,314 .. 852,319 21,421
1946 1,896 •
. 636,463 15,192
1947 2,065 .. 485,909 8,063
1948 2,050 .. 368,908 5,883
1949 2,097 .. 230,623 1,952
1950 868 .. 9,592 414
a Data, supplied by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, cover loans to refinance defaulted
or otherwise distressed mortgages of home owners and to finance the sale of properties ac-
quired through foreclosure. The volume series for 1935—1937 includes estimates for credit
sales of foreclosed properties derived by adding estimated yearly repayments to annual net
change in amounts outstanding. Outstandings for 1934 were estimated by assuming repay-
ments in 1934 to be six-sevenths of repayments from July 1, 1934 through January 31, 1935 and
subtracting these from the sum of outstandings as of June 30, 1934 and disbursements from
July 31 to December 31, 1934.
bDatawere supplied by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation of the Hous-
ing and Home Finance Agency, and represent HOLC's investments in shares of insured
federal and state savings and loan associations. Responsibility for. administering these invest-
ments was vested in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board by SectIon 5(j) of the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933.
387APPENDIX A
TABLE A-12
War Finance Corporation Lending Activity, 1918—1939
thousands)
VOLUME DULUNG YEAR OUTST AT YEAREND
Direct Loans Direct Loans
Financial Financial
Agric'ul- Inst it Agricul- Instit'u.-
YEAR turea Businessb tionsc turea Businessb tionsc
1918 $6,403 $122,792 $5,179 3,079 $ 29,629 $1,506
1919 1,424 171,826 80 1,459 93,928 1,676
1920 1 45,348 9 793 116,934 ..
1921 82,967 28,639 .. 82,997 104,680 ..
1922 186,143 10,015 .. 148,692 29,533 ..
1923 18,185 .. .. 70,201 28,204 ..
1924 9,872 .. .. . 40,269 16,945 ..
1925 937 .• .. 15,589 16,945 ..
1926. 355 .. .. 7,670 16,745
1,030
..
1927 178 .. .. 1,362 ..
1928 126 .. .. 454 190 ..
1929 .. .. .. 161 170 •
1930 .. .. .. 59 170 ..
1931 .. .. .. 45 170 ..
1932 .. .. .. 14 170 ..
1938 .. ... ... 13 138 ..
1934 .. .. .. 9 119 ..
1985 .. .. .. 8 .. ..
1936 .. .. .. 7 •. ••
1937 .. .. .. 4 .. •.
1938 .. .. . 3
1939 .. .. .. .. .. •.
a Coversloans made in 1918—1923 to cattle raisers under Section 9 of the War Finance CQrpo-
ration Act of 1918 and loans made in 1921-1924 to banks and other financial institutions, live-
stock loan companies, and cooperative marketing associations for agricultural and livestock
purposes under Section 24 of the Agricultural Credits Act of August 24, 1921. Data were
compiled from the Annual Reports of the War Finance Corporation, and the Liquidation of the
War Corporation (Treasury Department, 1943). Volume data for 1918—1920, and the
part for 1921—1923 representing loans to cattle raisers, are for fiscal years ending November
30, (1920 having been estimated); volume after 1924 represents expense advances incident
to the liquidation of the Corporation's assets. Outstandings in 1918—1920, and the part in 1921—
1925 concerning loans to cattle raisers, are for November 30. Outstandings for 1918 were
prorated among the agricultural, business, and financial sectors according to the sectors'
respective shares in the year's volume.
b Data are from the Annual Reports of the War Finance Corporation and refer to loans
through banks to public utilities, industrial corporations, railroads, and canning firms under
Section 9 of the War Finance Corporation Act, and export advances under Sections 21 and
22 of the Agricultural Credits Act of 1921. Volume figures in 1921 are for January 1—November
30, and in 1922 for the fiscal year ending November 30. Data on outstandings in 1918—1928
are as of November 30 (estimated for 1918 as explained above).
c Data are from the Annual Reports of the War Finance Corporation and represent loans
to commercial and savings banks, and building and loan associations, under Sections 7 and 8
of the War Finance Corporation Act. Outstandings are as of November 30 (estimated for
1918 as indicated in note a).APPENDIX A
TABLE A-13
Public Works Administration Lending Activity,
thousands)
.
VOLUME DUItIN& YEAS AT YEAn
Direct Loans Direct Loans
Minor Gov't Minor Gov't
YEAR Businessa Unitsb Businessa Unit8b
1933 $39,864 $ 50,021 c C
1934 93,615 113,929 $133,478 $135,655
1935 55,113 151,728 148,780 188,290
1936 12,233 104,900 57,107 207,115
1937 150 36,251 50,731 186,230d
1938 .. 40,921 46,506 175,514
1939 .. 66,679 22,011 197,380
1940 .. 33,471 13,548 215,531
1941 .. 14,947 11,696 218,857
1942 .. 6,973 10,877 204,869
1943 .. 270 10,188 160,635
1944 .. .. 9,457 152,030
1945 .. .. 7,839 147,986
1946 .. .. 5,990 134,738
1947 .. .. 8,035 133,383
1948
1949
.. .. 3,035 147,00le
.. .. 2,123 102,899





1953 .. .. f 88,366
Volume of loans to business was estimated from the records of the Federal
Works Agency: .1933 by linear interpolation of fiscal year data and 1934—1937 by
obtaining estimates on a semiannual basis using data on outstandings and repay-
ments. Volume •of loans to minor governmental unitsis from records of the
Federal Works Agency and Financial StatementsofCertainGovern'inent
Agencies (S. Doe. 172, Part 2, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 1940, pp. 860 and 871) except
that the amounts for 1941—1943 were estimated by linear interpolation of fiscal
year data, and those for 1933—1936 include estimates for loans to limited dividend
housing corporations. The latter were obtained by computing net change in out-
standings between fiscal year ends and then combining on a calendar year basis
by linear interpolation(in fiscal 1935 repayments were added to net change
before interpolating).
Outstandings were estimated from Senate Document Number 172, pp. 860 and
871, the Daily Statements of the Treasury Department, and records of
theFederal Works Agency. For business
loans, in 1934—1937 they reflect the par value of securities held by PWA plus the
par value of securities purchased from PWA and held by the RFC (in 1935,
estimated from outstandings, repayments, and disbursements for 1986); after
1937, the estimated par value of securities held by the RFC. For loans to minor
(continued on next pa9e)
3.89APPENDIX A
TABLE A-la (continued)
governmental units, in 1934—1953 they reflect the par value of securities held by
PWA plus the par value (estimated for 1937—1953) of securities purchased from
PWA and held by the RFC.
a Represents loans to railroads for operational and maintenance purposes.
b Represents net payments (bonds purchased less bonds canceled in lieu of
grant payments) on loans to states, municipalities, other public agencies, and
private corporations for the construction of community facilities and low-cost
housing projects; and net payments on loans to limited dividend housing cor-
porations.;
c Data not available.
d Excludes $10,142,400 outstanding on loans to limited dividend housing corpora-
tions. As of November 1, 1937 this account was transferred to the U.S. Housing
Authority, 'the predecessor of the Public Housing Administration.
e Includes $13,900,000 in revenue bonds transferred in 1948 from the Department
of the Interior pursuant to Executive Order 9839 of April 14, 1947.
f Probably extinguished.
390TABLE A-14




YEAR Businessa Housingb Unitsc P'wrposesd
DURING YEAR
1945 .. .. $6,624 ...
1946 .. .. 18,271 ..
1947 .. .. 12,282 ..
1948 .. .. 6,812
i ..
1949 .. .. 6,403 ..
1950 $ 9,SOOe $1,594f 7,216g ..
1951 11,390 3,742 9,174 $85"
1952 4,983 6,577 19,072 5,339
1953 8,837 5,839 25,490 23,498
OUTSTANDINOS AT YEAR END
1945 .. .. $6,624 ..
1946 .. 24,625 ..
1947 .. .. 35,425 ..
1948 .. .. 33,884 ..
1949 .. .. 33,246 ..
1950 $21,917 $ 1,594 34,203 ..
1951 30,425 5,274 37,228 $85
1952 • 13,893 10,748 51,504 5,414
1953 12,918 11,863 62,041 28,887
Data supplied by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of the Ad-
ministrator.
a Covers loans to prefabricated housing manufacturers for the production, dis-
tribution, sale, or erection of such units as authorized under Section 102 of the
Housing Act of 1948, Section 4(a) (1) of the RFC Act as amended, and Public
Law 139. Loans prior to 1950, when the program was administered by the RFC,
are included in the RFC business loan series given in Table A-9.
bRepresentsloans to the Alaska Housing Authority, as authorized by the
Alaska Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 52, approved April 23, 1949), for
residential construction and property improvement.
CCoversadvances to state and local governments for the planning of public
works as authorized under Title V of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act
of 1944, and under Public Law 352 approved October 13, 1949; advances under
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 171, approved July 15, 1949) to
communities and local public agencies to assist in planning urban development
projects, in acquiring land for their construction, and in financing such urban
redevelopment and slum clearance projects; and loans to communities in critical
defense areas to assist in providing necessary community facilities as authorized
under Title III, Section 313(a) of the Defense Housing and Community Facilities
and Services Act (Public Law 139, approved September 1, 1951).
ii Covers loans to institutions of higher learning, as authorized under Title IV
of the Housing Act of 1950 (Public Law 475, April 20, 1950), for provision of
housing facilities for students and faculty.
Computed by subtracting from the total disbursements on active loans reported
by HHFA through December 31, 1950 ($26.4 million), the outstanding loan bal-
ances as of September 7, 1950 reported by RFC as transferred to the HHFA
($16.9 million).
£Cumulativefrom April 23, 1949.
gIncludesdata for the second half of 1949 for the Slum Clearance and Urban
Redevelopment (P.L. 171) and Second Advance Planning (P.L. 352) programs.
ii Cumulative from April 20, 1950.TABLE A-15
Farmers Home Administration Lending and Loan Insuring Activity, 1984—1953
(in thousands)
VOLUME DUBING YEAR • OUTSPANDINGS AT YEAB. END
Direct Farm Loans Direct Farm Loans
Farm Loan Real Non-Real-Farm Loan Real Non-Real-
YEAR Estatea EstatebInsurancec Estatea EstatebInsurancec
1934 d
.. C
.. .. .$5,600 ..
1935 .. .. 62,900 ..
1936 .. C .. .. 131,600 ..
1937 .. C .. .. 121,685 ..
1938 $10,275 .$ 80,692 .. $ 10,275 173,171 ..
1939 26,576 111,746 .. 32,301 249,173 ..
1940 • 39,713 95,426 .. 66,286 296,724 ..
1941 60,663 114,188 .. 116,610 337,385 ..
1942 31,430 172,108 .. 160,258 403,912 ..
1943 28,998 122,869 .. 174,946 375,272 ..
1944 25,103 65,510 179;840 332,230 ..
1945 28,651 73,763 .. 185,060 300,105 ..
1946 46,902 112,766 .. 194,622 301,175 .
1947 36,300 93,271 .. 200,185 279,553 ..
1948 21,483 87,781 $ 2,972 194,035 266,162 $ 2,908
1949 17,888 111;547 9,727 193,902 290,607 12,396
1950 46,615 128,342 17,632 219,503 292,494 29,359
1951 47,298 137,110 15,899 239,161 283,924 43,084
1952 50,873 180,340 11,156 264,294 330,656 51,599
1953 33,194 197,042 10,473 274,455 381,020 58,535
Volume data were supplied by the Farmers Home Administration except that the amount
for real estate loans in 1942 was obtained by deducting cumulative loan advances through 1941
(Agricultural Statistics, 1950, Department of Agriculture, Tables 720 and 733, pp. 672 and
690) from cumulative advances through 1942 (FHA). Real estate loans for 1944—1945 were
partially estimated by linear interpolation of data for the preceding and following half years;
and data on non-real-estate loans in 1944 include estimates for certain quarters based on linear
interpolation of the available quarterly figures.
Data on outstandings were supplied by the FHA except that those for 1934 through 1936
were compiled from Agricultural Finance Review (Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 12, Supplement May 1950, Table 17, p. 25).
a Represents loans made from federal funds and state rural rehabilitation corporation trust
funds to tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers for the purchase, enlargement, and develop-
ment of family-type farms; loans or construction or repair of farm houses and buildings; and
receivables from individuals purchasing surplus real property of rural rehabilitation projects.
bCoversoperating and production loans to farmers and stockmen; loans to cooperative
associations for rehabilitation purposes; water facilities loans to farmers, ranchers, and co-
operatives; production disaster loans; and loans authorized July 14, 1953 under the Special
Livestock and Emergency Loan Programs. Lending under the first two broad categories became
a function of the Resettlement Administration in 1935 (when the functions of the Rural
Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration were transferred)
and was continued by its successors, the Farm Security Administration and the Farmers
Home Administration. Data prior to 1943 exclude loans made in the territorial possessions.
Annual data on loan advances during 1934—1937 are not available, but as of December 31, 1937
the volume of loans made totaled approximately $160,000,000.
c Refers to amount of commitments under FHA insurance of loans made by private lenders





Lending and Loan Insuring Activity of the Maritime Administration
and its Predecessors, 1921—1953
VOLUMEBURlNO YEAR
'




























1939 $ 56,116 $975
1940 350 71,205 1,267
1941 6,300 62,952 7,482
1942 500 68,872 5,628






1949 2,400 471,266 2,400
1950 .. 412,081 2,313
1951 80,401 448,775 553
1952 21,600 405,909 446
1953 355,717 371
Volumeof direct loans refers to fiscal years ending June 30 and was compiled
from United States Shipping Board, by D. H. Smith and P. V. Betters (Brook-
ings Institution, Service Monograph No. 63, 1931, p. 285), the Annual Reports of
the U.S. Shipping Board, and material supplied by the Maritime Administration.
Volume of loan insurance, compiled from the Annual Reports Of the U.S. Mari-
time Commission, refers to fiscal years ending October 25, 1939; September 30,
1940 and 1941; and June 30, 1942, 1943, and 1949.
(continued on next page)
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TABLE A-16 (continued)
Outstanding amounts of direct loans for 1921—1933 and 1947—1953 are given as
of June 30 (estimated in 1922—1927 and 1929—1933) and for 1934r-1946 as of Decem-
ber 31, and were compiled from the Annual Reports of the U.S. Shipping Board,
the Annual Reports and the Daily Statements of the Treasury Department, and
from material supplied by the Treasury and the Maritime Administration. In
1947, outstandings on ship sales notes as of March 31 are included. Outstanding
amounts of loan insurance were compiled from Annual Reports of the U.S.
Maritime Commission and material supplied by the Maritime Administration, and
refer to the following dates: October 31, 1939; September 30, 1940 and 1941;
June 30, 1942 through 1953.
a Covers construction loans to American shipowners as authorized by Section 11
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920; and outstandings also cover advances
made to finance the sale of government-owned ships. The volume series, however,
excludes mortgage loans made in 1921—1950 in connection with the sale of gov-
ernment-owned ships, because annual data are lacking.
bRefersto insurance of, and commitments to insure, mortgage loans to Amer-




Federal Housing Administration Lending and Loan Insuring Activity, 1934—1953
(in thousands)
IC DUIUNGYEAR 0LJTSTANDINGS AT YEAREND
Direct Direct
Loans to Loans to
Direct Housing Financial Direct Housing Financial
Housing Loan In- Inst itu- Housing Loam In- Institu-
YEAR Loansa suranceb tionsc Loansa suranceb tionsc
1934 .. $80,451 :. •. $ 80,451 ..
1935 $447 319,857 $125 $408 307,815 $110
1936 5,885 557,196 16 5,286 701,315 18
1937 6,938 495,239 .. 9,137 1,019,604 2
1938 6,641 693,630 .. 11,623 1,511,271 ..
1939 6,006 954,336 .. 13,855 2,135,846 ..
1940 13,123 1,025,979 .. 23,174 2,795,975 ..
1941 14,468 1,186,419 .. 32,948 3,502,923 ..
1942 15,655 1,135,227 .. 41,016 . 4,095,955 ..
1943 7,494 943,166 .. 41,127 4,394,416 ..
1944 3,473 888,683 .. 32,342 4,542,369 ..
1945 7,927 683,085 .. 31,935 4,500,933 ..
1946 13,599 797,927 .. 37,630 4,238,327 ..
1947 8,855 1,861,034 .. 38,379 4,967,442 ..
1948 15,299 3,424,655 .. 45,576 7,276,342 ..
1949 21,543 3,907,889 .. 58,601 9,959,829 ..
1950 30,723 4,439,257 .. 76,914 12,786,064 ..
1951 32,112 3,308,278 .. 97,603 14,468,521 ..
1952 29,854 3,232,065 .. 114,727 15,918,324 ..
1953 49,340 4,070,005 .. 148,310 17,524,388 ..
Housing loan data, volume of housing loans insured, and estimates of insured loans out-
standing were supplied by the Federal Housing Administration, except that the insurance
outstandings in 1934—1938 were estimated by the National Bureau of Economic Research as
follows: Data on Title I loans for 1934 were estimated by assuming no terminations or amortiza-
tion, leaving the volume of loans insured equal to outstandings at the end of the year; for
1935—1938, by subtracting repayments during the second half of each year (which were es-
timated to be one-third of the amount outstanding as of June 30), from the sum of outstand-
ings on June 30 and loans insured during the second half of each year. Also included are
amounts for mortgages insured under Section 203 (estimated by linear interpolation of the
ratio between estimated insurance outstanding and cumulated mortgages insured at fiscal
year ends 1935—1938 so as to apply that ratio to the cumulated volume figures at calendar year
ends) and under Section 207 (obtained by assuming insurance in force equal to insurance out-
standing, a relationship which existed at fiscal year ends 1935—1938).
Data on loans to financial institutions are from the Annual Reports of the Federal Housing
Administration and the report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal
Expenditures, Federal Lending 1984—1948 (S. Doe. 103, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 37).
a Refers to mortgage loans to individuals to finance the sales of properties acquired through
foreclosure of FHA-insured mortgages; claims paid on defaulted Title I notes acquired by
FHA; and the amounts of debentures and cash adjustments on insured mortgages assigned to
(continued on next page)
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TABLE A-17 (continued)
FHA. Volume data for assigned mortgages represent annual net changes in the amounts of
debentures and cash adjustments covered by mortgage notes on hand at year end.
bCoversinsurance of property improvement loans (Section 2, Class 1 and 2 of the National
Housing Act), mortgage loans on new and existing one- to four-family dwellings (Class 8 of
Section 2, and Sections 8, 203, and 603), loans on site-fabricated houses (Section 611), mort-
gage loans on. cooperative housing projects (Section 213), mortgage loans on rental housing
projects (Sections 207, 207-10, and 608), short-term loans to finance the production of pre-
fabricated houses (Section 609), mortgage loans on publicly constructed housing (Sections
603-10 and 608-10), loans to finance construction of housing for military and civilian em-
ployees of U.S. military posts (Section 803), and loans to finance housing in critical defense
areas (Sections 903 for one- and two-family dwellings and 908 for rental projects of twelve
or more units). Data are based on original face amount of loans insured.
c Represents loans, as authorized under Section 3 of the National Housing Act, to financial




Export—Import Bank Lending Activity, 1934—1953
(in thôu8ands)
VOLUME YEAR OU.TSTANDINGS Ar YEAR END
Direct BusinessLoans Direct Bu8iflessLoans
Regular - Regular
Lendjnga Otherb Lenclinga Otherb
1934 $8,800 .. .. ..
1935 10,300 .. $4,300 ..
1936 21,100 .. 17,600 ..
1937 7,600 .. 17,400 ..
1938 18,600 .. • 26,200 ..
1989 53,700 .. 65,200 ..
1940 95,300 .. 131,000 ..
1941 116,800 .. 186,100 ..
1942 50,500 .- 181,500 ..
1943 51,000 .. 200,200 ..
1944 47,500 .. 217,700 ..
1945 79,600 .. 245,800 ..
1946 -1,036,500 .. 1,241,700 ..
1947 824,500 .. 1,970,700 ..
1948 428,900 .. 2,138,500 ..
1949 184,800 .. 2,179,600 ..
1950 199,900 .. 2,219,500 ..
1951 204,100 . 2,289,000 ..
1952 478,200 $ 217 2,496,100 $ 188
1953 647,000 7,674 2,833,300 7,868
Data for 1984—1945 were supplied by the Export-Import Bank of Washington;
for 1946—1953, were compiled from the Semi-Annual 'Reports of the Export-Import
Bank. Amounts for regular lending (i.e. under the Export-Import Babk Act of
1945 as amended) are rounded to one-tenth of a million.
a Covers direct loans to finance exports and imports and to assist in recon-
struction, development, and stabilization of foreign economies, and loans in con--
nection with lend lease terminations. Also included, because the annual data do not
permit separate treatment, are loans for similar purposes made by commercial
banks and other private lenders under Export-Import Bank guaranty(the
so-called agency agreements under which the lender, usually a commercial bank,
is protected against nonpayment by an Export-Import Bank guarantee to reim-
burse the bank upon demand). Of the total advanced under Export-Import. Bank
risk through December 31, 1953 ($311.6 million) $300.5 mfflion or 97 percent was
disbursed before the end of 1946. Outstandings on such loans have representeda
declining share of total year-end outstandings since the end of 1946 (from 15
percent in 1946 to 1 percent in 1953).
bRepresentsloans (including participations in loans) to private business enter..-
prises for the expansion, development, and production of essential materials where
such operations are conducted in foreign countries, as authorized under Section
802 of the Defense Production Act of 1950.
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TABLE A-i9
Treasury Department Lending Activity, 1933—1953
(in thousands)





TEAR Purposesa Inst it utionsb Purposesa Institntionsb
1983 .. $ 18 .. $ 18
1934 .. 10,707 .. 10,725
1935 ... 38,575 .. 49,273
1936 .. .. .. 48,991
1937 .. .. .. 48,051
1938 .. .. .. 47,053
1939 .. .. .. 89,679
1940 .. .. .. 26,748
1941 .. .. .. 21,284
1942 $ 800 .. $ 800 17,548.
1943 • 900 .. 701 6,884
1944 200 .. .. 8,489
1945 .. .. .. . 1,982
•1946 .. .. .. 1,150
1947 .. .. .. 555
1948 .. .. .. 247
1949 .. .. .. ..
1950 .. .. .. ..
1951 .. .. .. ..
1952 .. .. .. ..
1953 • 1,900 .. 1,900 ..
Volume of direct loans in 1942—1944 was estimated from fiscal year data in the
report of, the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expendi-
tures, Federal Lending 1984—1948 (S. Doe. 103, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 1947, Table
1); volume in 1953 and outstandings throughout were supplied by the Treasury
Department.
Data on stock purchases were supplied by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.
aRepresentsloans to the District of Columbia for civilian defense and other
purposes during 1942—1944 and for construction of public works in 1953 (pur-
suant to Public Law 533 of June 2, 1950).
bRefersto purchases of shares of federal savings and loan associations. Re-
sponsibility for administering these investments was vested in the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board by Section 5(j) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.
398APPENDIX A
TABLE A-20





Direct Loam Guar- Direct Loan.,
to Minor Loans, antees,
Governmental Minor Minor
YEAR Unitaa Gov.b
1937 $1,500 $ 10,024 C
1938 29,000 81,604 C
1939 138,500 122,755 $51,127
1940 450,500 185,519 247,863
1941 . 507,900 367,410 203,042
1942 261,000 365,808 258,743
1943 95,500 318,364 • 225,335
1944 3,500 804,711 226,024
1945 1,500 285,706 229,218
1946 . 1,400 278,300 233,719
1947 24,600 277,632 • 225,501
1948 37,000 285,406 218,657
1949 25,000 285,489 220,627
1950 123,800 352,319 414,003
1951 422,800 594,665 . 805,925
1952 773,400 900,316 1,067,248
1953 727,300 511,433 1,982,953
Volume data (rounded to one-tenth millions) were estimated by linear inter-
polation of fiscal year data for 1937—1945 from the report of the Joint Committee
on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Federal Lending 1984—1948
(S. Doc. 103, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, Table 1) and for 1946—1953 from material
supplied by the Housing and Home Finance Agency.
Outstandings are from the Daily Statements of, and material supplied by, the
Treasury Department.
a Represents loans to local housing añthorities for the and opera-
tion of low-rent housing and slum clearance projects, as authorized by the Housing
Act of 1937 (Public Law 412), by Public Law 671 (enacted as a war emergency
measure), and by the Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 171), and advances in
fiscal 1939 on loans to limited dividend housing corporations which were made
originally by the Public Works Administration during 1933-1937. Outstandings
from 1937 on also include outstanding balances on PWA loans to limited dividend
housing corporations transferred to PHA as of November 1, 1937. At time of
transfer, balance of such loans totaled $10,142,182.
b Refers to outstanding commitments of PHA in connection with temporary
financing obtained by local housing authorities through private sources for which
PHA holds escrow notes, and with long-term obligations issued by local authori-
ties to private investors and secured by annual contributions contracts of the





Lending Activity of the Small Business Administration, 1953,






Loans for Direct .





YEAh Volumestanding8 Agric. Bu8. Agric. Bus.
• 1949 •• c $4
1950 .. .. c c 4 $3 •
1951 .. .. C C 4 87
1952 •. C c 15
1953 $4 $4 c C 1 83
a Data were supplied by the Small Business Administration. Represents loans
to victims of floods or other catastrophes. The Small Business Administration was
established under the Small Business Act of 1953 for the primary purpose of
making loans to small business concerns. As of December 31, 1953 no disburse-
ments on business loans had been made.
bDatawere supplied by the Treasury Department and refer to loans to aid
agriculture and business enterprises in the Virgin Islands.
c Data not available.
400APPENDIX A
TABLE A-22
(continued on next page)
401
Lending Activity of the Agricultural Marketing Act Revolving Fund,





EMERGENCY CROP AND PEED
LOAN DmsIoNb
Direct FarmLoans Direct Farm Loans
Volume Out8tandings Volume Outs landings
YEAR during Year at Year End during Year at Year End
1918 .. .. $ 2,101 c
1919 .. .. 2,100 $4,201
1920 .. .. .. 8,938
1921 . . .. 1,957 8,411
1922 .. .. 1,480 2,885
1923 .. .. .. 2,359
1924 .. 414
: 2,513
1925 .. .. .. 2,207
1926 .. .. 244 2,101
1927 .. .. .. 2,292
1928 .. .. .. . 2,246
1929 $ 14,823 $ 14,510 5,759 7,976
1930 348,552 233,756 5,340 8,946
1931 516,821 436,254 55,787 • 49,769
1932 229,026 466,501 64,205 90,353
1933 46,711 334,092 57,376 90,863
1934
1935
9,555 146,911 70,471 111,238
7,402 115,859 96,382 172,863
1936 20,450 121,762 16,135 165,369
1937 5,936 98,971 31,815 172,701
1938 7,911 91,183 19,648 171,489
1939 1,214 87,207 15,080 168,330
1940 3,094 16,461 19,517 . 168,438
1941 3,990 16,914 18,346 164,974
•1942 5,017 12,551 19,698 156,675
1943 1,417 7,351 18,699 147,650
1944 809
• 3,067 18,444 139,541
1945 660 2,693 16,465 130,505
1946 975 2,232 16,972 118,120
1947 1,400 2,603 106,259
1948 1,000 1,315 90,240
1949 700 1,365 71,341
1950 700 1,309 53,347
1951 700 1,451 •• •: 38,235




aCompiledfrom the Loans and Discounts Reports and the Annual Reports of
the Farm Credit Administration. Covers loans to farmers' cooperatives for mar-
keting and operating purposes, for construction or purchase of physical facilities,
and for refinancing debt incurred in acquiring such facilities, and loans to
stabilization corporations to support farm commodity prices.
bCoversoperating loans to farmers to relieve distress conditions caused by
drought and flood in United States and possessions. Loans were made from 1918
to 1933 under the Department of Agriculture and thereafter (May 27, 1933 to
October 1946) under the Farm Credit AdministratiOn. Also included are drought
relief loans made in 1934—1935 and orchard rehabilitation loans made since 1942.
The program is now being liquidated by the Farmers Home Administration.
Data were supplied by the Farm Credit Administration and the Farmers Home
Administration. Volume for 1918 and 1919 was estimated by dividing equally the
total of loans made in the two years; data for 1946 represent advances through
October 31, 1946. Outstandings for 1919 represent total amount advanced in 1918
and 1919 without adjustment for repayments; 1920—1922 data represent estimates
of the outstanding balances as of June 30 of each year; 1923—1930 data are for the
year ending June 80.
cDatanot available.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a The series refer to discounts of dealers' paper originating in the sale or in-
stallation of electrical and gas appliances and equipment. Outstanding accounts
were transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1942 for liquida-
tion and are included in the RFC business loan series in Table A-9. Volume for
1934—1941 refers to amount of contracts accepted, estimated by linear interpola-
tion of fiscal year data in the Annual Reports of the Electric Home and Farm
Authority; 1942 volume refers to estimated amount disbursed, from the U.S.
Treasury Bulletin, August 1942. Although the Electric Home and Farm Authority
operated for a few weeks in 1933, contracts accepted in that year are included
in the data for 1934. Data on year-end outstandings are from the Daily State-
ments of, and material supplied by, the Treasury Department.
bDatarefer to loans made in 1931 to farmers and stockmen for purchase of
stock in agricultural credit corporations and livestock loan companies, and were
compiled from Annual Reports of, and material supplied by, the Farm Credit
Administration, and from material supplied by the Farmers Home Administra-
tion. On the assumption that no repayments were made during 1931, outstandings
as of the end of that year are based on loan volume during the year; data for 1932
and 1934 are estimated by linear interpolation between the outstandings at the
preceding and following year ends (but the 1933 figure is for November 30); for
1946 and 1947, by linear interpolation of change in outstandings 1945—1948. The
program is now being liquidated by the Farmers Home Administration.
Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Farm Credit Administration, the
Agricultural Finance Review' (Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricul-
tural Economics, Vol. 12, November 1949, Table 13), and material supplied by the
Farmers Home Administration. Represents short-term production loans to farm-
ers and stockmen made by the twelve regional agricultural credit corporations,
including loans for regular operating and marketing purposes; loans to fruit
growers in Washington; World War II food production loans (including those
made under Section 2 of the Department of Agriculture Appropriation Act of
1944); and fur loans. The program is now being liquidated by the Farmers Home
Administration.
dCalendaryear data on volume were estimated by linear interpolation of semi-
annual information taken from the report of the Joint Committee on Reduction
of Federal Expenditures, Federal Lending, 1934—1948 (S. Doe. 103,
80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, Table 1). Data on year-end outstandings are from the
Daily Statements of, and material supplied by, the Treasury Department. The
series cover loans to cooperatives in the Tennessee Valley to assist in their de-
velopment and thereby improve the economic welfare of the area's inhabitants.
Liquidation of the program was begun in September 1947; the corporation was
dissolved in December 1948, assets being transferred to the Treasury.
e Refers to purchases of stock of agricultural cooperatives and canning associa-
tions. Volume data are from the Report on the Audit of the Tennessee Valley
Associated Cooperatives, Inc. (H. Doc. 234, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949); year-end
outstandings are from the Daily Statements of the Treasury Department.
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TABLE A-24
Lending Activity of the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 1933—1953,
and the Rural Electrification Administration, 1935—1953
(in thousands)
FEDERAL FARiI( MORTGAGE CORpORATIONaRURALELECTRIFICATIONAO1flINISTItATIONb
Direct Real Estate Loans .Direct Non-Real-Estate Loans
Volume Out standings Volume Out 8tandings
YEAR during Yearat Year End during Year at Year End
1933 $ 70,812 $ 70,738 .. ..
1934 553,136 616,825 .. ..
1935 196,395 794,752 $ 10 $ 10
1936 77,258 837,274 3,328 3,338
1937 40,020 815,001 30,999 34,315
.1938 29,395 757,710 54,007 88,141
1939 27,417 700,360 95,754 . 183,293
1940 ' 36,664 662,200. 69,235 249,249
1941 37,533 615,674 78,697 322,531
1942 28,534 582,925 32,291 345,644
1943 80,497 425,710 14,171 347,172
1944 35,017 346,764 27,874 . 360,930
1945 29,462 241,237 56,971 407,688
1946 15,035 149,005
. 132,188 527,822
1947 10,606 109,339 225,413 734,135
1948 17 79,886 284,724 , 999,132
1949 19 60,344 327,331 1,301,323
1950 25 45,424 273,252 1,543,407
1951 58 33,959 241,225 1,742,519
1952 41 24,865 228,220 1,920,773
1953 40 18,397 228,021 2,095,995
•a Data were compiled from the Loans and Discounts Reports Of, and material
supplied by, the Farm Credit Administration, and cover first and second farm
mortgage loans made by the Land Bank Commissioner in the United States and
possessions. Outstandings also include purchase money mortgages and real estate
sales contracts, which are excluded from the volume series because annual data
are lacking.
b Data, supplied by the Rural Electrification Administration,
.representself-
liquidating loans made in the United States and possessions to lOcal enterprises
(cooperatives, public power districts, local government authorities, and private
power companies) for construction of electric facilities and for purchase and
installation of electric appliances and plumbing; also loans for the construction
and operation of new, and the expansion and improvement of existing, telephone
facilities in rural areas. Volume data represent net advances after the return
of unused loan funds; outstandings are cumulative net advances less principal
repayments.
405TABLE A-25
Lending Activity of the Central and Regional Banks for Cooperatives, 1933—1953,
and the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, 1923—1953
CENTRAL & REGIONAL BANKS
FOR coopEnATlvEsa







Farmers' Other Volume Outstand-
during ings at Cooper a- Agric. Coo pera- Agric.
yEAR Year Year End tivese Loansd tivcsc Loansd
1923 $35,519 $ 9,367 $33,627 $9,105
1924 83,223 34,004 43,507 18,760
1925 100,243 53,488 53,780 26,272
1926 103,941 73,521 52,704 39,730
1927 51,039 87,121 31,991 43,924
1928 53,571 83,568 36,174 45,103
1929 43,588 94,667 26,073 50,018
1930 109,927 109,047 64,377 65,633
1931 145,127 122,867 45,177 74,691
1932 .. .. 89,245 151,578 9,866 82,518
1933 $27,144 $18,697 27,910 141,045 15,211 61,016
1934 40,371 27,851 57,369 235,110 33,969 116,697
1935 66,348 50,013 44,509 327,580 2,731 143,822
1936 81,294 69,647 3,755 347,634 1,641 148,576
1937 97,584 87,633 5,129 407,281 1,813 176,504
1938 94,945 87,496 2,668 422,219 920 176,653
1939 83,361 76,252 4,156 438,247 1,835 180,679
1940 101,231 74,741 4,593 475,868 1,490 205,219
1941 18L569 113,444 5,651 571,360 2,152 232,965
1942 252,380 144,644 9,397 646,082 2,000 235,665
1943 398,581 235,174 5,000 699,215 2,000 240,731
1944 363,637 212,835 3,402 730,809 700 233,316
1945 333,702 157,545 4,032 737,989 2,042 229,232
1946 399,769 181,550 11,579 891,961 4,151 269,167
1947 530,248 274,777 14,128 1,104,440 4,000 332,462
1948 494,678 304,684 13,639 1,363,405 4,709 420,801
1949 382,617 301,887 9,900 1,376,285 2,400 435,017
1950 402,176 344,978 9,044 1,509,510 3,233 506,984
1951 568,961 423,952 15,176 1,943,431 4,000 629,008
1952 528,118 418,504 8,000 1,901,678 2,000 671,261
1953 497,016 372,110 4,000 1,718,157 500 589,695
a Compiled from the Loans and Discounts Reports of the Farm Credit Administration;
refers to loans made by the Central Bank for Cooperatives and the twelve district banks to
farmers' groups for general farm operating purposes, the marketing of agricultural com-
modities, and construction or acquisition of marketing facilities.
b Data were supplied by the Farm Credit Administration, and are exclusive of loans to,
and discounts for, regional agricultural credit corporations (1933 through 1935) and the
central and regional banks for. cooperatives.
Represents loans to farmers' groups for production and general farm operating purposes.
d Represents loans to, and discounts of agricultural and livestock paper for, production
credit associations, agricultural and livestock credit corporations organized under state laws,
and commercial banks. Renewals are included.
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TABLE A-26
Lending Activity of the Federal Land Banks, 1917—1953,
and the Production Credit Corporations, 1933—1953
(in thousands)
LAND BANKSa PRODUCTION CREDiT CORPORAT1ONSb
Stock Purchases for Farm Direct Farm
Real Estate Loan8 Production Credit
Volume Outstandings Volume Outstanding8
YEAS during Year at Year End during Year at Year End
















1933 151,634 1,268,441 $ 2,480 $ 2,430
1934 730,367 1,959,106 89,405 90,086
1935 248,671 2,126,117 17,017
1936 109,170 2,133,192 3,895 15,038
1937 63,092 2,119,018 4,824 76,146
1938 51,418 2,072,262 75,788
1939 51,582 2,002,061 75,370
1940 64,275 1,955,616 1,301 61,445
1941 65,068 1,879,901 21,464 81,498
1942 53,974 1,717,697 1,920 81,621
1943 61,900 1,456,334 621 76,090
1944 70,275 1,214,801 538 63,587
(continued on next page)
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TABLE A-26 (continued)
REDERAL LAND BANXSa PRODUCTION CREDIT
Direct Farm Stock Purchases for Farm •
S
Real Estate Loans Production Credit
Volume Out standings Volume Outstandings
during Year at Year End during Year at Year End
1945 $ 92,986 $1,086,488 $596 $55,491
1946 130,162 985,477 292 46,034
1947 138,764 898,417 225 84,918
1948 150,514 878,586 30 29,139
1949 182,357 916,862 115 22,296
1950 205,933 959,789 965 15,728
1951 214,220 1,007,695 1,015 11,371
1952 254,581 1,086,289 100 7,596
1953 289,772 1,185,781 640 4,946
a Volume data were compiled from the Annual Reports 5and the Loans and Discounts Re—
ports of the Farm Credit Administration. Outstandings for 1917 are based on loans made
through that year less the amount estimated to have been repaid during December; other out-
standings data were compiled from the above-mentioned reports and from material supplied
by the FCA. Both series cover regular mortgage loans made in the United States and Puerto
Rico. Outstandings also include purchase money mortgages and real estate sales contracts,
which are excluded from the volume series because annual data are lacking. For Land Bank
Commissioner loans, see Table
bData,supplied by the Farm Credit Administration, represent purchases by the produc-
tion credit corporations of Class A stock of the production credit associations.


































Lending Activity of the Director General of the Railroads and the
Interstate Commerce Commission, 1919—1953, the Federal Home Loan Banks,






. Direct Loans to
Financial In8titutions Direct Business Loans . Direct Business Loans
VolumeOuts tanclingsVolumeOuts tandings YEAR VolumeOutstandings
1930 47,367
1931 89,434 .. ..
1932 38,704 $838 $838
1933 38,097 90,032 85,442 .. ..
1934 84,452 38,676 86,603 $14,884 •$13,589
1935 30,915 39,130 102,686 28,479 32,493
1936 • 30,238 93,257 145,227 8,519 23,526
1937 30,230 123,251 200,038 4,932 20,216
1938 30,230 81,958 198,842 6,500 17,343
1939 30,186 94,781 181,313 3,805 13,683
1940 30,080 134,212 201,492 2,860 9,152











1944 21,598 239,254 130,563 20,381 3,894
1945 21,598 277,748 194,872 14,043 1,995
1946 21,598 329,232 293,455 3,445 534
1947 11,964 351,079 435,572 .9,296 1,387
1948 11,929 359,613 515,016 15,994 995
1949 11,805 255,662 433,429 4,005 2,178
1950 11,805 674,757 815,957 6,530 2,632
1951 11,805 •422,976 805,937 27,656 4,687
1952 6,019 585,813 864,189 81,193 3,921
1958 5,759 727,532 951,555 22,009 1,900APPENDIX A
TABLE A-27 (continued)
a The series represent operating loans to railroads made by the Director General as author-
ized under Section 7 of the Federal Control Act of 1918, equipment trust notes taken by him
in connection with the transfer of railroad equipment to private hands at the cessation of
federal control, operating loans to railroads by the Treasury Department upon certification
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, as authorized under Section 210 of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920, and loans to the carriers by the Director General, as authorized under Section
207 of the Transportation Act of 1920. Outstandings also include securities accepted in the
reorganization of railroads pursuant to Executive Order 8533 of September 6, 1940. Loans
made by the Director General under Section 12 of the Federal Control Act are excluded for
lack of annual data. The total advanced under .Section 12 was $62,103,453.
Volume figures were estimated from data in the Annual Reports of the Director General of
Railroads and of the S.ecretary of the Treasury. In 1919 they represent purchases of equipment
trust notes, estimated as one-fifth of the outstanding balance of June 30, 1920. In 1920 they
include estimates constructed as follows: Section 7 loans were assumed to equal their amount
outstanding as of June 30, 1920; Section 210 loans at year end were estimated as to
outstandings at December 31 (estimated by linear interpolation between fiscal year dates);
equipment trust notes were estimated by subtracting 1919 data from data on total advances.
In 1921—1924 they were estimated from fiscal year data for Section 210 loans by assuming
a constant monthly volume and then combining monthly data on a calendar year basis.
Year-end outstandings were compiled from the Annual Reports of and materials supplied
by, the Treasury Department. For years before 1935, they were estimated by linear interpola-
tion of outstandings for June 30 of the preceding and following years; in 1920 they exclude
outstandings on Section 207 loans; and in 1944—1952 they include outstandings on securities
received in the reorganization of certain carriers (in 1947—1951, $5,785,872 face value of bonds
and script of Seaboard Air Line Railroad accepted and held by the RFC is included, but
common and preferred stock also received in reorganization are excluded from the estimates,
there being no valuation of these items).
b Data are from Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Finance Agency, January 1954,
p. 43, and cover advances to savings and loan, building and loan, and homestead associations,
to savings and cooperative banks, and to insurance companies which are members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank system; outstandings are as at year ends.
cDatawere supplied by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and repre-
sent loans, and participations in loans, to industrial and commercial businesses under Section
13b of the Federal Reserve Act as amended; outstandings are year-end figures.
d Data not available.
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TABLE A-28
Lending Activity of the Federal National Mortgage Association, 1938—1953,
and the RFC Mortgage Company, 1935—1953
(in thousands)
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOcIATIONa RFC MORTGAGECOMPANYb
Direct Housing Loans Direct Housing Loans
Volume Ou tstandings Volume Ou tstandings
YEAR during Year at Year End during Year at Year End
1935 .. .. $5,744 $5,705
1936 . .. 33,880 36,126
1937 .. .. 45,395 67,534
1938 $82,166 $80,266 35,316 54,227
1939 74,081 146,760 27,824 57,377
1940 48,042 181,101 26,148 67,800
1941 42,321 206,840 29,034 73,036
1942 23,178 210,928 45,646 97,578
1943 1,502 64,487 41,625 104,634
1944 200 52,423 45,048 102,211
1945 57 7,442 17,436 39,240
1946 33 5,591 2,715 13,610
1947 60 4,420 123,744 122,715
1948 197,945 199,295 16,060 131,296
1949 672,213 828,354 . .. 122,653
1950 1,044,295 1,346,664 91,909
1951 677,309 1,849,534 •. 78,477
1952 537,872 2,241,667 .. 71,920
1953 542,457 2,461,637 .. 65,529
a Data were supplied by the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, or are from the Semi-Annual Reports of FNMA. They cover purchases
of housing project and home mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion under Titles I, II, VI, VIII, and IX of the National Housing Act of 1934 or guaranteed
by the Veterans' Administration under Title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of
1944; also direct mortgage loans, made by FNMA under FHA insurance, on Alaskan properties
as authorized by the Alaska Housing Act of 1949; and direct, FHA-insured loans on rental
properties.
b Data were supplied by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Volume in 1947 and 1948
was partially estimated by assuming a constant monthly volume from October 1947 through
March 1948; outstandings for 1947 were derived from estimated disbursements and repayments
during the year. Both series cover the following: purchases of large-scale housing and home
mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration under Titles I, II, and VI of
the National Housing Act, and of VA-guaranteed home mortgage loans; loans on, and
purchases of, mortgages secured by new and existing income-producing properties; loans to
holders of mortgage bonds.. and certificates of deposit on such in adverse circum-
stances; a loan for purchase of property and for building construction; and refunding loans
to owners of business properties adversely affected by war conditions. The operations of the
RFC Mortgage Company were discontinued in June 1947, but disbursements under previously
approved commitments continued through 1948.
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TABLE A-29
Lending Activity of the Bureau of Community Facilities, 1942—1953,
the Inland Waterways Corporation, 1921—1953,


























1924 .. .. 1,198









1928 .. 12 823
1929 .. 5 828
1930 .. S • 793
1931 .. .. 731
1932 .. .. 643
1933 .. .. 618
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TABLE A-29 (continued)
a Year-end data, from the Daily Statements of, and material supplied by, the Treasury
Department; represents loans for the construction of community facilities in defense produc-
tion areas as authorized under Title II of the Lanham Act. Annual loan volume is not available;
the total advanced under Title II was approximately $8,115,000. Data f or the First and Second
Advance Planning Programs (P.L. 458 and 352) are included in Table A-14.
bDatarepresent loans to states, municipalities, and transportation companies for the con-
struction of terminal facilities as authorized under Section 201 (c) of the Transportation Act
of 1920. The volume series excludes approximately $385,000 in loans to private companies for
which annual data are lacking. Year-end outstandings in 1953 exclude a $9 million mortgage
received from the sale of the corporation's property and operating equipment.
Information on volume was compiled from Pnblic Aids to Transportation (Federal Coordi-
nator of Transportation, Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 229 and 262f.) and on year-end outstandings, from
the Annnal Reports of the Inland and Coastwise Waterways Service an4 of the Inland Water-
ways Corporation, and from the Daily Statements of, and material supplied by, the Treasury
Department. Outstandings for 1922 were estimated by linear interpolation between June 80
data for 1922 and 1923; 1923 data were estimated by computing monthly average change in
outstandings between June 30, 1923 and December 31, 1924 and subtracting the average change
for the six months after June 30, 1923. Outstandings for 1945 and 1947—1952 are for No-
vember 80.
Data, supplied by the Tennessee Valley Authority, refer to loans under Section 12a of
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act to municipalities and cooperative wholesale power dis-
tribution companies for acquisition and operation of power plants and distribution facilities.
The figures for 1948—1950 exclude the amounts of the outstanding loan balance in connection
with the sale of Norris Village on June 15, 1948. Outstandings are as at calendar year ends.
Volume figures were estimated by linear interpolation of fiscal year data.
d Data not available.
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TABLE A-30
Lending Activity of the Defense Homes Corporation, 1941—1946,
the Smaller War Plants Corporation, 1942—1946,
and the War and Navy Departments and U.S. Maritime Commission, 1942—1953
thousands)








Guarantees Direct Housing Loans Direct Business Loans





































1950 .. .. .. .. .. 664
1951 .. .. .. .. .. 636
1952 .. .. .. .. .. 613
1953 .. .. .. .. .. 613
a Data represent mortgage loans for construction of housing in defense production areas.
The program was transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for liquidation in
March 1947; outstandings on unpaid loans are included in the RFC business loan series in
Table A-9.
Volume estimates were made by linear interpolation of fiscal year data in the report of the
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Federal Lending 1984—
.1948 (S. Doe. 103, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947,Table1); outstandings as at calendar year ends
were supplied by the Treasury Department.
b Data refer to loans, and participations in loans, to small business concerns engaged in
the production of war and essential civilian goods. The accounts were transferred to the
ReconstructionFinance Corporation for liquidation in January 1946; outstandings on unpaid
loans are included in the RFC business loan series in Table A-9.
The volume data were supplied bytheReconstruction Finance Corporation; those for 1942—
1944were estimated by reducingapproved authorizations by the proportion ofthecumulative
net amount authorized to the cumulated amount of applications approved by December 81,
1944. Year-end outstandings are from the Daily Statements of the Treasury Department.
c The estimatesconcern amounts of guarantees on loans to war contractors made by private
financinginstitutions and guaranteed by the War Department, the Navy Department, or the
U.S. Maritime Commission under Regulation V.
Volume was estimated from data in A Statistical Study of Regulation V Loans, by Susan
S. Burr and Elizabeth B. Sette (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1950,
Tables 2 and 17, pp. 14 and 47)by reducing theprincipal amount of authorizations by the
weighted average ratio of amount guaranteed to principal amount authorized. Year-end out-
standings arefrom the FederalReserve Bulletin, May 1949, p. 535,and from datasupplied










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a Covers loans to Indians to promote industry and self-support made under
yearly appropriations beginning in 1911, loans for educational purposes, as au-
thorized under the Act of June 18, 1934, loans to Indians and Indian organizations
such as tribes, credit associations, and cooperatives from a revolving fund estab-.
lished under the Acts of June 18, 1984 and June 28, 1936, and loans for emergency
relief and rehabilitation, made during 1935—1937. The volume series was estimated
by linear interpolation of fiscal year data from the report of the Joint Committee
on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Federal Lending, 1934—1948
(S. Doe. 103, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, Table 1) and from material supplied by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Annual data on loans to promote industry are
• available only since 1934 and for education loans since 1939. Advances for 1911—
1983 for the former totaled $5,441,000. Volume figures for emergency relief loans
are also excluded for lack of annual data. Year-end outstandings are from the
Daily Statements of, and material supplied by, the Treasury Department. For
loans to promote industry and for education loans they are available only since
1944.
b Represents loans to victims of floods and other catastrophes occurring after
January 1, 1936. The corporation was dissolved June 30, 1945; outstanding loan
balances were transferred to the RFC and are included in the RFC miscellaneous'
loan series in Table A-9. Volume data, supplied by the RFC, represent annual
withdrawals from funds held by the RFC for the Disaster Loan Corporation; as
such they overstate somewhat the annual volume of loan disbursements. Outstand-
ings as at year ends were supplied by the Treasury Department.
Represents loans made by the Office of Education to students enrolled in ac-
celerated courses during the war emergency period. In 1953 the Federal Security
Agency was dissolved and its activities transferred to the Department of Health,
•Education, and Welfare. Volume data were estimated by linear interpolation of
fiscal year data in the Annual Reports of the Federal Security Agency,, except
the 1942 figure, which was assumed to equal outstandings at December 31. Year-
end outstandings are from the Daily Statemen.ts of, and material supplied by, the
Treasury Department.
d Volume data were estimated by linear interpolation of fiscal year data from
Senate Document 103 cited above. Year-end outstandings were supplied by the
Treasury Department. The figures represent loans to radio stations in Uruguay
and advances to Mexican motion picture producers, made through the Banco de
Mexico as trustee, to finance the purchase of motion picture production equipment.
eYear-endoutstandings, from the Daily Statement8 of, and material supplied
by, the Treasury Department, refer to loans to farmers, farm tenants, laborers,
and stockmen, and to cooperative associations and farm partnerships, for rural
rehabilitation. Annual loan volume is not available. Liquidation of PRRA by
February 14, 1955 was approved on August 15, i953.
f Data not available.
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TABLE A-32
Lending and Loan Guaranteeing Activity of the Department of Defense,
1942—1953
(inthousands)
VOLUMEDURiNG YEAR OUTSTANDINGSAT YEAR END
Direct B*siness Loan Direct Busi- Bttsine88 Loan
YEAR ness Loansa Guaranteesb ness Loansa ,Guarantcesb
1942 $124 c $118 c
1943 10,603 c 9,769 c
1944 42,618 C 89,582 C
1945 5,390 c 14,526 c
1946 4,409 c 6,219
. C












1950 .. d 4,335 c
1951 8,050 $1,179,310d 11,988 $543,868
1952 7,342 2,223,924 12,599 703,338
1953 3,134 1,935,284 11,214 568,655
Compiled from material supplied by the Department of Defense and the Treas-
ury Department.
a Covers direct loans to war contractors made by the War Department in 1943—
1945, purchases of guaranteed portions of principal balances of loans guaranteed
by the Navy and War Departments under Regulation V of World War II, and
purchases of guaranteed portions of principal balances of loans guaranteed by
the Army and Navy under Section 801 of the Defense ProductiOn Act of 1950.
bRefersto amount of commitments under loan guarantees wHtten by the De-
partments of Army, Navy; and Airforce under Section 301 of the Defense Pro-
duction Act of1950. Guarantees on loans disbursed by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation are excluded, since covered in the RFC activity shown in Table A-9.
Volume figures were estimated by reducing the total annual loan disbursements
by yearly averages of percentage guaranteed on loans authorized.
c Data for guaranteeing activity of the Navy and War Departments under
Regulation V are reported on a combined basis in Table A-30.
d The relatively small amount of activity in 1950isincluded in the 1951figure.
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TABLE A-33
Loan Guaranteeing Activity of the Atomic Energy Commission,





Atomic Energy General Services of
YEAR Commissiona Adminisfrationb Commercea
VOLUME DUPJNG YEAR •
1951 c $157,129 $540
1952 c 111,517 883




OUTSTANDINGS AT YEAR END
$ 37,874 $540
1952 512 100,470 85
1953 370 99,191 124
Volume data were supplied by General Services Administration and the De-
partrnent of Commerce; outstandings, by the Treasury Department.
a Represents the amount of commitments on loans guaranteed under Section
301 of the Defense Production Act of 1950.
b Refers to amount of commitments on loans guaranteed under Section 301 of
the Defense Production Act of 1950; and the amounts covered by letters of credit
issued by GSA (and its predecessor, the Defense Materials Procurement Agency)
as authorized under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to finance
the overseas procurement of commodities. Excludes guarantees on Defense Pro-
duction Act loans disbursed by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, since
they are included under RFC activity in Table A-9. The volume data were
estimated by reducing total annual disbursements by yearly averages of per-
centage guaranteed on loans authorized..
C Data not available.
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PART of the research undertaken in preparing this volume was a detailed
analysis of the business loans of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
Only a few tabulations of RFC business loan data appear in the foregoing
chapters, and in order that the statistics concerning this excursion of the
federal government into the business credit market may be available in
detail, the analysis as a whole is included here.
Objects of the Study
Of all federal lending agencies, the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion had probably the most complex history. Its influence, from 1932 up to
its termination in 19ö3 was pervasive; posed difficult problems of public
policy; and drew more congressional attention than perhaps any other
federal enterprise.
The business loan program was only one category of RFC activity.
Begun in the early thirties as an anti-depression measure, it never reached
the dimensions of the RFC programs for defense plant financing and
construction, rubber and tin production, and stockpiling. Yet by its
nature and continuity, the business loan program probably was the most
controversial of RFC's operations.
LEADING ISSUES
Among the issues posed by RFC business lending were these: Should
the federal government continuously operate an agency for the financing
of private business? What functions could a federal source of business
credit perform? Were there "gaps" in private finance which only a gov-
ernment agency could fill? If such gaps were not always present, did they
emerge in time of war or deep economic depression? Was RFC needed in
times of high employment as a stand-by source of credit? What effect
did the program have upon the efficiency with which economic resources
were utilized? Upon the vigor of private enterprise? Upon private finan-
cial institutions and markets?
A description of the business loans made by RFC during the seventeen-
year period from mid-1934 through 1951 and comparisons of them, where
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practicable, with term loans to businesses by commercial banks will make
it possible:
(1) To assess the magnitude of credit in relation to
the total amount of business term credit.
(2) To compare the characteristics of businesses that borrowed
money from RFC with those of businesses that were customers
of private financial institutions.
(3) To compare the characteristics of RFC business loans with
those of loans made by private lending agencies.
(4) To show what changes occurred in the business loans of RFC
over its history.
(5) To contrast the record of repayment, default, and loss on RFC
loans with that for business loans made by private institutions.
(6) To ascertain the types of, RFC loans on which experience was
favorable and the types that did not turn out well.
A number of questions also arise in connection with RFC's cooperation
with commercial banks in lending money to business. Did "participation"
loans perform a unique economic function, or did they merely transfer to
a public agency risks which private banks would otherwise have borne?
In particular,
(1) What types of businesses borrowed under RFC-bank participa-
tion agreements, and how did they compare with firms which
borrowed directly from banks or from the RFC?
(2) How did the characteristics of participation loans compare with
those of nonparticipation credits?
(8) What kind of commercial banks participated with RFC in busi-
ness lending, and in what respects did banks participating fre-
quently differ from banks which participated on only one
occasion?
(4) What were the reasons for bank participation?
The importance of the policy questions involved was not diminished by
the 1953 action of Congress in replacing RFC with a Small Business
Administration. The basic issues remain, and a systematic analysis of
RFC business loan experience can help to solve them.
SOURCES OF DATA AND METHODS OF STUDY
RFC was required by law to make monthly reports to Congress stating
the name and address of each borrower and the amount of the loan au-
thorized. For national security reasons these reports were discontinued
in World War II. RFC also made quarterly and annual reports to Con-
gress summarizing the number and amounts of loans authorized, canceled,
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disbursed, repaid, and outstanding. Another source of information about
the Corporation's business loans are the reports of investigating commit-
tees of Congress. Supplementing published reports of RFC, these records
give data on number of loans (by size and industry), loans in default, and
losses. Detailed information about methods of appraising credit and
servicing business loans was also assembled. Finally, the reports of the
Comptroller General contain, analyses of the costs of RFC business lend-
ing.
Despite all of this, comprehensive data on all RFC loans to business,
giving details on the characteristics of loans and of the borrowing firms,
have been lacking. To fill this gap, two special studies were undertaken
by the National Bureau of Economic Research during 1952 with the
cooperation of RFC. The first was a sample study of nonparticipation
loans authorized by RFC through June 30, 1951 and disbursed before
the end of 1951; the second, an analysis of participation loans authorized
up to July 1, 1947. The account of RFC business lending which follows
is based mainly on these data.
Even with comprehensive loan information, the account is not ex-
haustive. Being confined to a description of loans authorized or disbursed
by RFC, it does not adequately describe the influence exercised by the
Corporation in handling thousands of loan applications,in contacts
with banks in behalf of borrowers, and in its mere existence as a "court
of last resort" for business credit.
A brief review of the original purposes of Congress in granting to the
Corporation powers to make direct loans to business enterprises, of
subsequent alterations in those powers, and of the organization of opera-
tions precedes the analysis of loans, lending experience, and costs.
Evolution of RFC'S Statutory Power to Make Business Loans
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932 was an anti-
depression measure intended to aid agriculture, commerce, and industry
by strengthening the national credit structure.1 On the assumption that the
rehabilitation of banking institutions and the restoration of confidence in
them would promote recovery, the lending powers of RFC Were originally
confined to the relief of financial institutions,2 primarily commercial banks,
insurance companies, and mortgage institutions. Direct loans to com-
mercial and industrial firms were not contemplated.
1P.L.2, Cong., January 22, 1932.
2Theone exception was the railroad industry. For analysis of RFC activities
in aid of railroads and financial institutions, seeThe Finance
Corporation, 1932—41, by James B. Eckert (unpublished dissertation, Cornell
University, 1947). See also Fifty Billion Dollar8: My Thirteen Years with the
.RFC (1932—1945), by Jesse H. Jones with Edward Angly (Macmillan, 1951),
Chaps. I—XL
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By 1934 the financial crisis had been surmounted, but economic re-
covery was incomplete. Hearings held then by the House Committee on
Banking and Currency indicated that RFC had not succeeded in helping
small businesses, and a bill was introduced in the Senate designed to make
the credit facilities of the Federal Reserve Banks available for industrial
purposes. An amendment to the original bill extended the same power to
the RFC.3
THE ACTS OF 1934 THROUGH 1938
The business lending activities of RFC began with the approval, in
June 1934, of "An act relating to direct loans for industrial purposes by
the Federal Reserve Banks, and for other purposes."4 This authorized
RFC to make loans to any industrial or commercial enterprise established
before January 1, 1934. Such loans could be made by RFC alone or in
cooperation with banks or other lending institutions.
The dominant purpose of the act was to maintain and increase employ-
ment by making RFC loans available to solvent business enterprises
unable to obtain credit through normal channels. Loans were to be sub-
ject to such terms, conditions, and restrictions as the Board of Directors
of the RFC might determine. The statute placed specific limitations upon
the maturity, collateral security, and volume of loans to be made. The
maximum maturity of business loans was five years; all loans were to be
adequately secured; the aggregate outstanding amount was limited to $300
million and the aggregate amount for any one borrower to $500,000. The
power to make loans under the act was to terminate on or before January
31, 1935. The act specifically authorized loans to the fishing and mining
industries, subject to the same terms, conditions, and limitations.
Although severe limitations were imposed by the 1934 law, Congress
was disappointed that a large volume of loans did not develop. In a
letter to the President dated January 17, 1935, RFC chairman Jesse
Jones stated that few business loans had been made because most of the
businesses that needed help were unable to comply with the requirements
of the law. Consequently, Congress passed on January 31, 1935, "An
Act to extend the functions of the RFC for two years, and for other
purposes."5
The original law had required that loans be adequately secured, and
RFC interpreted this to mean that the current market value of collateral
must be at least equal to the principal amount of a loan. The 1935 act
provided merely that "loans shall be so secured as reasonably to assure
repayment.
S Loans to Industry, H. Rept. 1719 to accompany S. 3487, 73rd Cong., 2nd
sess., May 21, 1934.
4 P.L. 417, 73rd Cong., June 19, 1934.
5 P.L. 1, 74th Cong., January 31, 1935.
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Secondly, whereas the 1934 statute had provided that all disbursements
must be made within one year from the date of commitment, the 1935 act
permitted disbursements at any time up to January 31, 1936 on commit-
ments made before the new act. This change gave recognition to the fact
that in many instances, especially in the case of receivers' loans, it was
impossible to make disbursement within one year.
Thirdly, in order to avoid strain on the borrower resulting from a
requirement of rapid repayment, the 1935 act provided that advances,
renewals, or extensions of loans were to mature at such time as the RFC
might determine, but not later than January 31, 1945. Since the previous
maturity limit had been February 1, 1940, the effect was to extend the
maximum maturity of RFC loans from five years to ten.
Fourth, the 1935 act struck out the provision that the aggregate of loans
to any one borrower must be limited to $soo,ooo.
The1935 act also expanded the list of industries or operations specifl-
cally mentioned as eligible for RFC credit. Thus, it authorized loans to
"any institution, now or hereafter established, financing principally the
sale of electrical, plumbing, or air conditioning appliances or equipment
or other appliances, both urban and rural"; and loans in the field of
mining, milling, or smelting ores could be made for the development of
sources of gold, silver, or tin ore as well as to producing firms.
The concern of Congress—that the direct lending powers of RFC
were granted temporarily on an emergency basis to supply credit not
otherwise available—was clearly indicated by the act of January 26, 1937
"to continue the functions of the RFC, and for other purposes."° This
provided that the President might suspend any RFC lending activity when
it was shown that any class of authorized borrowers had credit sufficiently
available from private sources, upon fair terms and rates, to meet its
legitimate demands. By that means the act intended to facilitate a with-
drawal of the credit functions of the RFC during the two-year extension
of its lending authority that was provided; but events moved in an un-
expected direction.
Early in 1938 it became apparent that the nation was again in the
throes of economic recession andvariety of corrective measures were
prepared. One of these was an act, approved in April 1938, designed to
liberalize the requirements relating to RFC business loans.T The act au-
thorized RFC to purchase the securities and obligations of any business
enterprise, thus enabling the Corporation to provide credit and capital
when was not otherwise available on reasonable terms and con-
ditions from private sources. In accordance with this new provision, the
collateral security requirements of the law were expanded to provide that
BP.L.2, 75th Cong., January 26, 1937.
7P.L.479, 75th Cong., April 13, 1938.
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all purchases of securities and loans were to be of such sound value or
so secured as to reasonably assure retirement of repayment. The limitation
on maturities was removed and RFC authorized to set dates by
administrative decision.
DEFENSE LOAN POWERS IN 1940 AND THEREAFTER
The national defense and war programs brought further expansions of
RFC's business lending powers. The first law relating to the wartime
activities of RFC, approved in June 1940, authorized RFC to make loans
to, or to purchase the capital stock of, any corporation for the purpose
of developing and producing strategic and critical materials; for plant
construction, expansion, and equipment; and for working capital, "to be
used by the corporation in the manufacture of equipment and supplies
necessary to the national defense."8 Important nonlending functions were
added: RFC was authorized to organize subsidiary corporations to pro-
duce or to aid in the production of critical materials, to purchase and
lease land and other property for producing war materials, and to lease
such property to private corporations.9 All such activities were to be
subject to such terms and conditions as the RFC might determine.
Although RFC had possessed authority to make loans for mineral de-
velopment for some time, the acute shortage of certain critical minerals
indicated that more definite legislation was needed. Accordingly, an act
of September 1940 authorized the Corporation "to make loans for the
development of deposits of strategic and critical minerals which, in the
opinion of the Corporation, would be of value to the United States in
time of war."° As before, loans were not to exceed $10,000,000 in the
aggregate, and the total of loans to any one borrower was limited to
$20,000, except that an additional $20,000 might be advanced if the
borrower had expended funds jreviously obtained from RFC in such a
manner as to justify another loan.
A further liberalization of the wartime powers of RFC occurred under
an act approved in June 1941, which made a carte blanche extension of
the emergency powers of the Corporation by authorizing any action which,
in the opinion of the President and the Federal Loan Administrator, might
8P.L.664, 76th Cong., June 25, 1940.
9 This power was extended by P.L. 506, 77th Cong., March 27, 1942, which
authorized the RFC to acquire real estate by purchase, lease, condemnation, or
otherwise, in order to carry out the provisions of the law relating to the authority
of subsidiary corporations created pursuant to Section 5(d) of the RFC Act as
amended.
The Defense Plant Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company, the Rubber
Reserve Company, and the Defense Supplies Corporation created by an act
of June 25, 1940 were dissolved by a joint resolution approved June 30, 1945
(P.L. 109, 79th Cong.), and the power of the RFC to create such corporations
was removed in 1947 by joint resolution (P.L. 132, 80th Cong., June 30, 1947).
10P.L.784, 76th Cong., September 16, 1940.
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expedite the defense program. The aggregate amount of funds authorized to
be outstanding in carrying out the provision was limited to $200,000,000.11
Finally, the wartime role of RFC was enlarged by the passage on June
11, 1942 of "An act to mobilize the productive facilities of small business
in the interests of successful prosecution of the war, and for other pur-
poses." This authorized RFC to make loans to, to purchase the obligations
of, and to subscribe to the capital stock of any business enterprise for
any purpose deemed by the Corporation to be advantageous to the na-
tional defense, subject to such terms and conditions as the Corporation
might determine. The act also authorized the War and Navy Departments
to participate in or to guarantee any loan made by the ItFC pursuant to
the above provision.'2
THE 1947 CHARTER AND THE 1948 ACT
Up to the end of World War II the business lending of RFC
were successively widened by a series of amendments to the RFC Act.
The life of the Corporation itself—originally conceived to be a temporary
agency—was extended from time to time. In 1947 Congress approved a
joint resolution repealing most of the existing legislation affecting RFC,
and provided a new charter for the Corporation.13 The law was designed
to codify the functions of the RFC, to terminate most of its war powers,
and to maintain it with greatly diminished powers as a government finan-
cial agency whose activities could be expanded should circumstances
require.
As to the maturity and the collateral security of business loans the 1947
charter made no change; but in order to compel the liquidation of some
outstanding loans and security holdings, the aggregate of loans, pur-
chases, investments, and commitments authorized to be outstanding at
any one time under all programs was limited to $2 billion. The require-
ment that loans and other commitments could be made only if private
credit was not available on reasonable terms and conditions was retained;
in fact, it was strongly emphasized in a House committee report that no
loans or other commitment should be made unless the RFC had tangible
evidence that credit was not otherwise available on reasonable terms'4
The report also made clear that RFC should extend credit only on such
terms and conditions as would not have the practical effect of making the
Corporation a competitive source of business credit.
The congressionalinvestigation that was largelyresponsiblefor
these changes was still in process on June 30, 1947, the date previously
set for the expiration of the Corporation. The joint resolution of 1947
1' P.L. 108, 77th Cong., June 10, 1941.
12 P.L. 603, 77th Cong., June 11, 1942. 13 P.L. 132, 80th Cong., June 30, 1947.
'4Recon8truction Finance Corporation Act, House Report No. 626, Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 21, 1947.
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therefore extended the succession and powers of the RFC for only one
additional year. When the hearings were concluded and the final report
of the investigations committee was submitted in 1948, a plenary revision
of the statutes relating to the RFC was undertaken. In May 1948 a new
RFC act became law.'5
Senate debates reveal that the May 25, 1948 act was a turning point
in the congressional view of RFC's business lending purposes and
methods.'6 The committee on banking and currency concluded that four
basic considerations should thereafter govern RFC's. operations:(1)
RFC should not compete with private sources of credit, (2) loans should
be made only when the public interest was served thereby, (3) all lending
activities should be self-sustaining as far as possible, and (4) the activities
of the Corporation should be sharply curtailed in times of inflation. The
committee apparently was of the opinion that the normal decline of ap-
plications in good times would automatically tend to reduce RFC's
activity; it also advocated a limit on outstandings, and regular congres-
sional review of operations. Under the 1948 act the aggregate of invest-
ments, loans, purchases, and commitments outstanding under all programs
after June 30, 1947 was not to exceed $1.5 billion (later increased), and
the Corporation was required to report regularly to Congress each direct
loan of $100,000 or more to any one borrower, each loan in which the
Corporation had a participation, and each investment of $100,000 or more
in securities.
In accordance with the foregoing basic principles, the 1948 act con-
tinued the business lending powers and functions of the RFC subject to
certain limitations: First, no loan or other commitment was to be made
unless credit was not otherwise available on reasonable terms from private
sources. Secondly, all securities or other obligations purchased by the
Corporation, and all loans made by it, were to be of such sound value or
so secured as to reasonably assure retirement or repayment. Thirdly, a
ten-year maturity limitation was applied to loans, excepting that any
loan made before July 1, 1947 might be renewed or extended in the
interest of national defense or to aid in its orderly liquidation, and loans
made for the purpose of construction of industrial facilities could have
a maturity of ten years plus such additional period as might be required
to complete the construction. Fourthly, in the case of deferred participa-
tion agreements, participation by the RFC was limited to 70 percent of
the balance of the loan outstanding at the time of the disbursement in
those cases where the total amount borrowed was $100,000, or less, and to
60 percent where the amount exceeded $100,000.
15P.L.548, 80th Cong., May 25, 1948.
16SenateReport 974, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., March 1948. Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, Report on the Operations of the Reconstrnction Finance Corpo-
ration to accompany S. 2287.
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Special statutory authority to make loans to particular types of business
had been conferred on RFC by previous legislation, but experience had
clearly shown that supplying credit on special terms resulted in extensive
losses.17 The 1948 act granted no such special authority.'8
The capital stock of the RFC held by the U.S. Treasury was reduced
to $100,000,000. Since all funds in excess of authorized capital stock and
of accumulated surplus above $250,000,000 were to be paid by RFC
into the Treasury, the effect was to compel RFC to pay interest thereafter
on most of the funds used in conducting its operations.
In late 1950 RFC was directed to give priority under its regular lend-
ing programs to loans that would promote national defense; and in 1951
and 1952 it was given special lending powers to aid defense production.
Administration of the Business Loan Program
CENTRAL ORGANIZATION
The management of RFC was vested by law in its board of directors.
For many years the Corporation functioned without a president or general
manager. Jesse H. Jones served as chief executive while holding the
office of Chairman of the Board of Directors (and later the office of
Federal Loan Administrator) up to his resignation in 1945. The Corpo-
ration continued to operate with a five-member board of directors under a
succession of chairmen up to May 1951, when, under Reorganization Plan
1 of 1951, the board of directors was replaced by an Administrator and
a Loan Policy Board (responsible for basic lending policies) composed
of the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Commerce, the RFC Adminis-
trator, and the RFC Deputy Administrator. The reorganization plan also
established a Board of Review within the Corporation, composed of five
loan examiners, to which all loan applications were referred. The Ad-
ministrator could act contrary to the recommendation of the Board of
17 During the war RFC had expanded its program of assistance for mineral
development purposes: many loans were not repaid.
18 On August 10, 1948, one special provision was added by P.L. 901 (80th Cong.).
In order to aid in housing construction, the RFC was authorized to make loans
to and purchase the obligations of any business enterprise for the purpose of
providing financial assistance for the production of prefabricated houses or
prefabricated housing components, or for large-scale modernized site construc-
tion. Terms, maturities, and conditions were to be such as the Corporation might
determine. To the extent that the proceeds of such loans or purchases were used
for the purchase of plant and equipment or machinery, the principal obligation
was not to exceed 75 percent of the purchase price. The total authorized to be
made available under this act was limited to $50,000,000 outstanding at any one
time; and it was stipulated that no aid under the act was to be forthcoming
unless it was not otherwise available on reasonable terms. As of September 7,
1950, this power was transferred to the Housing and Home Finance Agency by
Reorganization Plan 23 of 1950.
427APPENDIX B
Review, but only if he placed in the record a statement of his reasons for
so doing.'9
As of June 30, 1945 the activities of the Corporation were organized
into the following divisions: Agency Division; Examining Division; Self-
Liquidating [Loan] Division; Railroad Division; Legal Division; Treas-
urer's Office; Auditing Division; Statistical and Economic Division; Sec-
retary's Office; Division of Personnel; Division of Information; Ware-
housing Division; Real Estate Division. During 1946 theofficeof
Controller was established within the Corporation. It will be observed
that the primary basis of RFC's internal organization was functional, the
only exceptions being the divisions responsible for self-liquidating and
railroad loans. One consequence of this is that the cost of administering
any single program is difficult to determine.
FIELD OFFICE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Not long after RFC began operations in 1932, field offices or "loan
agencies" were set up throughout the United States. During most of the
period covered by business loan operations, RFC had 31 such agencies.
So great was the volume of business, and so urgent were the loan applica-
tions, that the Board of Directors delegated to the managers of loan
agencies authority to make final decisions on loans within certain limits.
The extent of this delegation of authority varied from time to time,
depending on the Board's view of the relative importance of policy uni-
formity and speed; in general, the administration after the early years
and through World War II provided for a large measure of decentraliza-
tion of the, lending process.
As described in Senate hearings during 1947,20 the procedure was that
all business loan applications were filed initially with a loan agency.
Agency managers were authorized to make direct loans up to $100,000, and
participation loans up to $350,0O0 (provided a bank took at least a 25 per-
cent participation) without prior Board approval. Applications recom-
mended by the agency for decline were forwarded to Washington for a
final decision.
Direct, loan applications were assigned at once to an examiner. He
determined the loan's eligibility (whether it would promote employment,
was affected with a public interest, etc.), ascertained whether the borrower
could obtain a loan through normal banking channçls (by communicating
with 'the applicant's banker), and analyzed the nature of the applicant's
19AnniualReport and Financial Statements, Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, 1951, p. 4.
20Hearingsbefore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. Res. 132, "A Resolution for an inquiry
into the Operation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Its Sub-
sidiaries"; Part 1, December 1947, pp. 32f., 219.
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business, his managerial record and methods, his credit standing, and the
security offered for the loan. The examiner's report and recommendation,
if favorable, suggested terms and conditions.
The examiner's report was next reviewed by the agency review com-
mittee, composed of the senior credit examiners, of the agency, and then
submitted to the agency manager. along with the committee's recommenda-
tions. If aloanof less than $50,000 was recommended, the agency man-
ager could act finally, if affirmatively. If the proposed loan exceeded
$50,000, it was reviewed by the agency advisory committee, consisting of
experienced businessmen and bankers in the community. Agency managers
were free to accept or reject the advice of the advisory committee.
A loan application that involved a larger credit than the agency office
could approve, or one that was viewed negatively by the agency manager,
was forwarded to Washington, along with the local examiner's report and
the agency manager's recommendation. There it was assigned to another
examiner, who obtained supplemental information, if necessary, and made
his own report. This report, along with the entire loan file, was examined
by the Washington review committee, whose chairman submitted the
application finally to the RFC Board with the committee's recommenda-
tion.
Thus managers of loan agencies had final authority to act on the large
majority of separate applications for direct or participation loans; and
under the blanket participation program announced in March
theirpowers, though subject to Board approval of the agreement with
each bank, were considerable. This program provided, in effect, for an
automatic guaranty by RFC of up to 75 percent of a loan made by an
approved bank to a business enterprise which met the requirements of a
blanket participation agreement between the bank and RFC. Each such
agreement was subj ect to approval of the RFC Board; and with respect
to each loan made under such an agreement, loan agency managers had
power to approve Of the reasonableness of the salaries and compensation
paid to officers andY key executives of the borrowing firm—a statutory
requirement for all RFC direct or participation loans. As will be shown
later, a very large volume of bank lending developed under such blanket
participation agreements.
Appreciable divergence of lending practices among the agencies was
possible, despite review in Washington of all large and all rejected loan
applications. Partly because of congressional criticism, as of May 1951
RFC Administrator Symington withdrew from the loan agencies authority
'to approve of any loans, excepting disaster loans, and returned this au-
thority to the Washington office. The result was a more uniform loan policy
throughout the nation, but at the cost of slower processing of applications.
21RFCCircular No. 25, Information Regarding Blanket Participation in
Loans Made by Banks to Business Enterprises, March 1945.
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EFFICIENCY OF BUSINESS LOAN ADMINISTRATION
Any attempt to appraise the quality of administration of the business
loan program confronts the difficulty that the criteria ordinarily applicable
to the management of a business enterprise were inapplicable in the case
of RFC. RFC did not seek to maximize profit in any sense; nor, indeed, to
realize any profit at all. It necessarily took risks which led to abnormally
high ratios of losses to funds disbursed. Congress charged it with the
duty of making many loans which, by their nature, were bound to end in
loss. One is therefore forced to rely upon qualitative factors in
the administration of RFC's business programs. Were its personnel able
and experienced? Were its policies and procedures designed to give a
searching review of the salient features of loan applications?
RFC attracted an unsuaJiy large number of experienced and competent
financial men during the thirties, because alternative opportunities were
limited. The wide range of financial operations undertaken by RFC dur-
ing World War II also attracted men of ability.22 During the post-World
War II period, of "influence" and political favoritism in the
administration of certain business loans suggest that there was some
deterioration at that time in the quality of RFC personnel.
A reading of a large number of business loan files in the Corporation's
hands reveals, that investigations of loan applicants were characteristically
conducted with thoroughness, that judgments of collateral values—though
not infallible—reflected a careful weighing of the evidence, and that
normally every precaution was taken to assure the repayment of sums
advanced.
Characteristics of RFC Direct Business Loans
The course of RFC's business lending and loan guaranteeing activity
over the' full period of the Corporation's existence and including all types
of programs is shown in Chart B-i, quarterly through 1950 and annually
thereafter. Outstanding balances of d.irect loans cover those made under
regular and wartime powers, and include RFC's share in immediate par-
ticipation loans made with commercial banks. Commitments outstanding
distinguish between two classes of deferred participations: those author-
ized 'under both regular and wartime powers where each loan was
separately appraised by RFC, and those authorized under the blanket
participation program that began in 1945 and continued in slightly re-
stricted form after 1947 as the small loan participation program.
The long-term sweep of RFC business credit activity is seen in the
chart as a rising trend, with commitments under deferred participations
always a material fraction of the total except in the earliest years. Yet
22 Although perhaps not fully representative, the list of "Some RFC Alumni
Who Have Done Well" given by Jesse H. Jones is illustrative of the high caliber of




RFC Business Lending and Loan Guaranteeing:
Amounts Outstanding Quarterly 1934—1953
Covers loans and guarantee commitments (deferred participations) under both
regular and wartime powers. Through June 30, 1947 data are from "Quarterly
Reports" of the RFC; thereafter from records supplied by that agency, with ad-
justment of direct loans 1951—1953 to exclude outstanding railroad loans (from
"Daily Statements" of the Treasury Department).
outstandingsdid not rise above $200 million until 1942; during the war
period they rose sharply, to more than $500 million in 1944. After a brief
decline, the entry of the BPA program in the reconversion period brought
total outstandings to still higher levels by the end of 1946, and they
remained above $500 million through 1952. Apart from the blanket par-
ticipation programs the marked decline after 1944 continued until late
1946, but steep rises followed, especially in direct lending. Even at the
highest, however, RFC direct loan outstandings would appear but small
in comparison with commercial bank term lending: in 1946 the bank out-
standings totaled $4.6 billion.23
For a summary of RFC activity in terms of number of loans, somewhat
23DuncanMcC. Hoithausen, "Term Lending to Business by Commercial Banks
in 1946," Federal Reserve Bi.zlle tin, May 1947, Table 1, p.
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less comprehensive figures are available. From the beginning in June
1934 through mid-1951 approximately 47,000 business loans were au-
thorized out of about 88,000 applications, totals that cover direct loans
under both regular and wartime powers and also participation loans except
under the BPA program. Of the 47,000, not quite half (about 23,100)
were regular loans made solely by RFC. Of these, at least 5,900 were
canceled, so that funds were disbursed on perhaps 17,000. To them the
analysis now turns, reserving the participation programs to a later section.
The development of the business lending operations of RFC as sole
lender and under peacetime laws may logically be studied in the following
series of phases corresponding to strategic changes in the authority of
the Corporation:
(1) June 1934 to January 1935 marked the beginning of business
lending operations, under rather restrictive statutory powers.
(2) February 1935 to April 1938 began with the relaxation of RFC's
statutory authority to omit the requirement of 100 peréent col-
lateralization of loans, to extend maximum term from 5 to 10
years, and.to remove the limit of $500,000 to any one borrower.
(3) May 1938 to May 1940 was marked by a further liberalization
of RFC lending powers, notably by enabling the ,Corporation to
purchase securities and obligations of any business.
(4) June 1940 to February 1945, during which RFC was empowered
to make loans to or purchase securities of businesses engaged in
national defense operations, without restrictions as to collateral,
maturity, or use of proceeds; relatively little lending was done
under, the regular programs.
(5) March 1945 to January 1947, a period of postwar reconversiOn.
(6) February 1947 to May 1948, beginning with a new charter for
RFC repealing its war powers and requiring it to have tangible
evidence that a borrower could not obtain credit elsewhere.
(7) June 1948 to June 1951, beginning with enactment of a new
RFC act specifying that RFC should not éompete with private
sources of credit, that loans should serve the public interest, and
that activities should be curtailed in times of inflation.
Table B-i presents estimates of the number' and amount of direct busi-
ness loans disbursed by RFC during each phasethe Corporation's
program through 1951.24 Over the entire seventeen-year period, the Cor-
poration is estimated to have disbursed nearly $1.2 billion on the more than
24 The analysis of RFC direct business loans in this chapter and the next is
based on a sample survey, made by the National Bureau of Economic Research,
of all such loans authorized by the RFC under its regular lending authority from
the beginning of the program in June 1934 through June 1951. Besides loans to
firms generally classified as manufacturing and merchandising enterprises, those
to mining companies, transportation companies other than railroads, and housing
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TABLE B-i
Estimated Number and Amount of RFC Direct Business Loans Disbursed









June 1934 to January 1935 389 $20,947 . 2.4% 1.8%
February 1935 to April 1938 1,118 87,609 7.0 7.6
May 1938 to May 1940 2,140 106,277 13.3 9.2
June 1940 to February 1945 600 67,279 3.7 5.8
March 1945 to January 1947 2,792 191,752 17.4 16.5
February 1947 to May 1948 2,397 120,256 :14.9 10.4
June 1948 to June 1951 6,607 565,520 41.2 48.8
Total 16,043 $1,159,640 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business loans. The
sample includes 2,851 loans and covers disbursements through December 1951 on loans au—
thorized through June 30, 1951, exclusive of participation loans and national defense loans.
16,000 loans authorized through mid-1951. Itis apparent that apart
from the excluded national defense loans the program was of compara-
tively small dimensions until the postwar years 1945 and thereafter.
Nearly three-quarters of the loans, by number and by amount, were made
after Pebruary 1945; not far from half during the period beginning in
June 1948. This acceleration shows that RFC credit to business was not
used as a counter-cyclical measure after 1940. On the contrary, it ex-
panded during a period of general economic prosperity and price in-
flation.
In the detailed analysis that follows, tabulations will usually cover
the full seventeen-year span, with comment in the text on significant
changes within the shorter periods.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOANS
RFC regular business loans were predominantly in the middle size
brackets, in comparison with the term loans held by commercial banks. A
size classification of RFC loans made over the years 1934—1951 and of
term loans made by Federal Reserve member banks in the year preceding
November 20, 1946 discloses that 65 percent of the bank loans were in
original amounts under $5,000, whereas only 28 percent of RFC loans
construction and manufacturing firms are included. From a total of about 17,000
net authorizations, a sample of 2,851 loans was drawn covering all loans of $500,-
000 or more and a random selection of the smaller loans: roughly 10 percent of
the loans of $100,000 or less, and nearly half the loans in the intermediate range.
Before tabulating the results, the data for each size stratum below $500,000 were
inflated by the reciprocal of the sampling ratios to obtain estimated full coverage.
Tested against, complete totals by region, industry, size of lOan authorization, and
year authorized, the estimates appeared representative of the population sampled.
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were of such small amount (Table B-2).25 Obviously, the RFC direct loan
program cannot be described as filling a "gap" in the private financial
markets for small term loans, because commercial banks had penetrated
far more extensively into that market by 1946. The Corporation was not
as well geared as were commercial banks to serve very small businesses.
Higher up the loan-size scale, RFC had noticeably higher percentages of
the number of its term loans to business in the $10,000 to $100,000 brackets
than did commercial banks. As regards the amounts of funds disbursed,
both RFC and commercial banks had nearly half their funds in loans of
$1 milliOn or .over.
There were three periods, however, during which RFC shifted notice-
ably into smaller loans. Between May 1938 and May 1940 about 50 per-
cent of the loans disbursed were under $10,000. Again, in 1945 and 1946
more than two-thirds of the loans, and during 1947 and up to May 1948
more than one-half, were under this amount. During mid-1948 through
mid-1951, however, there was a marked shift toward loans of larger
amount, possibly as a result of price inflation. Since 1935 it had con-
sistently been true, nevertheless, that upwards of three-quarters of the
funds disbursed to business by RFC represented loans of $100,000 or
more.
Because of the widespread complaints of businessmen during the
thirties, special interest attaches to the maturity terms of RFC loans.
Commercial banks traditionally made business loans maturing in one year
or less; only during the past fifteen years or so have they engaged actively
in the extension of term credits. The Federal Reserve survey of the
business loans held by member banks on November 20, 1946 revealed that,
of'an estimated 673,000 business loans aggregating $13.2 billion held by
member banks at that date, 144,400 loans aggregating $4.6 billion had an
original maturity in excess of one year. That is, 22 percent of the number
and 34 percent of the amount of business loans of commercial banks were
term loans.26 In contrast, RFC operated almost exclusively in the field
of term credit. Of its loans made during 1934—1951, less than half of one
percent of the number and one percent of the amount had a term to
maturity of under one year.
A comparison of the term loans made by RFC with those made by
commercial banks, though inexact because of nonuniform class intervals,
indicates that the RFC credit was of much longer duration. Of the term
loans made by banks during the year ending November 20, 1946, no less
25Thecomparison somewhat understates the amounts disbursed by banks, be-
cause the size distribution refers to amounts outstanding in November 1946
(i.e. exclusive of amounts repaid twelve months or less after origination); but
repayments within so short a period could scarcely affect the great contrast shown.
26Cf.Albert R. Koch, "Business Loans of Member Banks," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, March 1947, Table 1, p. 255, and Holthausen, op.cit., Table 13, p. 511.
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TABLE B-2
Distributions by Size of Loan and Term to Maturity for RFC Direct Business
Loans Disbursed 1934—1951 and for Commercial Bank Term Loans to
Business 'Made in 1946
NUMBEROFLOANS AMOUNTOF LOANS
Member Member
LOAN RFC RFC Bank3
CHARACTERISTICS 1934—1951 .1946 1934—1951 1946
SIZE OF LOANa
Under $1,000 2.0% 19.7% b 0.4%
$1,000—4,999 26.3 45.6 1.0% 3.8
5,000—9,999 14.5 13.9 1.3 3.2
10,000—24,999 21.7 10.7 4.2 5.1
25,000—49,999 13.2 4.1 5.7 4.2
50,000—99,999 12.0 2.5 9.8 5.0
100,000—499,999 8.2 2.4 19.0 16.8
500,000—999,999 1.1 0.6 9.5 12.4







3, 4 yrs. 28.5 34.3 12.8 27.4
5—9 yrs. 43.9 17.5 41.3 47.5
10 yrs. and over 6.3 3.0 28.5 6.8
Otherd 1.6 .. 1.5 ••
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1.00.0% 100.0%
RFC data are based on the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct
business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans,; for number and amount
of loans, see Table B-i. Bank data are from a sample survey by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System covering 2,000 member banks, and represent an estimated 119,900
term loans to industrial and commercial businesses made between November 1,1945 and
November 20, 1946 and still outstanding (to an estimated amount of $3.2 billion) on the latter
date; see "Term Lending to Business by Commercial Banks in1946," by Duncan McC.
Hoithausen, Federal Re3erve B'ulletin, May 1947, Tables 6 and 14, pp. 505 and 513.
a Size classes, for FRC loans, refer to amount authorized; for bank loans, to amount out-
standing.
b Less than 0.05 percent.







115 and over 121 andover
d Includes loans with terms of six months or less, and a few loans payable "on demand"or
whose term to maturity was unknown.
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• than 45 percent of the number and 18 percent of the amount hadan
original maturity of two years or less. Only afifthof the commercial bank
term loans, accounting for 54 percent of the total amount, had original
maturities of over five years. In contrast, fully half of RFC loans, ac-
counting for nearly 70 percent of the amount disbursed from 1934 through
1951, had original maturities of five years and over (Table B-2). Clearly,
a salient distinction between RFC and commercial banking term credit
has been the greater length of RFC terms.
Tabulations (not shown) of the maturity distribution of RFC loans
made at different periods indicate that a smaller than usual proportion of
the loans made during the war and immediate postwar periods—30 to 40.
percent—had maturities of five years and over; up to 1940, and again
from mid-1948 on, the proportion ranged from about half to
ters. As to amount, the longer-term loans consistently accounted for more
than half of RFC credit disbursed. In fact, from 1935 through 1946,
more than 80 percent of the credit was for terms of five years or more;
and in 1945 and 1946 nearly three-fourths of the amount advanced was
for ten years or more. The record reveals more stability than change, five
to nine years being the modal maturity except from 1945 to mid-1948,
when about one-third of the loans were made with terms of three to four
years.
RFC was required by statute to lend money in support of employment
and production, an injunction that was broadly interpreted to mean that
it could lend to prevent reductions in production and employment. This
made it possible to approve loans to refund 'outstanding debt. However,
the principal use of loans by borrowers was to augment working capital:
just under 34 percent of the number of loans, accounting for 38 percent
of the amount of credit disbursed, were of this type (Table B-3). Re-
TABLE B-B
Distribution by Borrower's Use of Proceeds, for RFC Direct





Construction of plant 11,0% 11.8%
Purchase of equipment 27.5 12.4
Repayment or retirement of .
debt 21.2 35.5
Addition to working capital 33.9 38.4
Purchase of land and buildings 3.6 0.8
Purchase of existing business 2.6 0.9
Not available 0.2 0.2
Total 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureal of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number. and
amount of loans, see Table B-i.
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payment of outstanding loans, federal taxes, trade debt, and other obliga-
tions was the principal use of 21 percent of the loans, accounting for 36
percent' of the amount of credit disbursed. Another frequent principal
purpose of RFC loans was to purchase machinery and, equipment, this
being the dominant motive behind 28 percent of the number and 12 per-
cent of the amount of credit. These three principal purposes jointly
accounted for 83 percent of the number and 86 percent of the amount of
funds disbursed by RFC. Construction of plant, purchase of business
assets, and purchase of existing enterprises were comparatively unim-
portant as principal uses of RFC funds, although they may have con-
stituted secondary uses in many loan transactions.
An analysis of the term loans to business firms held by a sample of
commercial banks' about June 30, 1941indicatesthat retirement of out-
standing obligations, increase of working capital, and purchase of ma-
chinery and equipment have also been the dominant uses of commercial
bank term credit.27 Apparently, businesses have used 'RFC credit for
about the same purposes as they have used bank term loans.
Older, established enterprises tended to use the proceeds of RFC loans
predominantly to augment their working capital, whereas new and re-
cently established firms tended to use the funds primarily to purchase
machinery and equipment.. This is an interesting divergence, which may
help to explain the comparative default and loss experience of RFC in
its loans to enterprises of various ages, to which reference is made sub-
sequently.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BORROWING BUSINESSES
We may now turn to the characteristics of RFC's borrowing enter-
prises, especially their size, age, industry, and region.
Table B-4 presents percentage distributions by size of borrowing busi-
ness for RFC loans disbursed during 1934—1951'. Table B-S compares
that information with a similar distribution for business term loans held
by Federal Reserve member banks late in 1946. It is apparent that nearly
three-quarters of the number of bank term credits went to businesses with
assets of under $50,000, whereas only about half of the RFC loans went
to such small firms. At the other end of the scale, a considerably higher
proportion of the amount of bank term loans than of RFC loans went to
firms with assets of $5 million or more. Evidently, RFC found the market
for its credit services to business relatively largest among the medium-
sized firms, with assets between $50,000 and $5 million. The notion that
RFC mainly provided credit to "small business" is clearly without founda-
tion in the comparative sense; for although RFC did extend credit to many
27NeilH. Jacoby and R. J. Saulnier, Term Lending to Bu8iness (National
















1—4.9 million 3.2 • 19.7
5—49.9 million 0.8 18.5
50 million and over 0.1 11.8 •
Not available 17.7 16.0 .
Total' 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-i.
a Based on total assets of borrowers at time of loan application.
TABLE B-S
Business Size Distributions of RFC Direct Business Loans Disbursed
1934—1951 and Commercial Bank Term Loans to
Business Outstanding November 20, 1946
NUMBER OF LOANS AMOUNT OF LOANS
Made byHeld by MemberMade byHeld by Member
SIZE OF BUSINESS RFCa Bamks,a RFCa Banks,a
(TOTAL ASSETS) 1934—1951 1946 1934—1951 1946
Under $50,000 48.7% 74.0% 4.9% 7.9%
$50,000—249,999 31.6' 17.1 15.5 8.6
250,000—749,999 12.8 3.7 15.4 5.3
750,000—4,999,999 5.8 2.2 28.2 11.6
5,000,000 and over 1.1 3.0 36.0 66.6
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
RFC data are from the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC
direct business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for
number and amount of loans, see Table B-i. The underlying bank data are esti-
mates from a nationwide survey of 2,000 member banks and cover 144,400 term
loans to commercial and industrial businesses, totaling $4.6 billion, that, were
outstanding November 20, 1946; see "Term Lending to Business by Commercial
Banks in 1946," by Duncan McC. Hoithausen, Federal Reserve Bulletin, May
1947, Table 7, p. 506.
a Excludes loans unclassified by business size of borrower.
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small firms with assets under $50,000, the concentration of commercial
bank term loans in that field was much greater, both in number and
amount.28
As its business loan program progressed, the percentages of RFC
loans made to small and medium-sized borrowers combined were quite
stable; but the proportion of loans to the smaller firms of that group
increased. Firms with assets between $50,000 and $1 million received
about three times as many loans, up to 1938, as did smaller firms; but
from May 1938 through May 1948 the greater number went to the small
firms, after which the situation again reversed: In amount, the small firms'
share never exceeded 6 percent, and the principal shift for the other
size groups was a greatly increased share for large firms during the war—
June 1940 through February 1945—perhaps because smaller borrowers
were being served through the defense loans of RFC, which are not in-
cluded among the loans analyzed here.
As to age of borrowing firm: Only one-seventh of the business loans
made by the RFC from 1934 to mid-1951 were for financing the estab-
lishment of new business ventures (Table B-6). The proportion varied
markedly within the period. Relatively, few loans to establish new busi-
nesses were made up to World War II; from June 1940 through Feb-
mary 1945, such loans formed only 6 percent of the small number of
nondefense loans covered by the sample; but during 1945 and 1946 nearly
half the loans went to businesses just starting. In amount such loans
were never an important part of the total, even in 1945 and 1946 ac-
TABLE B-6
Distribution by Year Borrowing Firm Was Established, for




























From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; 'for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-i.
28 Nearly a fifth of bank term loans to businesses with total assets under




counting for less than 4 percent. As to the proportion going to new
businesses in a broader sense—that is, to firms organized within three
years or less before date of loan as well as to newly forming ventures—
Table B-9, below, gives information covering the full period. About 36
percent of RFC direct loans, accounting for 11 percent of the amount
disbursed, went to such firms. Unfortunately, these data are not com-
mensurable with the available information on commercial bank term
loans.29
Taking the period 1934—1951 as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable
that RFC business loans were heavily concentrated in the manufacturing
segment of business (Table B-7). Nearly two-thirds of operating busi-
nesses in the American economy in 1946 were in retail trade (43 percent
of the total) and service (21 percent—mostly small ventures not generally
using institutional credit. Nevertheless, over half of the business term
loans held by Federal Reserve member banks in November 1946 had
been made to those groups (retail trade, 37 percent.; services, 17 per-
cent). Of RFC business loans made during 1934—1951 only three-tenths
went to the retail and service groups (about 15 percent each). On the
other hand, manufacturing firms, which comprised less than 10 percent
of the business population and were accountable for about 15 percent of
the business term loans outstanding in commercial, banks in 1946, re-
ceived about 45 percent of RFC business loans made through
In dollar amount the contrasts are equally striking, with retail and
service firms accounting for larger shares of bank outstandings than of RFC
loans made, and with three-quarters of RFC credit extended to manufac-
turing firms, as against somewhat more than half of the bank outstand-
ings. Even more striking is the heavy concentration of RFC credit in the
metals group of manufacturing firms. Two out of every five dollars ad-
vanced to business by RFC went to that group; but of the amount of bank
holdings, only about one-sixth was owed by manufacturers in the metals
industry. Presumably such firms were particularly subject to business
cycle fluctuations and often found it comparatively difficult to obtain credit
from private sources. Also notable are the relatively heavier concentra-
tions of bank holdings in the groups including petroleum, coal, chemicals,
rubber, and transportation, communications, utilities; and of RFC credit
in the textiles, apparel, leather group and in miscellaneous manufactur-
ing—lumbér, stone, clay, glass, paper and printing, etc.
In all subperiods, metals and machinery producers were important
among RFC borrowers. Through May 1938 they received about one-fourth
of the loans and three-tenths of the amount disbursed. Thereafter only
about a seventh of the loans went to the metals industry, but its share
29 Of member bank term loans outstanding November 20, 1946, 44 percent of
the number and 9 percent of the amount were obligations of firms three years
old or less on that date (Hoithausen, op.cit.,Table4, p. 504).
440TABLE B-7
Industry Distributions of RFC Direct Business Loans Disbursed
1934—1951,ofCommercial Bank Business Term Loans Outstanding in 1946,
and of All Operating Businesses in 1946
.
NUMBEROF
NUMBEROF LOANS T 0F LOANS
Held by Held by
OPERATING Made by Member Made by Member
BUSINESSES RFC Banks RFC Bank8
INDUSTRY SEPT. 1946 19g4—1951 Nov. 1.946 1984—1951 Nov. 1946
Total manufacturing
and mininga 9.4% 48.0% 14.6% 76.2% 52.0%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 1.0 8.2 1.8 6.5 8.6
Textiles, apparel, and
leather 1.3 5.4 1.0 7.9 2.2
Metals and metal
productsb 1.8 13.8 4.2 40.3 15.6
Petroleum, coal, .
chemicals and rubber 0.8 8.0 1.6 5.6 16.6
Othere 4.5 17.6 5.9 15.9 9.0
Retail trade 43.4 15.5 37.3 2.8 9.0
Wholesale trade 5.0 4.6 6.8 1.4 4.9
Construction 7.0 6.3 5.8 3.0 1.4
Transportation, communica-
•
tions, and public utilitiesd4.6 8.3 11.7 8.1 21.1
Services 21.4 14.6 16.7 3.0 5.1
Finance, insurance, and
real estatee 9.2 0.5 0.2 5.1 1.6
All otherf g 2.1 7.4 0.4 4.9
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Bank data are from Table 2 of "Term Lending to Business by Commercial Banks in 1946,"
by Duncan McC. Hoithausen, Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1947, p. 502. The underlying
figures—144,400 loans totaling $4.6 billion—are estimates of outstanding term loans of all
member banks to commercial and industrial businesses on November 20, 1946 and were de-
veloped from a nationwide sample survey of business loans held by almost 2,000 member banks.
RFC data are based on the National Bureau of Economic Research survey 'of RFC direct
business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and amount
of loans, see Table B-i.
Data for the business population cover all firms outside of agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and the professional services which were in operation on September 80, 1946 and are from
the Survey of Current BuSine8s (Department of Commerce), June 1949, p. 21. A firm is
defined as a business organization under one management and includes self-employed persons
provided they have one or more employees or an established place of business.
aMiningcompanies represent just under one percent of all business firms in operation in
late 1946, and among RFC borrowers account for only 3 percent of both the number and
amount of loans disbursed. A breakdown of the combined total owed to banks by manufac-
turing and mining firms is not available.
b Besides metal mining the series for all operating businesses includes coal mining companies,
but these two types combined formed less than 0.3 percent of the business population. Metal
mining firms obtained under one percent of both the number and amount of loans made by the
RFC.
C Covers lumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries, such as
printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining or quarrying), and
other miscellaneous manufactured products.
d Data for the RFC exclude railroads.
For member banks, includes only sales finance companies.
f For the RFC, covers farming and fishing; for member banks, includes forestry, fishing, and
real estate as well as a few cases for which type of business was unknown.
gNotcovered in the Department of Commerce estimates of the business population.APPENDIX B
of the funds did not diminish except briefly, and increased to 45 percent
during 1945—1951; in the reconversion years, 1945 and 1946, such firms
received over 70 percent of RFC disbursements. Manufacturers of textiles,
apparel, and leather goods, a group which in the mid-thirties received
about a fifth of the number and amount of loans, had a steadily clecreas-
lug share thereafter—only about one-twentieth during 1945—1951. Pro-
ducers of lumber, furniture, paper, stone, clay, and glass received about
a third of the amount disbursed up to mid-1938 and a fourth of •the
number of loans until 1944, but then their share declined, to roughly
one-seventh of the number and amount of loans made in 1945—1951. In
the war period, transportation, communications, and public utility firms
were heavy borrowers, judging by the nondefense loans covered here,
receiving about a tenth of the loans and 37 percent of the funds disbursed.
Retail and service enterprises, inconspicuous among RFC borrowers in
the early years, became more important after the thirties as to number
of loans, so much that during 1945—1951 their share equaled that of all
manufacturers combined, roughly one-third of all loans; presumably
many of these retail and service credits were in aid of small businesses
owned by veterans, for in amount they were iess than a tenth of the total.
Similar ventures in local trucking may explain the high frequency and
small average amount of loans to transportation firms during 1945 and
1946.
Table B-8, comparing the distribution of RFC loans by location of the
borrowing firm with the distribution of all operating businesses, affords
an indication of the direction in which RFC affected the regional flow of
credit. It is clear that firms in highly industrialized states—California
and the Middle Atlantic and East NortE Central groups—received a rela-
tively small share of RFC loans: only about 25 percent, whereas they
included more than 50 percent of the nation's business population in 1948.
Conversely, relatively large numbers of RFC loans were made in states
whose business population was small, for instance in' the southern and
far 'western sections of the country. Firms in Texas obtained nearly 14
percent of all RFC loans, although only 5 percent of the nation's business•
firms were located there. Oklahoma, Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, and
Florida show similar disparities. For Washington and Oregon, too, the
percentage share of RFC loans was about three times their share of the
business population. Altogether, thestates mentioned accountedfor
nearly half of 'all RFC loans, but for only about 15 percent of the busi-
ness population.
The differences in the regional distribution of public and private loans
probably reflect a somewhat lesser sufficiency of private banking facilities,
at least in places of smaller population, in the areas where RFC was
relatively most active, and some tendency for these areas to have a more
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TABLE B-8
Geographic Distribution of RFC Direct Business Loans
Disbursed 1934—1951, of Business Loans Held by Commercial













June 30, Dec. 31,
1951 .1941 Number Amount
New England 6.91% 3.61% 5.78% 6.06% 6.94%
Maine 0.74 0.11 0.61 0.28 0.30
New Hampshire 0.44 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.16
Vermont 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.14
Massachusetts 3.44 2.20 3.19 4.17 4.16
Rhode Island 0.55 0.12 0.10 0.51 0.47
Connecticut 1.46 0.85 1.63 0.84 0.71
Middle Atlantic 22.86 10.17 18.44 41.82 43.91
New York 13.07 5.27 9.93 32.86 35.10
New Jersey 3.61 1.56 3.22 1.64 1.62
Pennsylvania 6.18 3.34 5.29 7.32 7.19
East North Central 20.66 10.30 21.19 16.42 17.85
Ohio 4.91 2.19 4.92 3.54 3.79
Indiana 2.50 1.18 1.29 1.03 1.02
Illinois 6.75 2.64 3.28 8.67 9.86
Michigan 4.00 3.45 10.47 1.91 1.78
Wisconsin 2.50 0.85 1.23 1.27 1.40
West North Central 9.91 5.58 3.71 6.33 6.48
Minnesota 2.01 1.13 0.42 1.53 1.63
Iowa 1.92 0.54 0.50 0.74 0.78
Missouri 2.77 1.94 2.06 2.75 3.02
North Dakota 0.37 0.33 0.24 0.09 0.08
South Dakota 0.44 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.08
Nebraska 0.97 0.83 0.28 0.52 0.44
Kansas 1.43 0.62 0.19 0.58 0.45
South Atlantic 11.07 15.13 13.55 6.14 6.47
Delaware 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.27 0.28
Maryland 1.27 1.16 5.08 0.57 0.75
District of Columbia 0.58 0.06 0.29 0.57 0.48
Virginia 1.66 0.70 1.13 0.92 1.05
West Virginia 0.96 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.37
North Carolina 1.78 1.18 1.20 1.16 1.00
South Carolina 0.88 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.32
Georgia 1.62 5.11 2.58 1.29 1.39
Florida 2.09 6.37 2.69 0.81 0.83
East South Central 4.97% 10.52% 4.98% 2.85% 2.97%
Kentucky 1.33 2.24 0.84 0.70 0.86
Tennessee 1.50 4.54 2.40 1.29 1.30
Alabama 1.33 2.77 1.08 0.59 0.62
Mississippi 0.81 0.97 0.66 0.27 0.19















1951 1941 Number Amount









Oklahoma 1.88 4.83 0.95 0.98 0.97
Texas 5.17 13.91 6.18 5.32 3.45
Mountain 3.40 6.55 2.16 1.62 1.17
Montana S 0.46 1.08 0.85 0.14 0.10









New Mexico 0.40 061 0.26 0.17 0.09
Arizona 0.48 0.33 0.07 0.23 0.12
Utah 0.39 0.59 0.22 0.27 0.25
Nevada 0.15 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.03













Possessions .. 0.91 0.68 0.56 0.01
•Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
RFC data are from the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and amount of
loans, see Table B-i. Bank series, which refer to commercial and industrial loans held by
insured commercial banks at the end of 1941 and by all operating banks in mid-1951, were
computed from data in A ssets and Liabilities of Operating Insured Banks (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation), December 81, 1941, Report No. 16, pp. 4—28, and Assets, Liabilities,
and Capital A ceounts ... Commercialand Mutual Savings Banks, id., june 30, 1951, Report
No. 85, p. 8. Numbers of business firms in operation in March 1948 are from Survey of
Busines8, December 1949, Table 6, p. 14.
proportionate share of new firms and of firms in new industries. Whatever,
the reason, relatively large numbers of RFC loans were made in capital
deficit areas, and relatively small numbers in areas of capital surplus.
The amounts of RFC credit advanced to businesses in the different
states over the period 1934—1951 may also be compared, in Table B-8,
with the amounts of commercial and industrial loans held by banks at
mid-1951 and at the end of 1941. It appears that the regional pull of
RFC loan disbursements was similar to that noted above in terms of the
number of firrils aided, though in a few states differences between public
and private lending are traceable to a few very large RFC loans. Thus
the number of California firms receiving RFC aid was, as noted previously,
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disproportionately small, but those firms received nearly 16 percent of
RFC credit, whereas banks in California held only 8 percent of the
national total of commercial and industrial loans in mid-i 951. The various
loans to Henry Kaiser enterprises centered in this state no doubt explain
the disparity. Similarly, the loan to the Kaiser-Fraser Company in
Michigan helps explain why that state received 10 percent of all RFC
credit and yet had not quite 2 percent of commercial and industrial loans
held by banks in mid-1951.
Up to mid-1938 firms in the Middle Atlantic region obtained about
three-tenths of the number and one-fourth the, amount of loans, and to-
gether with the East North Central states accounted for about half of
the RFC credit totals. After 1938, firms in more recently industrializing
regions—notably the East South Central, West South Central, and Pacific
areas—tended to obtain increasing shares. Because these were areas of
rapid economic growth, it may be inferred that RFC tended, through
time, to engage in venture financing in regions wherecapital demand
was high in relation to suppiy and investment opportunities were com-
paratively It is notable that over the entire seventeen-year period,
nearly. 24 percent of the number of loans were made in the West South
Central area (mainly Texas), aggregating only 9 percent of the amount
disbursed in the nation. Evidently a comparatively large number of
smaller-than-average loans were made in this area. The Pacific area ob-
tained 14 percent of the number and about 20 percent of the amount
of loans disbursed—also larger figures than the relative economic im-
portance of the region would suggest.
The majority of firms that borrowed from RFC—probably not less than
seven out of every ten—received only one loan. But 20 percent of all
RFC loans during the full period 1934—1951 went to repeat borrowers,
and these repeat loans' were of very large size, accounting for more than
half of the total amount disbursed. During the period June 1940 through
February 1945 (a period of few loans, in the present sample, because
those made under wartime powers are excluded) the proportion of repeat
loans rose to 38 percent by number and 64 percent by amount. In short,
a substantial part of the RFC credit volume was generated by firms which
had used such aid before. In some cases the borrowing firm had not been
financially rehabilitated by the first loan and remained unable to raise
credit from private sources. In other cases, the firm's credit requirements
increased after the first loan, and RFC increased the size of its com-
mitment by a new loan.
FINANCIAL STRENGTH AND CREDIT RATINGS OF RFC BORROWERS
Under its regular programs RFC had authority to lend to business
firms only when they were unable to procure credit on reasonable terms
445APPENDIX B
from customary sources, arid the most frequent reason, why businesses are
unable to obtain funds from commercial banks is that they lack the
requisite financial strength. Special interest therefore attaches to a study
of the creditworthiness of RFC borrowers. In the present investigation
creditworthiness was measured by trends in sales, in net income, in net
worth, and in the current ratios of borrowing firms during the three
years preceding the loan authorization. Indexes for the year last preced-
ing the negotiation of the loan were also utilized: the current ratio, the
ratio of net worth to debt, and the credit rating assigned by Dun &
Bradstreet.
Did RFC tend to finance firms whose sales trends during the three
years prior to their loan applications were strongly upward, horizontal,
or declining? Of the number of loans disbursed over the whole period
1934—1951, 23 percent were to firms with strong or moderate uptrends
in sales prior to loan authorization,. 20 percent were to firms with hori-
zontal or mixed trends, and 9 percent were to firms with moderate or
strong down-trends; 36 percent' were to firms so recently established as
to have no data for judging sales trend, and the remainder to established
firms for which no data were available (Table B-9). With respect to
amount, 45percentof the credit went to businesses with horizontal or
mixed sales trends, 27 percent to firms with rising sales, 12 percent to
firms with falling sales, and the balance to firms for which data were
lacking or inadequate.
Thus the striking feature of the record,' besides the numerous loans
to new and young enterprises, is the extent to which RFC funds were con-
centrated in financing firms with apparently stable business volumes.
However, in 1934 about 30 percent of RFC credit went to depression-hit
businesses with sharply declining sales. During 1935 through April 1938
over a third of both the number and amount of RFC loans went to
firms with strong uptrends in sales, and very little went to firms with
sales declines. During the period of war and postwar readjustment, es-
pecially the latter, a much increased fraction of the number of loans
went to new firms without sales records sufficient to show trends(in
fact, 69 percent during March 1945 through mid-1948). Though firms
with horizontal sales trends received relatively fewer loans, as did other
categories of established firms, by amount their share nevertheless in-
creased.
The over-all distribution of RFC loans by three-year net income trend
of borrower resembles that by sales trend, except that firms with sharp
declines appear more important here, receiving about a tenth of the loans
and a fifth of the amount (Table B-9). Numerous loans to new businesses,
and a preponderance of funds going to firms with stable or mixed net in—
come trends, stand out.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































those observed for sales trend. Until mid-1940 the percentages of both
the number and amount of loans that went to firms with favorable profit
trends were quite substantial: about 25 to 30 percent, even in the earliest
year. During the immediate postwar period, with the greatly increased
share of loans to new firms, a smaller share went to established firms; but,
as in the past, firms with apparently stable profit trends received the
major portion of all disbursements.
The trend of net worth measures the growth or erosion of owners' equity
in an enterprise, and often reflects the profitability of the business. Besides
the many loans to newly forming or young firms, loans to other firms not
supplying records bulk large in the distribution by net worth trend, so
that among loans to firms old enough to show trends (64 percent of the
total), for only one-third (21 percent of the total) were the requisite
data available (Table B-9). By amount the coverage is better, with in-
formation available for two-thirds of the credit extended to firms old
enough to show trends. As to the businesses with known trends, again
there was a preponderance of credit for those with stable or mixed trends
over the three years preceding the loan. Also notable is the large share
of credit going to firms with sharply rising net worth: over one-fourth
of the amount disbursed to established firms supplying figures.
The deficiencies of the data forbid detailed comparison between sub-
periods, but there isreliable evidence on several points. During the
thirties most of the RFC credit went to firms with stable or declining
net worths. After World War II, while most of the loans went to new
businesses, most of the credit went to established firms with expanding
net worths. Thus during the period of postwar inflation the shift toward
financing new firms was accompanied by a shift also toward growing
firms.
The trend in the current ratio normally reveals whether a firm has
become more or less liquid. As with net worth, current ratios were un-
available for many borrowers in addition to those too new to have cal-
culable trends (Table B-9). Where the history is known, again the firms
with stable or mixed trends are seen to have received the largest share
of RFC credit. Somewhat larger proportions of the number of RFC loans
went to firms with declining than with expanding current ratio trends,
but they involved less credit than the loans to firms with expanding trends.
Up to about 1940, loans to firms with adverse current ratio trends
bulked large in the aggregate number and amount of RFC credit. There-
after, this group became relatively small, while loans to new firms or
firms with no records became quite important—a finding that bears out
the observations made previously regarding a fundamental change in the
financial condition of RFC borrowers about 1940.
So far, creditworthiness has been weighed in terms of three-year trends
in the borrowing firms' financial conditions. A somewhat sharper measure
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of financial strength is afforded by the values of the current ratio, the
net worth to debt ratio, and the Dun & Bradstreet rating based
on the borrower's financial statement for the fiscal year. immediately pre-
ceding loan authorization.
Nearly half of the number of loans, involving more than half of the
amount of the credit, were made to businesses whose current ratios in the
last fiscal year preceding authorization were less than 2/1 (Table B-b).
TABLE B-b
Distributions of RFC Direct Business Loans Disbursed
1934—1951, by Borrower's Current Ratio, Net Worth to Debt Ratio,






Less than 1.00 22.2%
i 19.1%
1.00—1.49 15.4 19.1







5.00 and over 5.0 . 5.0













10 and over 4.7 , 3.7



























From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number
and amount of loans, see Table B-i.
aIncludesfirms just forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
b Liabilities in excess of assets.
e Loans to firms for which Dun & Bradstreet had credit reports but assigned no
rating were included here unless the RFC file contained additional information
that permitted assigning them to one of the rating classes. Also included are loans
to firms for which credit reports were entirely lacking (firms just organizing,
and others), and a very few loans rated "high to good," "fair to high," or•
"limited to fair."
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Since the current ratio is an important gauge of liquidity, and private
bankers usually decline to lend money to firms whose current ratio is less
than 2/1, it appears that RFC did supply credit to many enterprises
ordinarily unacceptable to private term lenders. Moreover, this situation
appears to have obtained throughout nearly all periods of the RFC busi-
ness loan program. An exception is the postwar period 1945—1948, when
the proportions of loans made to businesses with subnormal current
ratios fell sharply and there was an increase in the proportions of loans
going to firms for which no data on current ratio were available (prob-
ably because of loans to newly organized ventures). Otherwise the dis-
tribution of borrowers according to current ratio during the last fiscal
year preceding loan authorization did not change appreciably.
RFC tended to finance businesses whose indebtedness was large in
relation to their equity. The ratio of net worth to debt of a business is
usually taken to be a significant measure of the extent to which the firm
is "trading on the equity," is exposed to the risk of default, and is worthy
of additional credit. For the nation's businesses as a whole, net worth
has averaged about twice total debt.3° For the business loans of RFC
over the whole seventeen-year period, about a fifth of the number, involv-
ing more than one-third of the amount, went to firms with a net worth
to debt ratio of less than i/i; 41 percent of the loans, comprising 61
percent of the credit, went to firms whose ratio was less than 2/1 (Table
B-b). Clearly, RFC's borrowing clientele consisted largely of firms
with more slender margins of equity than the average for all businesses.
That such a large proportion of the firms borrowing from commercial
banks would have subnormal ratios of net worth to debt is highly im-
probable. The condition held true of all periods of RFC lending to busi-
ness, excepting the initial period June 1934 to January 1935, when a
very strict statute resulted in few loans going to borrowers with ratios
under 2/1, and the period March 1945 through 1946.
The credit ratings assigned by Dun & Bradstreet are widely used by
private bankers and commercial creditors as a guide to the creditworthi-
ness of businesses. Ratings or similar credit information were available
in RFC files for about seven out of every ten loans in the sample. About
41 percent of the loans, comprising 55 percent of the amount of money
disbursed, went to firms rated "good"; 23 percent of the number and 14
percent of the amount went to firms rated "fair" (Table B-JO). Relatively
few loans were made to borrowers with "high" credit ratings—as would
be expected for a lending agency required to restrict its loans to firms
unable to procure private credit. This situation appears to have obtained
throughout all phases of RFC lending activity.
30NeilH. Jacoby and R. J. Saulnier, Busines8 Finance and Banking (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1947), p. 33.
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Experience on RFC Direct Business Loans
Study of the loans that fell short of contract performances during
RFC's extensive lending experience, and comparisons of them with the
loans that turned out well, should reveal something as to the sources of
loss in business lending and may help guide business lending policies
in the future. We shall consider in turn the frequency of default, of fore-
closure, and of loss, and finally the extent of the losses incurred.
STATUS OF LOANS OUTSTANDING
AT THE END OF 1951
Our information on the frequency with which breach of contract in
some respect was encountered by RFC is derived from the group of about
5,700 direct business loans outstanding at the end of 1951. Most of these
loans were of rather recent origin and stemmed from the period of greatest
RFC business lending activity. Approximately two-fifths of the number
and one-half of the amount of all RFC loans made during 1934—1951
originated between June 1948 and June 1951, and such loans comprised
upwards of of the number and amount of all outstanding loans
at December 31, 1951.
About 87 percent of the active loans (by amount, 90 percent) were
classified by RFC as being in good standing (Table B-li). Of the 13
percent that were in distress, about one-third had become delinquent
rather recently, most were "problem" loans with more serious default,
and a few were "in liquidation" (that is, proceedings for termination at
the lender's option were being prepared). These three groups will be
TABLE B-il
Delinquency Status of ItFC Direct Business Loans
Outstanding December 31, 1951

























All loans 5,700 $449,925 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Amounts cover dis-
bursements through December 31, 1951 on loans authorized up to June 30 of that
year and outstanding at year end.
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combined in the analysis, without further regard to differences in degree
of delinquency. It is not possible to compare the indicated quality, of the
RFC business loan portfolio directly with that of the business term loans
held by commercial banks. However, it is known that of the total loans
and discounts held by all insured commercial banks and appraised by
bank examiners during the calendar year 1951, 99 percent of the amount
was "not criticized" and less than 1 percent was classified as "sub-
standard" in quality.31 Assuming that currently delinquent loans held
by RFC would surely have been classified as substandard by bank ex-
aminers, it follows that the quality of the RFç business loan portfolio
was considerably lower than that of the loan and discount portfolios of
commercial banks.
Surprisingly, no significant relationship appeared between the de-
linquency status of loans and their size, except in the over-all sense that
loans in default averaged smaller than loans in good standing ($57,000 as
against $82,300; Table B-li). Few loans of less than $1,000 were out-
standing in 1951, as Table B-12 shows. And although there are reasons
for expecting the proportion of delinquent loans to move inversely with
size, the several classes above $1,000 show default ratios 'deviating rather
moderately from the average, in an erratic pattern.
There was a decreasing frequency -of delinquency for loan groups with
successively longer maturities (Table B-12). The extremely high per-
centage of delinquency among loans maturing within a year should be
regarded with some caution because of the small number of loans to
judge by; but the distinct and regular improvement along the scale of
increasing contract lengths is significant. A comparison of the ratios by
amount with those by number shows that among loans in the two-year
class it was the smaller ones that were relatively more often delinquent.
There were sharp differences in default ratios as between industry
groups of RFC loans (Table B-i 3). The transportation, communications,
and public utilities group had the highest percentage of delinquency—
about one loan in five—and the status for loans to producers of consumer
goods such as textiles and foods was not much better. In the groups in-
cluding transportation and textile firms, delinquent loans averaged dis-
tinctly smaller than those in good standing within the same industry
class. Less than average delinquency is shown for the following groups:
metals and metal products; petroleum, coal, chemicals, rubber; miscel-
laneous manufacturing; construction; wholesale trade, and service. For
the construction group, delinquent loans were of notably larger original
size, on the average, than those in good standing.
Among regions, the South Atlantic states had the highest ratio of




Relation of Loan Size and Term to Maturity to Proportion of













Number A mount Number A mount
AMOUNT AUTHORIZED
Less than $500 .. .. .. ..
$500—999 50.0% 50.0% 0.5% a
1,000—4,999 11.5 8.1 13.6 0.5%
5,000—9,999 13.9 14.0 13.2 1.1
10,000—24,999 11.4 12.0 27.6 4.7
25,000—49,999 15.9 16.2 16.5 6.4
50,000—99,999
100,000—499,999
14.1 16.7 16.8 12.5
12.4 15.2 9.8 19.8
500,000—999,999 12.7 9.0 • 1.1 10.4,
1 million and over 9.6 3.8 0.9 44.5
TERM TO MATURITY
Less than six months .. .. .. ..
lyear 43.3% 42.3% 1.5%: 1.8%
2 yrs. 18.8 1.9 4.2 6.4
3, 4 yrs. 15.7 7.9 24.9 13.3
5—9 yrs. 11.5 11.2 57.5 54.2
10 yrs. and over 9.9 6.1 11.3 24.0
Payable on demand .. .. .. ..
Not available 20.0 30.5 0.6 0.3
All loans 13.2% 9.6% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-li.
a Less than 0.05 percent.
delinquent loans (17 percent), with the percentage for the East South
Central and Mountain states also worse than average. The: conspicuously
low ratios are those for the West North Central and West South Central
regions.
Default ratios were about twice as large where borrowing firms used
the proceeds of loans principally to pay debt or to increase working
capital as for loans used mainly to construct or purchase plants, and were
half again as large as for loans used chiefly to purchase machinery and
equipment. Among the few outstanding loans used to purchase an existing
business delinquency was very high, about one loan in four.
The somewhat better than average record for loans to most size classes
of borrowing firms from the smallest up to the $250,000 level, and for
those to firms of unknown size (mainly, but not entirely, new ventures),
is noteworthy. Three of the size classes, however—$25,000 to $50,000
assets, $250,000 to $500,000, and one to five million—showed about oneAPPENDIX B
TABLE B-13
Relation of Borrower's Industry, Region, and Use of Proceeds to
Proportion of Outstanding RFC Direct Business Loans in Default
RATIOOF
LOANS IN DEFAULT TO DISTRIBUTION OF
.
• ALL ACTIVELOANS ACTIVE LOANS
BORROWER
CIZARACTERISTICS Number A mountNumber Amount
INDUSTRY
Manufacturing and mininga 13.3% 8.9% 48.7% 72.6%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 17.0 18.7 10.0 8.9
Textiles, apparel, leather 16.9 4.4 3.2 5.7
Metals and metal products 11.8 6.0 12.9 34.7
Petroleum, coal, chemicals,
rubber 10.6 4.2 3.2 10.1
Otherb 11.7 15.7 14.4 13.2
Retail trade 13.9 19.0 16.9 3.7
Wholesale trade 11.2 9.4 4.8 1.9
Construction 10.0 20.1 6.2 4.0
Transportation, communica-
tions, public utilitiesc 20.4 8.4 5.8 4.6
Services 12.0 18.2 20.2 4.9
Finance, insurance, and
real estate 0 0 0.4 7.8
All otherd 15.7 21.2 1.9 0.5
REoroNe
New England 13.6 4.5 4.8 5.3
Middle Atlantic 12.2 10.4 7.0 17.2
East North Central 12.8 2.9 10.3 24.8
West North Central 9.4 7.8 5.6 3.0
South Atlantic 17.4 8.0 11.8 14.3
East South Central 14.0 7.4 13.7 8.4
West South Central 11.1 15.1 24.3 13.4
Mountain 15.1 41.7 6.3 2.3
Pacific 13.4 22.0 14.8 10.9
Possessions 19.2 15.5 1.4 0.4
PRINCIPAL USE OF PROCEEDS
Construction of plant 6.6 4.9 17.0 16.3
Purchase of equipment 11.2 7.8 20.4 19.7
Retirement of debt 16.8 14.2 27.0 23.9
Addition to working capital 15.6 10.0 27.2 37.4
Purchase of land or bldgs. 6.5 2.2 6.1 1.5
Purchase of existing business 28.7 5.5 2.3 1.8
Not available
All loans 13.2% 9.6% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-li.
a Mainly manufacturing.
b Covers lumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries,
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining
or quarrying), and other miscellaneous manufactured products.
c Excludes railroads.
dMainly fisheries and farming (fruit, poultry, truck, etc.).
e For states included in the regions, see Table B-8.
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loan delinquent in every five, where most other groups showed about one
in eight (Table B-14).
Loans to firms just organizing at time of loan had remarkably little
delinquency: about one loan in twenty. Nearly 70 percent of the newly
forming businesses referred to were started between mid-1948 and mid-
1951, as is known by the loan dates. Thus their record may be considered
alongside that of loans to another group of businesses organized at that
time—firms established before date of loan but as recently as 1950 and
1951. The latter showed a delinquency percentage: nearly one loan
in six. Taken together, the default ratios and the distribution of outstand-
ings suggest that as a combined group the brand-new and very young
firms indebted to RFC as of 1951 were fulfilling their loan contracts
as frequently as older firms were, and perhaps somewhat more so, a point
on which further evidence will be added.
TABLE B-14
Relation of Borrower's Asset Size, and of Year Business Established, to








CHARACTERISTICS Number Amount Number Amount
TOTAL ASSETSa
Less than $5,000 11.1% 3.6% 3.5% 0.1%
$5,000—24,999 12.0 8.7 15.3 1.1
25,000—49,999 17.4 22.0 18.1
50,000—99,999 11.1 14.0 17.7 5.2
100,000—249,999 12.3 11.0 17.3 11.2
250,000—499,999 20.7 19.1 8.5 9.1
500,000-999,999 11.6 19.2 3.9 8.6
1—4.9 million 18.7 11.6 2.9 21.4
5—49.9 million 4.5 2.8 0.4 14.0
50 million and over 0 0 0.1 19.3
Not available 8.1 8.4 12.3 7.0
YEAR BUSINESS ESTABLISHED
Before 1931 14.0 6.9 15.3 34.4
1931—1942 13.6 17.6 19.7 21.3
1943—1949 13.9 7.9 50.0 39.6
1950—1951 15.9 8.5 5.8 2.6
Newly forming at time
of loan 4.4 3.7
46.8 1.0
8.8 1.9
Not available 0.3 0.2
All loans 13.2% 9.6% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-li.
a At time of loan application.
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We have some evidence as to whether trends in the financial condition
of borrowing firms before their applications for loans had a predictive
value concerning default. The data are assembled in Table B-15.
One out of every four outstanding loans to firms with declining sales
trends 'was delinquent, but no more than one in nine for firms that had
stable or rising sales over the three years before loan authorization. A
similar contrast, but considerably less marked, shows in the default ratios
by net income trend. Businesses that were newly forming at time of loan
authorization, together with those whose date of organization showed they
were too young at time of loan to have calculable trends, had somewhat
less than average delinquency—12.8 percent, as against 13.2 percent for
all outstanding loans at the end of 1951. Among loans to older firms not
supplying the requisite information the default ratio was higher than
average: about 15 percent. In assessing such differences, it should be
remembered that there was a considerable range of discretionary action
open to RFC, both in classifying a loan as "in good standing" or "in
default" and also in changing the status of a delinquent loan by rèwrit-
ing the loan agreement; hence, the status at any given point of time is
in many cases somewhat arbitrary.
Much more than with sales or profit trends, lack of information affects
the figures relating the net worth and current ratio trends to delinquency
status. Here, as elsewhere in Table B-iS, it is observable that in almost
all categories delinquent loans averaged smaller than those in good
standing. But the reverse was true among loans to firms whose trend in
financial condition was unknown.
In so far as the loan sample produced sufficient evidence, it appears that•
for RFC's comparatively high-risk portfolio the three-year trends in
borrower's financial condition before loan authorization were serviceable
at least in a general way as indicators of the probability of default. Similar
comparisons 'focusing on the borrower's financial condition in the year
preceding the loan, while they show, as would be expected, high default
ratios for firms whose current liabilities exceeded their current assets,
are otherwise unpatterned (Table B-16).
FREQUENCY OF FORECLOSURE AMONG EXTINGUISHED LOANS
From observing the default status of loans outstanding near the end of
RFC's lending activity, we turn to the record of &xtinguished loans. It
is estimated that of some 16,000 business loans on which $1,160 million
were disbursed by RFC from June to the end of 1951, about 10,300
loans, involving disbursements of $710 million, had been 'extinguished by
December 31, 1951. The overwhelming majority of them—78 percent of
the number and 73 percent of the amount—were extinguished by the bor-
rower's full repayment of principal and interest (Table B-17). Eight
percent of the number and 12 percent of the amount of all loans extin-
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TABLE B-is
Relation of Three-Year Trends in Borrower's Financial Condition before
Loan Authorization to Proportion of Outstanding RFC Direct









CONDIPIONa Number Amount Number Amount
NET SALES
Sharply upward 1L9% 6.7% 21.3% 26.9%
Moderately upward 6.3 8.6 5.0 3.8
Horizontal or mixed 10.1 8.1 21.2 38.5
Moderately downward 24.3 16.4 5.6 4.8
Sharply downward 26.5 14.4 4.9 9.2
New businessb 12.8 9.3 .31.3 13.3
Not available 14.6 27.1 10.7 3.4
NET INCOME
Sharply upward 12.2 7.5 17.1 17.6
Moderately upward 3.0 7.6 1.3 1.0
Horizontal or mixed 12.8 8.6 24.6 43.9
Moderately downward 16.3 17.3 2.4 1.3
Sharply downward 15.0 10.0 13.3 19.8
New businessb 12.8 9.3 31.3 13.8
Not available 15.5 29.3 10.0 3.4
NET WORTH
Sharply upward 11.4 4.5 5.6 25.6
Moderately upward 0 0 3.3 8.8
Horizontal or mixed 10.3 10.5 5.8 21.2
Moderately downward 13.7 9.2 1.3 3.1
Sharply downward 41.1 9.4 1.8 5.9
New businessb 12.8 9.3 31.3 13.3
Not available 13.9 18.6 50.9 22.1
CURRENT RATIO
Sharply upward 8.1 4.9 3.4 17.5
Moderately upward 9.6 0.7 1.4 15.0
Horizontal or mixed 5.4 5.8 5.1 19.7
Moderately downward 31.2 22.4 1.8 5.2
Sharply downward 16.5 13.5 3.9 6.4
New businessb 12.8 9.3 31.3 13.3
Not available 13.8 18.3 53.1 22.8
All loans 13.2% 9.6% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-li.
a "Strongly" upward or downward refers to average annual expansion or con-
traction of 20.5 percent or more; "moderately," to expansions or contractions
averaging between 5.5 and 20.5 percent. "Horizontal" refers taverage annual
contractions or expansions less than 5.5 percent, and the class includes movements
of divergent direction. .




Relation of Borrower's Financial Condition at Time of Loan
Authorization to Proportion of Outstanding RFC Direct






TO ALL ACTIVE LOANS
DISTRIBUTION OF
ACTIVE LOANS
Number Amount Number Amount
CURRENT RATIO
Less than 1.00 17.8% 17.5% 30.9% 20.8%
1.00—1.49 12.0 11.4 15.8 17.8
1.50—1.99 14.5 8.6 8.2 14.1
2.00—2.99 11.9 2.0 9.6 23.5
3.00—4.99 13.9 8.0 5.4 10.9
5.00 and over 7.5 11.9 5.5 3.7
Not availablea 9.5 9.5 24.6 9.3
NET WORTH/TOTAL DEBT
Less than 0.5 13.8 16.2 7.8 15.6
0.5—0.9 14.8 8.6 16.8 23.1
1.0—1.9 12.5 3.2 21.9 35.9
2.0—3.9 20.1 23.5 15.5 9.4
4.0—9.9 7.5 3.3 10.5 2.9
10 and over 15.8 14.9 5.9 3.5
Debt under $500 11.7 22.2 8.2 1.1
Negative ratiob 27.4 18.5 0.5 1.3
Not availablea 7.7 8.2 12.8 7.1
CREDIT RATING
High 4.3 0.5 3.9 11.4
Good 14.0 5.0 33.6 45.5
Fair 15.2 16.9 27.2 20.5
Limited 11.9 20.5 3.3 3.8 .
Not availablec 12.0 15.8 31.9 18.8
All loans 13.2% 9.6% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of loans, see Table B-li.
a Includes firms just forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
b Liabilities in excess of assets.
c Loans to firms for which Dun & Bradstreet had credit reports but assigned
no rating were included here unless the RFC file contained additional information
that permitted assigning them to one of the rating classes. Also included are loans
to firms for which credit reports were entirely, lacking (firms just organizing,
and others), and a very few loans rated "high to good" and "fair to good."
guished were terminated by RFC making another loan to enable the
borrower to repay the debt due under a previous loan. RFC terminated
13 percent of the number and 9 percent of the amount of its business
loans by foreclosing on the borrower's collateral security or otherwise
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TABLE B-17
Method of Extinguishment for RFC Direct Business Loans, 1934—1951











Repaid by means of RFC
refunding loan
Terminated by foreclosurea
















Total 10,343 $709,715 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of RFC direct
business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans.
aOrby other liquidation proceedings at lender's option.
exercising its claim on the borrower's assets. The remainder was termi-
nated by transfer to banks or to the Housing and Home Finance Agency.
The frequency measure chosen for analyzing the liquidated loans is
the "foreclosure rate," here defined as the number (or amount) of loans
foreclosed or otherwise liquidated at the option of RFC as a percentage
of the number (or amount) of all loans disbursed during the entire period
1934—1951. Comprehensively, the estimates for loans terminated at the
lender's option—1,338 in number, $60,895,000 in amount—yield fore-
closure rates of 8.3 percent by number and 5.3 percent by. amount. Ade-
quate comparative data are not available on the foreclosure rates of
privately made term loans to business. But it is clear that private lending
agencies do not foreclose on as much as one loan of every twelve they
make or one dollar in every twenty dollars loaned.
The foreclosure rates on RFC business loans were unusually high
for loans up to $10,000 in amount and for loans for less than five years'
term to maturity (Table B-18); within the latter group, comparison of
the data by number and amount shows that among the loans of shortest
contract length it was the originally larger ones that more often went
into foreclosure, whereas with maturities of two to four years it was
mainly the smaller loans. Foreclosure rates were high on loans to manu-
facturers of metal and metal products and to transportation enterprises
borrowing small amounts (Table B-19). Borrowers in the East North
Central and Mountain regions had high foreclosure rates by both num-
ber and amount. The relatively numerous foreclosures in the South At-
lantic and West South Central regions evidently arose mainly from the
smaller loans; in the West North Central states and especially in the
territorial possessions, although foreclosures were relatively few, they
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TABLE B-18







CHARACTERISTICS Number 4 mount
A1YXOUNT AUTHORIZED
Less than $1,000 9.8% 9.1%







1 million and over 6.4 4.8
TERIIi TO :
Less than six months 5.8 45.1
1 year 9.6 21.0 •
2 yrs. 18.8 8.2
3,4 yrs. 12.1 4.2
5—9 yrs. 4.4 4.1
10 yrs. and over 4.9 1.5
Payable on demand 31.6 41.5
Not available 14.6 17.1
PREVIOUS :
Repeat loan 6.7 6.4
. Initial loan 8.7 8.9
All loans . 8.3% 5.8%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Based on records of
disbursements and of extinguishments through December 1951 on loans authorized
from June 1934 through June 1951; see Tables B-i and B-17 for number and
amount of loans.
occurred with loans in which RFC's original investment had beenlarger
thanthe average for all the extinguished loans within the region.High
foreclosure rates are also found on loans to firms with assets under
$25,000; to enterprises established during 1943—1949, those just organiz-
ing at time of loan application, and those on which age data were' un-
available; and to businesses with a moderately downward net income
trend, and firms too young to have calculable trends (Tables B-20 and
B-2 1). Firms with a current ratio at time of loan application of less than
1.00 had high foreclosure rates, and the results for loans classified by
borrower'scredit rating aremixed, with a relatively bad record for firms
rated "good" or "limited" at time of loan authorization (Table B-22).
The over-all foreclosure rate fluctuated widely for various phases of
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TABLE B-19
Industrial and Regional Differences in Foreclosure Rates









Numb or A mount
INDUSTRY .
Manufacturing and mininga 7.8% 5.2%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 5.5 8.7
Textiles, apparel, and leather 6.8 6.5
Metals and metal products 9.1 7.4
Petroleum, coal, chemicals, .
rubber 8.7 4.4
Otherb 7.9 . 5.2
Retail trade 6.9 4.0
Wholesale trade 2.0 1.4
Construction 8.1 2.4
Transportation, communications,
and public utilitiese 18.4 1.6
Services 7.9 2.9
Finance, insurance, and real . .
estate 0 0
All otherd 11.2 4.7
kEGIONe
New England 4.6 2.0
Middle Atlantic 6.5 4.6
East North Central 9.5 11.6
West North Central 6.1 7.5
South Atlantic 10.4 2.6







All loans 8.3% 5.3%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Based on records of
disbursements and of extinguishments through December 1951 on loans authorized
from June 1934 through June 1951; see Tables B-i and B-fl' for number and
amount of loans.
a Mainly manufacturing; loans to mining companies form only 3 percent of the
number and amount of all loans made.
b Covers lumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries,
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining or
quarrying), and other miscellaneous manufactured products.
c Excludes railroads.
d Mainly fisheries and farming (fruit, poultry, truck, etc.)...
e For states included in the regions, see Table B-8.
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TABLE B-20
Relation of Borrower's Asset Size and of Year Business Established









CHARACTERISTICS Number A mount
TOTAL AssETsa






















5—49.9 million 5.1 10.5
50 million and over 0 0
Not available 12.7 8.3
YEAR BUSINESS ESTABLISHED .
Before 1931 6.3 3.1 •
. 1931—42 4.1 2.9
1943—49 8.8 10.8
1950—51 0 0







All loans 8.3% 5.3%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Based on records of
disbursements and of extinguishinents through December 1951 on loans authorized
from June 1934 through June 1951; see Tables B-i and B-17 for number and
amount of loans.
a At time of loan application.
RFC's business lending operations. Foreclosures were relatively frequent
on loans made during the earlier period—June 1934 to April 1938—
fell considerably with economic recovery in 1939 and with the onset of
World War II; rose again after the war and during the period of post-
war reconversion; and dropped during the inflationary boom of June
1948—June 1951.
FREQUENCY OF LOSS
estimated that 1,338 RFC business loans foreclosed or otherwise
terminated at the lender's option during 1934—1951, 959 were extinguished
with some loss to RFC or were still in process of settlement at the end
of 1951 with loss anticipated (Table B-23). Among all loans made and
extinguished during 1934—1951, those eventuating in some ioss comprised
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TABLE B-21
Foreclosure Rates on RFC Direct Business Loans, by Three-Year











Sharply upward 3.3% 3.2%
Moderately upward 8.1 3.3
Horizontal or mixed 3.8 2.1
Moderately downward 7.3 6.8
Sharply downward 4.9 2.8
New businessb 14.2
Not available 10.2 39.0
NET INCOME
Sharply upward 2.8 1.5
Moderately upward 3.4
Horizontal or mixed 4.7 2.9
Moderately downward 9.1 12.5
Sharply downward 3.6 2.8
New businessb 14.2 5.4
Not available 10.8 40.1
NET WORTH
Sharply upward 1.1 0.4
Moderately upward 1.7 3.0
Horizontal or mixed 7.6 3.5
Moderately downward 9.2 4.5
Sharply downward 11.4 4.0
New businessb 14.2 5.4
Not available 4.6 10.2
CIJIULENT RATIO
Sharply upward 4.8 3.0
Moderately upward 3.4 0.6
Horizontal or mixed 6.2 2.3
Moderately downward 5.1 4.9
Sharply downward 8.0 4.7
New businessb 14.2 5.4
Not available 4.7 10.2
All loans . 8.3% 5.3%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Foreclosure rates
are based on records of disbursements and of extinguishments through December
1951 on loans authorized from June 1934 through June 1951; see Tables B-i and
B-17 for number and amount of loans.
a "Sharply" upward or downward refers to average annual expansion or con-
traction of percent or more; "moderately," to expansions or contractions
averaging between 5.5 and 20.5 percent. "Horizontal" refers to average annual
contractions or expansions less than 5.5 percent, and the class includes movements
of divergent direction.




Foreclosure Rates on RFC Direct Business Loans, by


















5.00 and over 4.9 2.7
Not availablea 13.2 3.9 •
NET WORTH/TOTAL DEBT
Less than 0.5 7.8 4.9 •
0.5—0.9 7.7 . 3.0
1.0—1.9 : . 2.6
2.0—3.9 6.9 3.8
4.0—9.9 5.0 • 1.9
10 and over 3.3 3.2
Debt under $500 12.7 • 8.1
Negative ratiob 29.1 54.8






Not availablec 6.3 4.5 .
All loans 8.3% 5.3%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. Foreclosure rates
are based on records of disbursements and of extinguishments through December
1951 on loans authorized from June 1934 through June 1951; see Tables B-i and
B-i7 for number and amount of loans.
aIncludesfirms just forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
bLiabilitiesin excess of assets.
cIncludesloans to firms for which Dun & Bradstreet rating or similar informa-
tion was lacking, and a few loans rated "high to good" and the like.
9.3 percent of the number and 7.4 percent of the amount disbursed. These
percentages illustrate the "loss-loan ratio" which will be used to compare
the frequency of loss on RFC loans grouped by salient characteristics
of loan and of borrower. Information is lacking for the application of
such a measure to commercial bank business term loans, but it is unlikely
that so high a frequency of loss would be found there as one loan in every
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TABLE B-23
RFC Direct Business Loans Extinguished with
and without Loss, to December 31, 1951

















From the National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of RFC direct
business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. The records
cover disbursements and extinguishments through December 1.51 on loans au-
thorized from June 1934 through June Foreclosed loans in process of settle-
ment at the end of 1951 on which loss was anticipated are classified as loss loans.
eleven that were made and extinguished. RFC had a relatively unfavorable
experience with its business loans, notwithstanding that it was more
patient than most private bankers in dealing with defaulting firms.
However, this result is not unexpected in view of the less creditworthy
group of firms with which RFC dealt.
The ratios of ioss loans to total loans extinguished varied significantly
among the different periods of RFC business lending activity. On loans
made up to mid-1938 frequency of loss was more than average, yet only
moderately so (Table B-24). The record for loans made from May 1938
TABLE B-24
Period of Lending Activity and Proportion of RFC Direct Business
Loans Extinguished with Loss
•





LOAN MADE Number Amount Number Amount
June 1934—January 1935 10.7% 10.5% 3.8% 2.9%
February 1935—April 1938 9.9 9.7 10.8 12.2
May 1938—May 1940 4.1 8.7 20.7 15.0
June 1940—February 1945 1.2 0.2 5.8 9.4
March 1945—January 1947 16.6 6.8 23.8 23.2
February 1947—May 1948 18.0 6.5 18.8 10.6
June 1948—June 1951 3.3 12.1 16.8 26.7
All loans 9.3% 7.4% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number
and amount of extinguished loans, 1934r—1951, see Table B-23.
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through February 1945—from which our sample excludes those made
under special wartime powers—shows up as very much better than
average. The highest loss-loan ratio came in 1945 and 1946, with one out
of every six loans extinguished having involved some loss to RFC; as is
shown by comparing the ratio by amount with that by number, trouble
occurred mainly with the smaller of the loans in original amount. The
next years of lending, through mid-1948, brought similar results. Just
the reverse is true for the three last years covered, with loss infrequent
and occurring mainly with the larger of the loans. Partly the high loss
frequency for the immediate postwar years resulted from the many GI
business loans which turned out unfavorably. The record may also reflect
variations, in the rigor with which loan agreements were policed by RFC.
The proportion of loans involving loss was significantly higher for
loans in the $1,000 to $10,000 range than for any other size class of
loan, about one out of every nine loans of this size having been extin-
guished with loss, as compared with one out of eleven for loans of all
sizes (Table B-25). Because small loans were ordinarily made to rela-
TABLE B-25
Relation of Loan Size and Term to Maturity to Proportion of
RFC Direct Business Loans Extinguished with Loss
LOAN
CHARACTERISTICS
fl.ATIO OF LOSS LOANS












500,000—999,999 5.7 5.5 .
1 million and over 9.6 7.4
TERM TO MATURiTY
Less than six months 5.3 45.1
1 yearS 7.9 21.0
2 yrs. . 11.6 2.1
3, 4 yrs. 12.8 5.0
5—9 yrs. 5.2 7.1
•10 yrs. and over 13.5 2.3
. Payable on demand 51.6 . 41.5 .
Not available 6.4 12.2
All loans 9.3% 7.4%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclUsive of participations and national defense loans; for number
and amount of extinguished loans, 1984—1951, see Table B-23.
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tively small businesses, and the risks of failure for small firms were defi-
nitely larger than for medium or large firms, this result is understandable;
but contrary to expectation there was no clear tendency for the loss-loan
ratio to increase with original term to maturity. In fact, the highest ratios
were for the relatively few loans payable on demand.
Industrially, the highest frequency of loss appe'ars among the ex-
tinguished loans that had been made to transportation, communications,
and public utility firms; and their low loss-loan ratio by amount indicates
(as other information, not shown, does also) that it was principally small
loans during 1945and1946, probably in aid of veterans' trucking busi-
nesses, that accounted for the high over-all loss frequency in that loan
group. Of the four industrial divisions in which RFC made the most loans,
two show higher than average frequency of loss: metal and metal products
manufacturing, and services (Table B-26). Loans to retaIl trade and
miscellaneous manufacturing firms (stone, clay, glass, lumber, paper)
were also numerous, but had less than average frequency of loss. Among
divisions where RFC loans were few but sufficient for measurement, two
show above-average loss-loan ratios—manufacturing firms in the fuel,
chemicals, and rubber field; and fishing and farming—and the others
(wholesale trade and construction) show smaller than average ratios. Loans
to manufacturers of consumer goods such as textiles and foods also had
less than average frequency of loss. The loss-loan ratios by amount are
usually lower than the ratios by number, and when higher are not ex-
tremely so; that is, loss loans averaged smaller in total amount disbursed
than other loans within most industry groups as well as when
compared for the sample as a whole.
Regionally, among extinguished loans the highest frequency of loss
was that in the Mountain states, where one loan in seven (against a
national average of one in eleven) brought some loss to RFC; next worst
are the ratios for the East South Central region and the territorial pos-
sessions, roughly one loan in eight. The distinctly good records are those
for the New England, Middle Atlantic, West North Central, and Pacific
regions. Again, most of the ratios by amount show that loss lOans averaged
smaller in original size than other loans in the same group, but here
the exceptions are more marked. In the territorial possessions, where
the loans made averaged considerably smaller than the average size for
all regions, loans on which losses occurred averaged larger in original
amount than other extinguished loans. In the East North Central states,
where the loans made were typically large, loss loans were also of large
average size, even for that region.
Loss was relatively frequent where the major use of RFC credit was
to purchase land, buildings, or equipment (Table B-27). Where borrow-
ing firms used loan proceeds principally to construct plant or to acquire
going concerns, the incidence of loss was comparatively low, roughly one
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TABLE. B-26
Industrial and Regional Differences in Proportion of RFC
Direct Business Loans Extinguished with Loss
RATIO OF 'LOSS LOANS






Manufacturing and mininga 8.8% 8.9%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 7.6 6.7
Textiles, apparel, and leather 7.2 8.8
Metals and metal products 11.4 10.3
Petroleum, coal, chemicals,
and rubber 11.4 18.8
Otherb '7.5 5.7




and public utilitiese 19.2 1.5
Services 10.6 5.5
Finance, insurance, real estate 0 0
All otherd 13.3 7.9
REoIoNe
New England 5.6 1.4
Middle Atlantic 6.1 6.5
East North Central 9.9 20.6
West North Central 6.8 . 8.9
South Atlantic 10.3 2.5
East South Central 13.1 5.3
West South Central 9.2 7.6
Mountain ' 15.1 7.2
Pacific 6.6 1.2
Possessions 12.4 48.7
All loans 9.3% 7.4%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number
and amount of extinguished loans, 1934—1951, see Table B-28.
a Mainly manufacturing.
bCoverslumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries,
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining
or quarrying), and other miscellaneous manufactured products.
e Excludes railroads.
d Mainly fisheries and farming (fruit, poultry, truck, etc.).
e For states included in the regions, see Table B-8.
loss loan in twenty loans extinguished; it was somewhat greater, but still
below average, where the proceeds went mainly to augment working
capital or to repay debt. The information-lacking group contains negligibly
few loans, and the ratios by amount differ too little from those by number
to occasion comment. In the breakdown of loans by the year the borrow-
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TABLE B-27
Relation of Borrower's Use of Proceeds, and of Year Business-
Established, to Proportion of RFC Direct Business




EATIO OF LOSS LOANS
TO ALL EXTINOtflSHED LOANS
Number Amount •







Addition to working capital
Purchase of land or buildings






YEAR BUSINESS ESTABLISHED .








All loans 9.3% 7.4%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number
and amount of extinguished loans, 1934—1951, see Table B-23.
ing firm was established, the notable figures are the high loss-loan ratios
for businesses just organizing at time of loan, and for firms organized
during 1943—1949.
In Table B-28, the data relating loss frequency to three-year trends
in the borrower's sales and net income up to date of loan are the most
reliable. It is shown that loans to firms too young to record trends had
a high loss-loan ratio, over one loan in seven that had been extinguished.
The ratio was also high for firms old enough to record trends but not
supplying information. Among extinguished loans to firms with downward
sales trends, about one in thirteen brought some loss, whereas for firms
with stable or rising trends the ratio was better than one in twenty.
Among the loans to young businesses, those on which loss: was incurred
averaged smaller in original size than others; but where, for other
reasons, sales and profit performance were unknown, the reverse was
true. Also notable are the high loss frequency where borrowers' net in-
come trends were declining moderately, and the much lesser frequency
of loss where the profit declines were sharp. The evidence provided by
trends in net worth and current ratio must be regarded as unclear—with
information-lacking loans (apart from those to young firms) comprising
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TABLE B-28
Relation of Three-Year Trends in Borrower's Financial Condition
before Loan Authorization to Proportion of RFC Direct
Business Loans Extinguished with Loss
RATIO OF LOSS LOANS
NATURE OF TREND IN
BORROWER'S FINANCIAL
TO ALL EXTINGUISHED LOANS
Number Amount
NET SALES
Sharply upward 2.7% 4.1%
Moderately upward 4.6 5.0
Horizontal or mixed 4.5 2.7
Moderately downward 7.5 9.7
Sharply downward 6.5 4.6
New businessb 15.1 8.2
Notavailable 11.3 46.6
NET
Sharply upward 2.5 0.9
Moderately upward 5.0 9.9
Horizontal or mixed 5.3 4.0
Moderately downward 12.5 17.4
Sharply downward 4.1 4.2
New businessb 15.1 8.2
Not available 11.1 47.1
NET WORTH
Sharply upward 2.0 1.0
Moderately upward 0.3 6.2
Horizontal or mixed 6.0 4.1
Moderately downward 7.4 5.0
Sharply downward 13.4 6.1
New businessb 15.1 8.2
Not available 5.7 12.8
CURRENT RATIO
Sharply upward 4.7 5.4
Moderately upward 5.0 2.8
Horizontal or mixed 4.9 2.6
Moderately downward 4.4 7.4
Sharply downward 8.6 6.0
New businessb 15.1 8.2
Not available 5.7 12.9
All loans 9.3% 7.4%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of extinguished loans, 1934-1951, see Table B-23.
a "Sharply" upward or downward refers to average annual expansion or con-
traction of 20.5 percent or more; "moderately," to expansions or contractions
averaging between 5.5 and 20.5 percent. "Horizontal" refers to average annual
contractions or expansions less than 5.5 percent, and the class includes movements
of divergent direction.
b Includes firms newly organizing at time of loan or too young to have calculable
trends.
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about 40 percent of all extinguished loans—even though the variations
in the known cases are not particularly implausible.
Loss-loan ratios by indicators of the borrower's financial condition
shortly before loan date show a clear-cut relationship between the current
ratio and the frequency of loss (Table B-29). The proportion of loans
extinguished with loss was almost one in every nine where the current
ratio was less than one (a loss frequency nearly twice as high as where
current assets equaled or exceeded current liabilities), and the loss loans
TABLE B-29
Relation of Borrower's Financial Condition at Time of
Loan Authorization to Proportion of RFC Direct
Business Loans Extinguished with Loss
. BORROWER'S
FINANCIAL CONDITION
RATIO OF LOSS LOANS
TO ALL EXTINOflISHEI) LOANS
Number - Amount
CURRENT RATIO
Less than 1.00 10.8% 25.0%
1.00—1.49 . 5.9 4.6
. 1.50—1.99 5.7 2.4
2.00—2.99 4.1 2.3
3.00—4.99 6.6 3.7
5.00 and over 6.5 8.5
Not availablea 12.9 4.0
NET WORTH/TOTAL DEBT










Not availablea . 12.3 3.4
CREDIT RATING






Not avallablec 6.0 6.0
All loans 9.8% 7.4%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of extinguished loans, see Table B-23.
a Includes firms just, forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
b Liabilities in excess of assets.
c Includes loans to firms for which Dun & Bradstreet rating or similar informa-
tion was lacking, and a few loans rated "high to good" and the like.
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tended to average larger in'originalsize than other loans in that group.
Loss was most frequent where information on the current ratio was lack-
ing; but in 'this case the trouble related more to the smaller of the loans.
As regards the ratio of net worth to debt: Few loans were made to firms
with liabilities in excess of assets, but they averaged exceptionally large
in original amount, and over half of them brought loss. The next highest
loss frequencies were those among loans where debt totaled less than
$500—probablyto small and new establishments—and where information
was not supplied. Loans to firms whose debt exceeded their net worth had
distinctly higher loss-loan ratios than where firms were less heavily in-
debted. The evidence from the borrower's credit rating is mixed.
EXTENT OP LOSS
On the loans made during 1934—1951 and foreclosed (or otherwise
liquidated at the option of RFC) by the end of 1951, the sample indi-
cates that losses totaled 37.5 percent of the amount originally disbursed,
or about $14.6 million. This may be compared with $710 million that
had been disbursed on all loans extinguished, to yield a loss ratio of about
2.1 percent. In other words, RFC lost about 2 cents and collected 98
cents of every dollar of principal originally disbursed or business loans
extinguished up to December 31, 1951.
Comparable loss ratios are not reported by commercial banks for their
business term loans, but the RFC figure is greatly in excess of that con-
sidered normal by private lending agencies. During 1951, all insured
commercial banks reported losses, charge-offs, and transfers to reserve
account of less than one-half of 'one percent of all loans and discounts
held by them.32 Considering that the weighted average term to maturity
of these credits was probably under two years, this implies a loss ratio
of under 1 of 'the amount of all loans and discounts extinguished
during the year, and there is no evidence that term ,loans had a poorer
record of loss than other commercial bank loans.
In studying the extent of loss according to different characteristics
of RFC loans and borrowers, loss 'loans will be considered first as among
other foreclosed loans, and then as among all extinguished loans and all
loans made. Loss ratios on liquidated loans varied widely among industry
groups of loans: for two of the divisions where our earlier materials
showed that foreclosure was frequent—namely, with metal and metal
products manufacturers, and for the petroleum, coal, chemicals, rubber
group—losses on the foreclosed loans were very heavy (Table B-30).
Regionally,the loss ratios were highest in the Middle Atlantic, Mountain,
and Pacific regions, among which only the Mountain states showed high.
frequency of foreclosure. Relatively few loans maturing in ten years or




Industrial and Regional Differences in L,ss Rates on









Manufacturing and. mininga 40.6% 44.5% 86.8%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 35.7 5.4 7.3
Textiles, apparel, and leather 33.1 15.2
Metals and metal products 50.4 14.8 32.3
Petroleum, coal, chemicals,
and rubber 61.6 3.1 7.4
Otherb
. 27.3 16.8 . 24.6 ,
Retail trade 6.9 12.9 . 3.3
Wholesale trade . 22.9 1.1 0.6
Construction . 18.8 6.2 2.2
Transportation, communications,




Finance, insurance, real estate .. ..
All otherd 26.6 2.8 0.6
REOIONe
New England 27.5 2.0 8.4
Middle Atlantic 47.7 8.0 25.8
East North Central 35.5 11.4 16.7
West North Central 18.6 4.1 8.4
South Atlantic 19.7
East South Central 32.4
18.9 10.5
10.1 2.8









All loans 87.5% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC directbusiness
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; fornumber and
amount of foreclosed loans, 1984—-1951, see Table B-].7. Foreclosed loans whose
settlement record was not complete are included, with losses to December31, 1951,
excepting six large ones where substantial recoverieson collateral security were
anticipated.
a Mainly manufacturing.
b Covers lumber and lumber products;paper and allied products or industries,
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (includingnonmetallic mining
or quarrying), and other miscellaneous manufactured products.
CExcludesrailroads.
d Mainly fisheries and farming (fruit, poultry,truck, etc.).
e For states included in the regirns, see Table B-8.
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more were foreclosed, but of the original investment in the loans fore-
closed, half had to be written off; the same is true, but with losses not
quite so heavy, for the five- through nine-year range (Table B-al). Loans
of $500,000 and over had better than, average records as to frequency of
foreclosure, but worse than average loss records on liquidated loans,
with over half of RFC's original investment lost. Similarly heavy losses
were incurred on foreclosed loans in the $10,000 to $25,000 range.
As to size of borrower, heavy losses were sustained on the foreclosed
loans to firms with assets of $25,000 to $50,000 and of $1 million and
over (Table B-32). Both those groups had relatively low frequency of
foreclosure. In the $5,000 to $25,000 range, there was above-average
TABLE B-al
Loss Rates on Foreclosed RFC Direct Business Loans,
by Size of Loan and Term to Maturity
REALIZED NET LOSS DISTRIBUTION OF




Less than $1,000 20.0% 2.3% 0.1%
$1,000—4,999 16.9 40.3 4.2
5,000—9,999 33.8 19.6 ,4.2
10,000—24,999 57.1 13.4 6.8
25,000—49,999 14.2 10.7 , 11.5
50,000—99,999 32.3 7.8 14.7
100,000—499,999 35.3 5.0 32.0
500,000—999,999




Less than six months .. ••
1 year 19.7 9.2 9.6
2 yrs. 20.2 19.3 7.0
3, 4 yrs. 20.1 41.6 16.1
5—9 yrs. 43.3 23.3 50.4
10 yrs. and over 51.5 '3.7 13.2
Payable on demanda 68.8 2.9 8.7
PREVIOUS ACTION
Repeat loan 40.7 16.2 '45.3
Initial loan 34.9 83.8 54.7
All loans 37.5% 100.0% 100.0%
From theNationalBureau ofEconomicResearch survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of foreclosed loans, 1934—1951, see Table B-17. Foreclosed loans whose
settlement record was not complete are included, with losses to December' 31,
1951, excepting six large ones where substantial recoveries on collateral security
were anticipated.
a Includes loans of unknown term, on which losses were light.
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frequency of foreclosure, wit.h two-fifths of the amount of the disburse-
ments finally written off.
Receipts on liquidated loans to businesses newly forming at time of
loan, which had a poor record as to frequency of foreclosure, were better
than average (Table B-32). The relatively heavy losses on foreclosed
loans came with firms established during 1931—1942, comparatively few
of whose loans went into foreclosure. Firms with moderately declining
net income trends up to loan date, which had the worst foreclosure rate
so far as trends were known, also apparently had a very poor loss record
on foreclosed loans, with RFC receiving less than four dollars out of
every ten originally invested.
Loss rates relating the amount of RFC losses to the total amount of
extinguished loans and of all loans made are given for different classes
of loan and of borrower in Tables B-33, B-34, and B-35.
Manufacturing firms, it may be recalled, received most of the credit
extended by RFC, by far the largest share going to metal and metal
products manufacturers (40 Percent of the RFC total), and the second
largest share to the miscellaneous group (lumber, paper, stone, clay,
glass; 16 percent). Loans in the metals group had high foreclosure rates,
high incidence of loss, and poor receipts on liquidated loans as compared
to RFC's average experience. Yet their loss rate, by either of the measures
shown, differed little from the over-all average (Table B-33). The ex-
planation is that while the average size of loans to metals firms was large
(about $211,000, as against an over-all average of $72,300), trouble arose
mainly from the smaller of them, and the good performance of many
large loans improved the loss rates for the group. Loss rates for the
miscellaneous manufacturing group, also close to the over-all averages,
are not surprising in view of the experience data given earlier.
The worst loss rates among industries are those for the petroleum,
coal, chemicals, rubber division. Those for the textile, apparel, leather
group are also high. Relatively low loss rates appear for construction, for
trade, and for service; also for the transportation, communications, public
utility group, notwithstanding a high frequency of distress among the
smaller of the loans. Loans in the insurance, real estate, financial group
were very few and brought no losses in the period covered.
Almost three-quarters of the total credit extended by RFC was concen-
trated in four regions: the East North Central and Pacific, each with
one-fifth, and the Middle Atlantic and South Atlantic with smaller but
sizable shares. Three of the four had relatively low loss rates: the East
North Central, where loss-loan frequency was somewhat high and in-
volved loans in which RFC's original investment had been large, but
where receipts on liquidated loans were better than average; the Pacific,
where such receipts were poor but foreclosure and loss infrequent and
pertaining unusually to the smaller of the loans; and the South Atlantic,
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Loss Rates on Foreclosed RFC Direct Business Loans, by Borrower's












Less than $5,000 22.4% 17.4% 2.8%
$5,000—24,999 40.7 22.4 5.0
25,000—49,999 49.5 6.2 2.4
50,000—99,999 25.1 7.3 5.5
100,000—249,999 39.6 10.2 19.4
250,000—499,999 21.5 4.5 12.2
500,000—749,999 18.1 2$ 8.3
750,000—999,999 19.5 0.9 6.0
1 million and over 44.4 1.3 23.3
Not available 58.3 27.1 15.5
YEAR BUSINESS ESTABLISHED
Before 1931 34.7 19.1 86.6
1931—1942 46.3 9.9 27.7.
1943—1949 16.2 38.1 22.1
1950—1951
Newly forming at time of loan 29.4 28.6 5.9
Not available 87.0 4.2 7.7
NET INCOME TRENDb
Sharply upward 12.1 5.5 7.6
Moderately upward 42.2 0.6 1.0
Horizontal or mixed 34.7 13.0 37.8
Moderately downward 63.7 2.0 5.8
Sharply downward 31.9 4.6 11.5
New businessc 28.7 61.2 17.1
Not available 56.1 13.1 19.2
CURRENT RATIOa
Less than 1.00 38.5 21.8 .33.6
1.00—1.49 27.0 10.1 20.9
1.50—1.99 12.2 4.9 11.7
2.00—2.99 39.6 4.2 4.5
3.00—4.99 44.8 3:5 3.7
5.00 and over 82.0 3.0 4.1
Not availabled 50.1 52.5 21.5
All loans 37.5% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct busi-
ness loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans; for number and
amount of foreclosed loans, 1934.—1951, see Table B-17. Foreclosed loans whose
settlement record was not complete are included, with losses to December 31,
1951, excepting six large ones where substantial recoveries on collateral security
were anticipated.
aAt time of loan application.
b During three fiscal years prior to loan authorization. For classification used,
see Table B-28.
c Firms newly forming at time of loan or too young to have calculable trend.
d Includes firms just forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
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Loss Rates on RFC Direct Business Loans Made, and on
Extinguished Loans, by Borrower's Industry,
Region, and Year Established
NETLOSS






Loans Made guished Loans
INDUSTRY
Manufacturing and mininga 1.6% 2.5%
Food,liquor, and tobacco 1.3 2.9
Textiles, apparel, and leather 2.1 3.0
Metals and metal productsb 1.4 2.0
Petroleum, coal, chemicals, and
rubber 2.7 9.2
Otherc 1.4 2.1
Retail trade 0.3 0.5
Wholesale trade 0.3 0.7
Construction 0.5 0.9
Transportation, communications,
and public utilitiesd 0.4 0.5
Services 0.5 1.3
Finance, insurance, real estate 0 0
All Othere 1.3 2.6
REGIONt
New England 0.5 0.8
Middle Atlantic 2.2 3.5
East North Centraib 0.9 1.7
West North Central 1.0 1.5
South Atlantic 0.5 0.9
East South Central 0.6 1.8









Newly forming at time of loan 3.8 7.5
Not available 19.7 20.8
All loans 1.3% 2.1%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of RFC direct
business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. The record
covers disbursements and losses through December 1951 on loans authorized from
June 1934 through June 1951; for number and amount of loans made and loans
extinguished, see Tables B-i andB-17.
a Mainly manufacturing. Loans to mining companies account for 3 percent of
the number and amount of loans disbursed.
bLosson six loans in process of settlement at the end of 1951 is excluded.
c Covers lumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries,
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining
or quarrying), and other miscellaneous manufactured products.
d Excludes railroads.
e Mainly fisheries and farming (fruit, poultry, truck, etc.).
f For states included in the regions, see Table B-8.APPENDIX B
where slightly higher than average foreclosure and loss frequency con-
cerneci mainly small loans, and where receipts on liquidated loans were
very good.
The very high loss rates for the territorial possessions—where loans
were few and usually small—reflect bad experience with a small number
of loans much larger than others in the group. The Mountain states, an-
other area of small loans as compared to the RFC average, show high
loss rates accordant with their high frequency of foreclosure and loss and
their poor record of receipts on liquidated loans. They also show a high
loss frequency of default among loans still outstanding at the end of
1951. The West South Central states, a rapidly developing region to
which RFC made a large share of its loans (nearly one-fourth of the total
number), but where, again, loan size averaged relatively small, had a
loss rate somewhat above average as measured by total extinguishments
but somewhat below average as measured by the amount of all loans
made—a difference explained by the good record of receipts on liquidated
loans. The delinquency status for loans still active in 1951 in the West
South Central region was also good as compared to RFC loans elsewhere.
Loans to newly forming enterprises (which received less than 2 percent
of the total amount of RFC credit) brought very high loss rates. Differ-
ences in the ioss experience with established firms dating from the forties,
the thirties, and before are not striking. Firms established during 193 1—
1942 had the least good record. Delinquency among loans still active
in 1951 was slightly less frequent for that group than for the other two,
but concerned the larger of its loans as to original amount.
Earlier measures of experience showed rather irregular patterns for
size classes of RFC loans, except that frequency of foreclosure was worse
than average for loans below $10,000 size and better than average for the
groups above that amount. The irregularity reappears when extent of
loss is measured (Table B-34). It may be worth noting that among loans
still active in 1951 (hence not includable in the loss measures) the highest
default ratios appeared for the size classes that show up best as to loss
rates on all loans made ($25,000 to $100,000) and a better than average
default ratio for one of the poorer groups as to loss rates ($10,000to
$25,000). On the record of extinguishments through 1951, the extremely
low loss rates for very large loans, $1 million and over, stand out; and
the default status of that group among loans still active in 1951 was also
good. Half of all RFC credit extended during 1934—1951 went into loans
of $1 million or over; thus their comparatively good record counts heavily
in the over-all loss rates on RFC business lending.
Among the loss rates by term to maturity, those for loans of unknown
term, or payable on demand or in less than six months, concern very few
cases. The loan group with 5- through 9-year contract lengths, where
41 percent of RFC business credit was concentrated, brought losses
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roughly twice as high, in proportion to the amount of loans made, as
those of the other considerable groups (Table B-34). Loans still active
in 1951, it may be recalled, showed lower frequency of default the longer
the term to maturity. The opposite pattern appears in the extent of loss
on extinguished loans, except for the relatively good record of those
with maturities of 10 years and over.
In general, the loss rates on RFC loans were worse the smaller the
asset size of the borrower; but firms in the $100,000 to $250,000 range
are an exception, with. loss rates higher than any other loan group except
those to businesses with assets of less than $25,000 (Table B-35).
RFC credit to firms that were old enough to have three-year net income
trends before date of loan yet failed to supply information was not negligi-
ble in amount (6 percent of the total) and brought heavy losses. Loans
to businesses too young to have calculable profit trends had loss rates
worse than the RFC average, yet not extremely so. Since that group of
firms received 11 percent of total RFC credit, and since only about one-
seventh of their share represented loans to enterprises just organizing at
time of loan, the loss rates for "new" businesses given in Table B-35
pertain mainly to young rather than to brand-new enterprises. Heavy
losses were sustained on the less than 2 percent of RFC credit that went
to firms with moderately declining net income trends, and distinctly above-
average losses on the still smaller amount that went to firms with moderate
rises. Eleven percent of the number and 20 percent of the amount of RFC
loans went to firms with sharply downward profit trends, and brought
smaller than average loss rates—better than those for the large share
of RFC credit (44!percent)that went to firms with stable or mixed
trends. As would be expected from the other measures of loan perform-
ance, borrowers with current liabilities exceeding current assets at time
of loan produced a loss record.
Analysis of RFC Participation Loans
A large part of RFC's credit activity in the business loan field involved
commercial banks. From the beginning of its business lending operations,
RFC stood ready to participate with a commercial bank on either an
"immediate" or a "deferred" basis. Immediate participation occurred
when the RFC and a bank each advanced a specified part of the funds
under a single loan agreement, initiated either by the bank or by RFC.
Deferred participation occurred when a bank advanced the total amount
of a loan from its own funds and RFC agreed to take up any amount not
exceeding a specified proportion of the loan upon demand by the bank, in
effect guaranteeing to' the bank repayment of that part of the loan. ItFC
charged the bank a fee on deferred participations, based upon the ab-
• solute amount and the proportion of the loan which it was committed to
purchase. During most of the time, the deferred participation f cc was
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TABLE B-34
Loss Rates on RFC Business Loans Made, and on










CHAB.ACTEJUSTICS Loans Made guished Loans
AMOUNT AUTHORIZED








1 million and overa 0.4 0.7
LOAN MADE
June 1934—January 1935 3.1 8.1
February 1935—April 1938 4.8 4.4
May 1938—May 1940 2.3 2.3
June 1940—February 1945 0.2 0.2
March 1945—January 1947 2.8 3.3
February 1947—May 1948 1.6 2.6
June 1948—June 1951a b 0.1
TERM TO MATURiTY
Lessthan six monthse 0 0
1 yeard 0.7 0.8
2 yrs. 0.6 1.0
3, 4 yrs. 0.9 1.4
5—9 yrs. 1.8 3.6
10 yrs. and over 0.8 1.2
Payable on demand 47.3 47.3
Not available 2.2 3.0
PREVIOUS ACTION
Repeat loana 1.2 1.8
Initial loan 1.4 2.3
All loans 1.3% 2.1%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. The record covers
.disbursements and losses through December 1951 on loans authorized from June
1934 through June 1951; for number and amount of loans made and loans ex-
tinguished, see Tables B-I and B-17.
a Loss on six loans in process of settlement at the end of 1951 is excluded.
b Less than 0.05 percent.
c Loss on four loans in process of settlement is excluded.
d Loss on two loans in process of settlement is excluded.
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computed on the outstanding balance of RFC's portion of a loan: 1 per-
cent when the bank's share was 10 to 25 percent; 3/4 of 1 percent when the
bank's share was 25 to 50 percent; and ½of1 percent when the bank's
share was over 50 percent.
In March 1945 RFC extended the principle of participation by writing
Blanket Participation Agreements with commercial banks. Under such
an agreement, an approved bank was automatically assured of a deferred
participation up to 75 percent of the amount of any business loan made
by the bank which conformed to the statutory restrictions imposed upon
RFC. The announced purpose of the BPA program was to "adequately
and promptly care for the large volume of applications for loans which
it is anticipated may develop during and subsequent to the period of re-
conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy." Originally, banks
were permitted to make eligible loans up to $250,000 to any one borrower
(later increased to $350,000, and then reduced to $100,000) without prior
approval. By making it possible for a bank to obtain a loan guarantee
without prior appraisal by RFC of each individual loan, the BPA pro-
gram greatly extended the range of RFC participations.
Although numerous banks availed themselves of BPA facilities, the
program was criticized by some bankers on grounds of providing an un-
necessary and untimely stimulus to credit expansion, of encouraging loose
lending practices by banks, and of adding to the already heavy liabilities
of the federal government.33 On January 22, it was withdrawn by
RFC, and was replaced by the Small Loan Participation program, which
was in effect a simplified procedure for handling applications for deferred
participation. SLP loans, with an RFC commitment up to 75 percent on
business loans limited to $100,000 each, could be finally approved in
RFC's field offices, provided the loan agency manager telegraphed a re-
port to Washington on the solvency of the borrower and the value of his
collateral, and received from the Secretary a telegraphed reply that
solvency and collateral were satisfactory to the JtFC Board.
The BPA and SLP programs involved special features and were opera-
tive only late in the period of RFC's activity. Chief attention will be
focused upon the ordinary, ongoing types of participation loans made by
RFC, with later comment on the characteristics of loans under blanket
participation agreements.
DEVELOPMENT AND MAGNITUDE OF PARTICIPATION LENDING
Outstanding amounts that RFC was committed to extend on demand—
or, in some cases, had extended—in participation loans always formed a
considerable segment of the Corporation's total credit volume, and at
times (from mid-1946 through mid-1947) exceeded the amount of its
See Proceedings of American Bankers Association, Convention, Chicago,
September 1946. Also Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1946.
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TABLE B-35
Loss Rates on RFC Direct Business Loans Made, and on
Extinguished Loans, by Financial Characteristics of
Borrower
. aEALIZED NET LOSS




On All On Extin-
CHARACTERISTICS Loans Made guished Loans
TOTAL ASSETSa








1 million and overb 0.7 1.2
Not available 1.9 2.3
NET TRENDC
Sharply upward 0.2 0.3
Moderately upward 2.0 4.2
Horizontal or mixed 1.0 1.6
Moderately downward 7.9 14.1
Sharply downwardd 0.6 1.0
New businesse 1.5 3.0
Not availablef 6.1 7.7
CURRENT RATTOa





5.00 and over 2.2 3.1
Not availableg 1.9 2.4
All loans 1.3% 2.1%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research survey of RFC direct business
loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. The record covers
disbursements and losses through December 1951 on loans authorized from June
1934 through June 1951; for number and amount of loans made and loans ex-
tinguished, see Tables B-i and B-il.
a At time of loan application.
bLoss on six loans in process of settlement at the end of 1951 is excluded.
During three fiscal years prior to loan authorization. For classification used,
see Table B-28.
d Loss on one loan in process of settlement is excluded.
e Firms newly forming at time of loan or too young to have calculable trend.
f Loss on five loans in process of setfiement is excluded.
gIncludesfirms just forming at time of loan, and other firms not supplying
information.
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direct lending.34 Up to mid-1947 RFC authorized more than $1 billion
as its share of immediate and deferred participations with commercial
banks. Of this amount, $629 million consisted of the RFC share of
ordinary participation loans, and the balance represented commitments
under the BPA program (with a small amount under the SLP program
begun in 1947). Among ordinary participation loans are included both
the "regular" business loans, made under the authority and subject to
the limitations of Section 5 (d) of the RFC Act of June 19, 1934, and
the "national defense" loans, made under expanded statutory authority
effective June 1940, which removed some of the restrictions as to purpose,
maturity, and collateral security that otherwise applied.
Nearly all of the ordinary participations were macic on a deferred
basis (as were all of the BPA loans); only 12 percent of them involved
the immediate extension of RFC funds. Thus we are dealing here largely
with a loan guaranteeing function, and will use that terminology except
if immediate participations alone are meant.
Table B-36 gives a summary of the number of participating banks,
number of ordinary participation loans (exclusive of withdrawals and
cancellations), gross amount authorized, and RFC share of the authoriza-
tions over the period June 1, 1984 to. July 1, 1947, and for three sub-
periods: the post-depression period June 1934 through December 1937;
the recession and pre-Worid War II recovery period January 1938
through December 1941; and the war and postwar period January 1942
through June .1947. Mid-1947 was chosen as terminal date because it
marked the end of the regular monthly reporting by RFC to Congress oii
which the study relied for information about participating banks.
Over the period as a whole, the gross amount of ordinary participation
loans• authorized was about $828 million, of which the RFC share was 76
percent. The average size of loan authorized was $70,100 in .the case of
immediate participations, of which the amount extended by RFC averaged
$53,200. The average size of deferred participations was $148,300, with
the share guaranteed by RFC averaging $112,600. Before World War II
the average amount of loan authorizations was considerably smaller, and
the RFC percentage share was less, than after the price inflation of the
war and postwar periods. Yet RFC was consistently the major partner
in participation loans, carrying two-thirds to three-quarters of the risk.
The deferred participation, loans made during 1934—1947 averaged
about twice the size of RFC's direct loans—$148,300 versus $72,300—
and both were considerably larger than the average bank term loan made
during 1946, which was somewhat over Thus, RFC's guaran-
34 See Chart B-i, page 431, for quarterly outstandings from 1934 on, where the
small amounts of immediate participations are included with direct loans and con-
trasted with the deferred participations (loan guarantees).
35 Holthausen, op.cit., Table 6, p. 505; the estimates refer to term loans made
from November 1945 to November 1946 and give the amount loaned less repay-
ments during the year.
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TABLE B-36














pating banks 312 1,043 1,218 2,018a
Number of participa-
tion loans 395 1,891 3,679 5,965
Immediate 269 371 88 728
Deferred 126 1,520 3,591 5,237
Gross amount of loans
authorized $27,503,900 $148,107,100 $651,920,100 $827,531,100
Immediate 17,550,100 17,999,600 15,506,000 51,055,700
Deferred 9,953,800 130,107,500 636,414,100 776,475,400
RFC share $19,783,100 $ 98,110,400 $510,636,600 •$628,530,100
Immediate 12,576,100 12,672,100 13,513,300 38,761,500
Deferred 7,207,000 85,438,300 497,123,300 589,768,600
Average size of loans $69,630 $78,322 $177,200 $138,731
Immediate 65,242 48,516 176,204 70,131
Deferred 78,998 85,597 177,225 148,267
Average RFC share $50,084 $51,883 $138,798 $105,370
Immediate 46,751 34,157 153,560 53,244
Deferred 57,198 56,209 138,436 112,616
Average RFC percentage . . .
share 71.9% 66.2% 78.3% 76.0%
Immediate 71.7 70.4 87.1 75.9
Deferred 72.4 65.7 78.1 76.0
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of. all RFC participation
loans to business except those made under blanket agreements; the few SLP loans made in
1947 are also excluded. Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full
before initial disbursement.
aLess the sum of the numbers shown in each period because banks participating in
more than one period are counted only once.
teeing of commercial bank loans occurred with respect to credits of con-
siderably larger average amount than either banks or RFC were ex-
tending singly.
Participation loans appear to have functioned as a counter-cyclical
factor before World War II and as a war financing measure after 1941
(Table B-37). They expanded through 1934 and 1935 and tapered off
during 1936 as the Great Depression ended, falling to a very iow point
of activity during 1937. During 1938, RFC business lending programs
were greatly accelerated to combat the sharp business recession; thereafter
the pace of participation lending was slowed. After the United States'
entry into World War II the number •of ordinary participation loans
authorized rose to an all-time peak, the high for the aggregate amount
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YEAR No. Percent
GROSS AMOUNT RPC SNARE
Amo'unt Percent Anzo'unt Percent
1934 (6mo.) 51 0.9% $3,243 0.4% $2,419 0.4%
1935 201 8.4 11,855 1.4 8,552 1.4
1936 87 1.5 7,967 1.0 5,681 0.9
1937 56 0.9 4,440 0.5 3,131 0.5
1938 883 14.8 7.8 41,409 6.6
1939 525 8.8 45,361 5.5 31,985 Sd
1940 312 5.2 15,181 1.8 9,845 1.6
1941 111 2.9 23,092 2.8 14,871 2.4
1942 1,870 23.0 133,162 16.1 103,326 16.4
1943 856 14.4 167,139 20.2 134,930 21.4
1944 606 10.1 142,993 17.8 115,579 18.4
1945 857 6.0 96,362 11.6 '14,758 11.9
1946 318 5.3 65,351 7.9 48,910 7.8
1947 (6 mo.) 172 2.9 46,912 5.7 83,135 5.3
Total 5,965 100.0% $827,531 100.0% $628,530 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC participation loans
to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs. Refers to net authorizations,
i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial disbursement.
coming a year later. The volume remained high through 1944, and then
declined substantially after the end of the war.
Viewing these movements over longer spans, it is seen that the volume
of participation loans authorized rose at an accelerating rate. During
the first 43 months of RFC's life only 395 loans aggregating $28 million
were involved; during the succeeding 48 months (to the end of 1941),
1,891 loans aggregating $148 million were authorized; during the final
66 months (to mid-1947) no less than 3,679 loans amounting to $652
million were authorized, exclusive of loans in which RFC participated
under the BPA program and which alone amounted to more than $525
million. Evidently, loan guaranteeing under participation arrangements
was a practice of growing popularity and vitality, at least until the cur-
tailment of RFC's functions in 1947 and 1948.
Of the 5,965 ordinary participation loans authorized during 1934—
1947, not far from half were national defense credits (Table B-38). The
defense loans averaged larger than the regular loans, and the RFC share
in them was also higher, in dollar amount and percentagewise. Hence
about 60 percent of the total RFC commitments to participation loans
from 1934 to mid-1947 consisted of national defense loans made after




Number and Amount of RFC Participation Loans Authorized Annually, 1934—1947
(dollar figures in thousands)APPENDIX B
TABLE B-38







• .Regular 54.5% 39.5%
Immediate 11.0 4.4 4.1
Deferred 43.5 38.1 35.4
National Defen8e 45.5 57.4 60.5
Immediate 1.2 1.7 2.0




From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC par-
ticipation loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial
disbursement. For number and amount of loans, see Table B-36.
Among the national defense participations only a very few—about
3 percent by number and by amount—involved the immediate use of RFC
funds (Table B-38). Among the regular participations, immediate ex-
tension of RFC loan funds was more frequent but nevertheless was far
outweighed by deferred participations, which represented 80 percent by
number and 90 percent by amount. Commercial bankers naturally pre-
ferred a loan under which the bank advanced the total amount of the funds
and earned the interest thereon (less participation charges), with the
RFC standing by to take up a major part of the loan upon demand,
rather than to have the RFC share in the original advance and divide the
interest income from the loan
RFC participations were strongly concentrated around the 75 percent
level (Table B-39). Other points of concentration were around the 50
percent and 90 percent levels. Altogether, about 70 percent of the loans
and 76 percent of the gross amount authorized involved an RFC share
of either 50, 75, or 90 percent; and over two-thirds of the amount of RFC
commitments represented participations at the 75 and 90 percent levels.
These facts suggest that if RFC had been limited by law to a maximum
participation of 50 percent, the volume of its participation lending might
have been considerably reduced.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPATION LOANS
AND OF BORROWING FIRMS
The size distribution of bank loans made with RFC participation is as
would be expected from the average size figures already given. Over
half were in the over $10,000 to $100,000 range, and only 25 percent in
amounts of $10,000 or less. Nearly three-quarters of the gross amount
authorized represented loans of more than $200,000; in fact 43 percent
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TABLE B-39
Distribution of Participation Loans by RFC
























72.5—77.4 32.5 35.6 35.1
77.5—82.4 12.2 6.4 6.7









100.0 0.4 1.3 1.7
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC par-
ticipation loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLF programs.
Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial
disbursement. For number and amount of loans, see Table B-36.
represented loans of over $1 million (Table B-40). A comparison of this
material with the distributions given earlier for loans made independently
by banks and by RFC (Table B-2), though hampered by differences in
the class boundaries used, again clearly shows the essentially "middle
size" character of the RFC business credit programs. Even more than
TABLE B-40








$5,000 and under 11.1% 0.3% 0.3%
5,000—10,000 13.5 0.8 0.8
10,000—25,000 •22.3 3.0 .2.8
25,000—50,000 16.4 4.7 4.6
50,000—100,000 16.5 9.6 9.6
100,000—200,000 8.6 9.6 9.2









Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC par-
ticipation loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial
disbursement. For number and amount of loans, see Table B-36.
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RFC's direct lending, its participation credit—largely in the deferred, or
guarantee, form—was concentrated in loans of $50,000 to $500,000 size,
•whereas commercial bank loans made independently were concentrated
more in the smallest and largest size classes.
As with direct lending, RFC's loan guaranteeing activity concentrated
heavily in the manufacturing sector of business (Table B-41). Within
that sector, again the metals and metal products division received the
TABLE B-41
Industrial and Regional Distributions of RFC








Food, liquor, and tobacco
Textiles, apparel, and leather



















Otherd 17.7 14.0 13.4



















Finance, insurance, real estate 3.3 6.7 6.1













West North Central 10.5 7.9 7.8

















Possessions 0.3 0.3 0.2
Total 100.0% '100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC par-
ticipation loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial
disbursement. For number and amount of loans, see Table B-36.
a For states included in the regions, see Table 13-8. Details of industry composi-
tion are given below.
bMainlymanufacturing; mining concerns account for 3.6 percent of the total
number and less than 2 percent of the total gross amount authorized.
c Loans to mining companies form only a nominal fraction.
dCoverslumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products (including nonmetallic mining and




most loans (20 percent of loans to all industries) and the largest credit
(32 percent of the gross amount authorized); loans to aircraft and air-
craft parts makers, and to other manufacturers of transportation equip-
ment (except automobiles)—industries which were expanding rapidly
during the period under consideration—were particularly important within
the metals group. In contrast, of bank term loans made during 1946 with-
out RFC participation only 4 percent by number and 16 percent by amount
went to the metals and metal products industry. But the fields where bank
term loans were most numerous—retail trade, and services—were com-
paratively unimportant in bank lending under ordinary RFC guarantee.
The reasons for these differences are not definitely known. It is a plausi-
ble view, however, that the risks of term lending are, on the average,
greater for firms in manufacturing than for firms of equal size in retail
or service trades, because the term to maturity of the credit that is re-
quired is normally longer, the profitability of the investment fluctuates
through a wider range, and technological and influences are
more pronounced. Banks probably found relatively more numerous in-
stances to request RFC participation in lending money to manufacturing
firms.
Regionally, the pattern of participation lending departed significantly
from the sizes of the business loan marketsmeasured by outstanding
commercial and industrial loans made independently by commercial banks.
The South Atlantic, West South Central, and Pacific regions had rela-
tively large percentages of the amount of participation loans authorized
(Tables B-41 and B-8). New.England, the East North Central region,
and especially the Middle Atlantic region had smaller shares of partici-
pation credit than ordinary bank loans. In the• Pacific states, which
received about 12 percent of the number and 23 percent of the amount
participation loans, average loan size was relatively large—$264,200
against $138,700 for the nation—and the portion guaranteed by RFC
was correspondingly large (averaging about three-quarters of the gross
amount, as elsewhere). These figures bear out an observation made sub-
sequently in connection with the regional distribution of participating
banks :participation credits were relatively heaviest in those states and
regions which were in process of most rapid economic development. In
this respect, RFC loan guaranteeing apparently tended to function as a
support for venture capital.
CHARACTERISTICS OF BANKS UTILIZING
RFC PARTICIPATION FACILITIES
What kinds of commercial banks made the most frequent and extensive
use of cooperative lending arrangements with RFC, particularly as re-
gards size, type of charter, location, and the population of the
communities served?
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There has been a general impression that, in sharing the risks of
business loans, RFC mainly helped small commercial banks to meet the
credit needs of their communities. The evidence shows, to the contrary,
that medium-sized and large banks consistently used RFC participation
facilities with relatively much greater frequency than did small institu-
tions. During the years 1942—1947, banks with deposits of less than
$5 million comprised 77 percent of the total number of insured banks
in the United States, but they included only 32 percent of the number of
insured banks utilizing RFC participation (Table B-42). At the other
TABLE B-42
City Size and Deposit Size Distributions of All Insured Banks
and of Banks Using RFC Participation, and Corresponding











53.1% 17.1% 8.0% 2.2% 2.3%
2,500—4,999 13.0 8.1 5.1 1.5 1.5
5,000—9,999 10.7 11.4 7.1 2.4 2.4
10,000-24,999 9.1 16.7 11.8 7.7 7.6
25,000—49,999 4.1 9.9 8.2 6.0 6.1
50,000—99,999 2.8 9.3 15.0 12.3
•
12.7
100,000—499,999 4.2 17.5 33.7 52.0 52.1
500,000 and over 3.0 9.5 . 10.9 15.8 15.3
Not available .. 0.5 0.2 C C
. DEPOSIT SIZE
Under $250,000 0.7 .. .. .. ..
$250,000—499,999 4.9 0.7 0.2 c c
500,000—999,999 16.6 3.2 1.3 0.1 0.1
1—1.9 million 26.1 • 8.3 4.0 0.9 0.9
2—4.9 million 28.6 19.7 12.0 4.0
5—9.9 million • 11.7 21.5 14.4 7.1 7.0
10—24.9 million 6.6 19.7 19.6 10.8 11.1
25—49.9 million , 2.2
• 9.8 10.6 10.9 11.3
50—99.9 million 1.2 7.0 12.5 14.8 14.7
$100 million andover 1.4 10.1 25.3 51.3 50.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% •
a Asof October 10, 1945; computed from Anwucti Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 1945, Tables 41 and 45, pp. 74 and 78. The total number of insured banks included
is 13,481. The deposit size classes differ from those used for participating banks, "$250,000 and
under" forming the first group, and so on.
b From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC participation
loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs. Refers to net authori-
zations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled. in full before initial disbursement. The number of in-
sured banks using RFC participation in 1942—1947 was 1,201; the number of participation loans,
3,654; their gross amount, $650,737,000.; and the RFC share authorized, $509,653,000.
cLessthan 0.05 percent.
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end of the size scale, large banks (deposits $10 million and over) formed
Only 11 percent of the total number of banks but included 47 percent of
the participating banks. Clearly, the RFC participation program was not
characteristically a small bank aid. To a much greater extent, medium-
sized and large institutions tended to use a public guaranty in lending
money to business. Nearly 70 percent of the participation loans author-
ized, and nearly 90 percent of their amount and of the RFC share, per-
tained to commercial banks with deposits of $10 million or more.
The banks which utilized RFC participation facilities characteristically
were large-city institutions. This refutes the impression that RFC par-
ticipation was mainly useful to the bank in the small community which
was unable, because of legal limitations upon its lending powers or
prudent diversification of its portfolio, to meet by itself the credit needs
of its larger customers. The dominance of large-city banks in the RFC
participation clientele persisted throughout the period 1934—1947, al-
though it declined to some extent through time. During 1942—1947 only
about 10 percent of all insured banks were located in cities with popula-
tions of 50,000 and over, but about 36 percent of all participating banks
were located in these large centers (Table B-42). Only a very small
fraction—about 3 percent—of banks in centers under 5,000 population
utilized RFC guaranty in business lending; yet appreciable proportions
of the institutions in larger centers did so. These findings are, of course,
consistent with those regarding the distribution of participation loans by
size of bank, because of the fairly strong positive correlation between
the size of banks and the size of the communities in which they are
situated.
Throughout the thirteen-year period 1934—1947, the banks utilizing
RFC participation in business lending were to a relatively large extent
members of the Federal Reserve System. During the years 1942—1947
member banks formed 46.8 percent of the American banking population,
but they included no less than 74.5 percent of all participating banks
(Table B-43). Because the larger institutions tend to hold national
charters, or, if state-chartered, to hold membership in the Federal Re-
serve System, the figures substantiate the view that participation with
RFC was characteristically most frequent with the larger and better-
established banks of the nation.
Comparison of the regional distribution of participating banks with
that for all banks shows that through 1937 the New England, Middle
Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Pacific regions had disproportionately large
numbers participating; relatively few banks in the East North Central,
West North Central, and West South Central regions participated (Table
B-44). Later, some of these regional disparities disappeared. But the
Mountain region emerged as an area of relatively frequent use of RFC
participation facilities and the South Atlantic and Pacific regions con-
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Distributions by Type of Charter for All Banks and for Banks
Using RFC Participation, and Corresponding Distribution






TYPE OF BANK BANKSa BANKSb Nwnber Amount Share
National 34.1% 65.3% 77.3% 77.6%
Insured state member of
Federal Reserve System 12.7 20.6 18.3 16.5 16.5
Other insured state 44.9 24.1 15.7 6.0 5.7
Noninsured state 8.3 1.4 0.7 0.2 .0.2
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
a Covers all commercial and mutual savings banks in the United States and possessions
(14,725) as of December 81, 1945; computed from the Anwual Report of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation for that year, Table 102, p. 98. Includes 92 trust companies not regularly
engaged in deposit banking: 1 national, 8 state members of the Federal Reserve system, 5 in-
sured state nonmembers, and 83 noninsured.
b From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC participation
loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs (with information on
type of bank from the source given above). Refers to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans
canceled in full before initial disbursement. Covers 1,218 participating banks; and 3,679 loans,
whose gross amount was $651,920,000 and the RFC share authorized $510,637,000.
TABLE B-44
Regional Distributions of All Banks and of Banks Using RFC
Participation, 1934—1937, 1938—1941, and 1942—1947
1934—1937 1938—1941 1942—1947
Par tici- Par tici- Partici-
• All pating AU pating All pating
ItEGIONa Bank8 Bank8 Banks , Banks Bank8 Banks
New England 5.9% 8.7% 6.0% 5.6% 6.0% 8.2%
Middle Atlantic 15.6 22.1 15.5 15.6 15.1 12.6
East North Central 20.6 16.3 20.4. 19.2 20.6 20.2
West North Central 22.6 12.5 22.5 13.6 22.3 12.0
South Atlantic . 10.8 14.7 11.0 13.7 11.1 15.5
East South Central 7.5 8.0 7.5 7.2 7.5 7.2
West South Central 10.7 3.9 10.8 10.6 11.0 11.3
Mountain 3.2 3.5 3.3 5.8 3.3 6.0
Pacific 2.9 9.9 2.7 8.1 2.7 6.4
Possessions 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% .100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Number of banks 15,444 312 14,877 1,043 14,725 1,218
Ratio of participat-
ing to all banks 2.0% 7.0% 8.3%
Data for participating banks are from the National Bureau of Economic Research compila-
tion of all RFC participation loans except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
Figures for all commercialand mutual savings banks are year-end data from Annual Reports
ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for 1937, 1941, and 1945 (pp. 73ff., 108f., and
98ff., respectively); the 1937 and 1941 data exclude all noninsured trust companies, and those
for1945 exclude such companies if not engaged in deposit banking.
a For states included in the regions, see Table B-S.APPENDIX B
tinued so, while banks in the West North Central region—containing the
predominantly agricultural states of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, the
Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas—continued to use RFC guaranty com-
paratively seldom. Relatively most frequent participation was found in
those regions which were developing economically with the greatest
rapidity. Thus RFC's cooperation with banks in business lending tended
to aid firms in developing areas rather than businesses in. areas of less
rapid development, as was seen also in the regional distribution of bor-
rowing business concerns.
BANK CONCENTRATION OF PARTICIPATION LENDING
There was a high degree of concentration in the use of RFC participa-
tion facilities by banks. No less than 51 percent of the gross amount
authorized under such arrangements over the years was con-
centrated with 99 banks—about 5 percent of all participating banks—
each of which utilized RFC guaranty (or, in some cases, immediate ex-
tension of RFC funds for part of the loan amount) in ten or more business
loans (Table B-45). On the other hand, 1,109 participating banks—55
percent of the total number—used RFC guaranty only once. The 99 banks
that were the most frequent users of RFC guaranty accounted for nearly
twice as many participation loans, and for nearly seven times as much
in gross amount of loan, as the 1,109 banks that made only one RFC
TABLE B-45
Distributionof RFC Participation Loans Authorized
1934—1947, and of the Participating Banks,













1 1,109 55.0% 18.6% 7.4% 7.4%
2 369 18.3 12.4 7.8 7.4
3 . 160 7.9 8.0 6.8 6.5
4 95 4.7 6.4 4.5 4.6
5 71 3.5 5.9 5.2 5.1
6 39 1.9 3.9 4.2 4.1
7 35 1.7 4.1 4.1 4.2
8 22 1.1 3.0 4.8 5.0
•9 19 0.9 2.9 4.3 4.6
10 and over 99 4.9 34.8 50.9 51.2
Total •2,018 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC participation loans
to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs. Refers to net authorizations,
i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial disbursement. For number and amount of
loans, see Table B-36.
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participation loan each. The average size of participation loans was very
much greater for the frequent users than for banks with one, two, or
three participations. Concentration in participation lending increased
greatly both just before and during World War II, probably because of
the exigencies of financing defense and war production.
Why did this high degree of concentration occur, and why did it tend
to increase rather than to diminish? The answers are not clear. Such
evidence as the data afford was gathered by comparing the distributions
of multiple users and of all participating banks by various bank charac-
teristics. The proportion of multiple users tended to be higher the larger
the size class of bank. During 1988—1941, banks with deposits of $5
million and over, which formed 40 percent of all participating banks,
constituted 62 percent of all multiple users, and this disproportion char-
acterized each of five subclasses within the group, whereas for each
smaller size class the reverse was true. A similar pattern, but with $10
million deposits as the dividing line, appeared for 1942—1947. Corre-
spondingly, throughout the period 1934—1947 it was consistently true
that multiple use of RFC guaranty was relatively more frequent among
participating banks in the larger than in the smaller centers of popula-
tion. Regionally, differences in the distribution of multiple users and of
all participating banks were not striking, except that during 1938—1941
the East North Central region had few multiple users in relation to the
number of banks participating, and the Pacific states, comparatively
many.
PARTICIPATION AND THE LEGAL LENDING
LIMITATIONS ON EANKS
Did banks seek RFC cooperation in making business loans because the
amounts of credit required in individual cases exceeded the amounts they
could lawfully or prudently lend to a borrower? The states variously
limit the amount of credit a bank may grant a single borrower to between
10 and 25 percent of the amount of capital and surplus, in order to com-
pel banks to diversify their earning assets and to avoid the risk of crip-
pling impairment of capital in the event of default of a very large loan.
Furthermore, bank managements generally limit their commitments to
individual borrowers to smaller amounts than the law permits. A knowl-
edge of such management policies would be necessary before one could
judge the extent to which RFC participation was sought for the purpose
of enabling banks to make larger-than-usual loans without incurring what
they would regard as undue risk through inadequate asset diversification.
It is possible, however, to state the relative frequency of participation
loans whose amount exceeded the legal lending limitations on the par-
ticipating banks, and thus could not have been made without the collabora-
tion of RFC (or of other banks). One-quarter of them did exceed the
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statutory lending limitations on the banks making them (Table B-46).
Bearing in mind that the policies of most banks frequently held the size
of independently made loans even below the. legal limit, the percentage
of RFC participations sought by the banks in order to minimize the risks
of departing from customary policies of portfolio diversification might
be set appreciably higher: say, at one-half.
When the proportions of loans over and under legal loan limits were
analyzed by size of lending bank, it was found, as might be expected,
that the proportion of over-limit loans rose as size of bank diminished.
In summary: RFC undoubtedly functioned as a risk-distributing agency,
mainly for banks of medium size, with respect to a considerable part of
these loans. It is natural that RFC should have performed such a func-
tion. The United States is increasingly characterized by large enterprises
with great credit requirements; yet the dominant institutional pattern of
banking is one of comparatively small-scale, unit institutions.
1-,
PARTICIPATIONAND THE RISK POSITION OF BANKS
In addition. to the risk element in larger than usual individual loans,
the over-all risk position of a bank may have played a motivating role
in the use of RFC participation facilities. The available evidence is given
in Table B-47, which compares the ratio of risk assets to total assets for
participating banks and for all banks, on selected dates near the close
of given lending periods. Among member banks in the Federal Reserve
system, the proportion of risk assets, was, in fact, higher for participating
than for all banks; the same was true for nonmember banks after 1941,
TABLE B-46
Percentage of RFC Participation Loans Authorized
1934—1947 Whose Amount Exceeded the










Over Limit Under Limit
10 percent . 4,437 . 27.1% 72.9%
15 305 28.2 71.8
20 667 22.8 77.2
25 365 8.2 91.8
All banks 5,774 25.5%. 74.5%
From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC par-
ticipation loans to business except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
Refers to net authorizations (i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial
disbursement) for which the necessary information was available.
a Defines maximum amount allowable per loan in terms of the lending bank's
total capital and surplus.
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TABLE B-47
Ratios of Risk Assets to Total Assets for BanksUsing
RFC Participation and for All Banks, 1934—1947,
by Period of Participation
PERIOD AND
TYPE OF BANK





Insured rionmember banks, 1934.—1937b
Insured nonmember banks, 1938—1941b













All member banks, 1938—1941





a Risk assets were computed by cash and U.S. government securities
(direct and guaranteed) from total assets. Ratios are as at the close of the periods,
excepting for 1942—1947 (ratios as of 1945), for member banks 1938—1941 (as at
end of 1942), and for national banks 1934—1937 (as at mid-1939). Sources: Assets
and Liabilities of Operating Insured Banks (Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion), pp. 30 and 31 of the following issues: December 31, 1937, No. 8; December
31, 1941, No. 16; June 30, 19.45, No. 23. Annual Reports of Comptroller of the
Currency,1939and 1942, pp. 127 and 29 respectively. Federal Reserve Bulletin,
July 1943, p. 676, and. June 1946, p. 678.
b Excludes a few banks in the District of Columbia, Alaska, and the Virgin
Islands and banks which either did not accept deposits or were liquidating their
deposit business.
though not before. There is some basis for the view, therefore, that
participating banks sought REC assistance because they were in com-
paratively exposed positions, though the evidence is not conclusive. Before
the relative amounts of risk carried by each group of banks could be
known accurately, an analysis of the qualities of the assets held by par-
ticipating and nonparticipating banks would be necessary. The true
differences in risk positions are not unambiguously disclosed by the rela-
tionships between broad categories of assets.
SPECIAL FEATURES OF LOANS UNDER BLANKET
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS
Having described the characteristics of the loans, of the borrowing
business enterprises, and of the commercial banks participating in the
regular participation program of RFC, it remains to observe the special
features of the BPA credits to business which commenced during March.
1945 and ended twenty-two months later on January 22, 1947.
The BPA program, in operation during the period of business recon-
version following World War II, was administered energetically by
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RFC. Blanket agreements for deferred RFC participation were made
with no fewer than 5,253 banks, and loans under tb.e agreements were
actually made by 2,422 banks, about one-fifth of all operating commercial
banks.36 The BPA program brought many banks into cooperative credit
relations with RFC over and above those which had participated under
ordinary arrangements.
More than 11,000 separate loans to business firms were made under
blanket agreements, with a total authorized amount of about $525 million.
Thus the average size of loan under BPA arrangements. was $48,000, only
about a third as large as the average ordinary participation loan. Evi-
dently, the automatic approval principle caused the RFC loan guaranty
to reach loans of much smaller average amount than had theretofore
been the case. Of the total amount of loans, the part guaranteed by RFC
was $381 million, or 73 percent (about the same as in ordinary deferred
participations, where it was 76 percent). When it is recalled that RFC
guarantees under the ordinary participation program during the same
two years totaled only $124 million, and even during the two years
when their total was highest (1943 and 1944) only $251 million, it is
apparent that the BPA arrangement vastly enlarged the scale of RFC
participation and enormously increased the usage of governmental guar-
antee of business loans. This raised apprehensions among bankers, pro-
voked criticism, and contributed to the ultimate withdrawal of the
program.
Under the blanket agreements RFC first began to guarantee loans of
comparatively small amount in large numbers, partly because there was a
maximum size placed upon such loans. About 56 percent of the loans made
under blanket agreements were of $25,000 size or less, whereas only
47 percent of ordinary participations were of similarly small size (Table
B-48). In gross amount, loans of $25,000 or less constituted about 14
percent of credit authorized under BPA arrangements, but only 4 percent
of ordinary participation credit. At the other end of the scale, only 29
percent of the gross amount of loans carrying a BPA guarantee comprised
loans of over $200,000, whereas 72 percent of ordinary participation
credit fell in that class.
The BPA program also brought the RFC into closer cooperation with
banks located in small communities. Data are not available showing BPA
loans classified by size of banks or by size of city, but the number of
banks that entered into BPA agreements with the RFC, classified by size
of city in which located, is known. Nearly half of the BPA banks were in
small centers under 5,000 population, whereas only a quarter of the banks
were located in such centers under the ordinary participation arrange-
Sourcesof statistical information about operations under the BPA program
are special tabulations prepared by the Research and Statistics Division and
Economics Analysis Staff, Controller's Office, RFC.
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TABLE B-48
Size Distributions of Loans Authorized under Blanket Participation









$5,000 and under 11.7% 0.8%
• 11.1% 0.3%
5,000—10,000 15.6 2.7 13.5 0.8
10,000—25,000 28.3 10.8 22.3 3.0
25,000—50,000 21.1 17.0 16.4 4.7
50,000—100,000 13.2 21.3 16.5 9.6
100,000—200,000 5.8 18.4 8.6 9.6
Over 200,000 4.8 29.0 11.5 72.0
Total 100.0% • 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
a From an unpublished tabulation by the Research and Statistics Di.vision, Office
of the Controller, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, August 22, 1947; covers
11,057 loans totaling $525,423,Q00. RFC participation under the BPA program was
always on a deferred basis.
b From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC
participation loans except those made under the BPA and SLP programs. Refers
to net authorizations, i.e. exclusive of loans canceled in full before initial disburse-
ment.
ments made during 1942—1947 (Table B-49). Under the BPA program
RFC participation thus began to assume more of the character of a small-
town banking aid.
The industry distribution of loans made under BPA guaranteewas
more like that of bank term loans made independently at about the same
time than was the industrial pattern of ordinary participation lending
from 1934 to mid-1947 (Table B-So compared with Tables B-7 and
B-41). The greatest number of ordinary participation loans went to
manufacturers of metals and metal products, and of miscellaneous products
such as lumber, paper, clay, and glass—altogether, about 38 percent of
the total—whereas only 10 percent of bank term loans went to those two
divisions. The figure for BPA loans lay between: about 27 percent. Of
ordinary participation loans, 22 percent went to the retail trade, whole-
sale trade, and service divisions of industry.; of BPA loans, 33 percent; of
bank loans, 61 percent. Still more in terms of amount is the closer resem-
blance of the BPA and the independent bank loan distributions apparent.
Of independently extended bank credit, 25 percent, and of BPA-
guaranteed credit, 28 percent went to the metals and miscellaneous manu-
facturing groups, as against 46 percent of ordinary participation credit.
And the percentage of B PA—guaranteed credit going to retail, wholesale,
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TABLE B-49
City Size Distributions of Banks with RFC Blanket Participation
Agreements, 1945—1947, and of Banks Using Ordinary RFC
Participation Facilities, 1942—1947

















Under 5,000 2,604 314 49.6% 25.8%
5,000—9,999 701 139. 13.3 11.4
10,000—24,999 730 202 13.9 16.6
25,000—49,999 332 119 6.3 9.8
50,000—99,999 253 113 4.8 9.3
100,000—199,999 187 101 3.5 8.3
200,000—499,999 224 110 4.3 9.0
500,000—999,999 103 48 2.0 3.9
1 million and over 119 66 2.3 5.4
Total 5,253 1,218c 100.0% 100.0%
a From an unpublished tabulation by the Research and Statistics Division, Office
of the Controller, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, August 2T, 1947.
b From the National Bureau of Economic Research compilation of all RFC
participation làans except those made under the BPA and SLP programs.
cIncludesa few banks in communities unclassified as to size, accounting for
about 0.5 percent of the total.
and service firms—divisions relatively neglected in other RFC credit
activities—actually exceeded the figure for independently extended bank
credit (24 as against 19 percent). This is further evidence that banks
tended to use the simplified form of government guarantee available
under PBA to underwrite risks of a type that they had been assuming
under their term lending programs.
Prices and Costs of Business Credit Supplied by RFC
•Information is assembled in this section on the prices charged by the
RFC for its business credit services, on the, costs incurred, andon the
relation between revenues and costs. Estimates are made of the amount
of "subsidy" inherent in the Corporation's policies, and some comparisons
are drawn between those policies and the business lending practices' of
commercial banks. Certain implications' regarding the ability of the
Corporation to carry credit risks, the incentives for business firms and
banks to utilize RFC services, and the credit policies of commercial,
banks are pointed out.
THE STANDARD LOAN RATE POLICY OF RFC
The statutes governing RFC never specified the rate of interest to be
charged by the Corporation for business loans; nor did they indicate an
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TABLE B-SO
Industry Distribution of Loans Authorized under Blanket
Agreements between RFC and Banks,
Industry Amount
Manufacturing 38.7% 45.4%
Food, liquor, and tobacco 8.4 11.4
Textiles, apparel, and leather 1.1 3.0
Metals and metal products 14.2 16.7
Petroleum, coal, chemicals
and rubber 2.1 3.1
Othera 12.3 11.2
Mining 2.4 3.1
Retail trade 16.6 8.6
Wholesale trade 6.6 9.1
Construction . 14.2 17.2
Transportation, communications,
and public utilities 8.9 7.5
. Services 10.1 6.4
Finance, insurance, real estate 0.7 1.5
Forestry, fishing, and farming 1.7 1.2
Total 100.0% 100.0%
From a special tabujation prepared by the Economic Analysis Staff, Office of
the Controller, Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
a Covers lumber and lumber products; paper and allied products or industries
such as printing; stone, clay, and glass products, and miscellaneous manufacturing.
average or a range of rates. Indeed, Congress did not even provide a
broad directive to the management of RFC regarding its aggregate income
from credit operations, or the relation of such income to the Corporation's
costs. The management was free to operate. at a profit or a loss, so far as
the statute was concerned, either on .its lending operations as a whole,
or on its business loan activities in particular.87
The policy of the Board of Directors of RFC was to charge a single,
standard rate of interest for each broad class of loans. When industrial
and commercial lending was initiated in June 1934, the board established
a rate of 6 percent per annum on the unpaid balance of a business loan,
irrespective of its amount, term to maturity, or credit risk. In May' 1935
the rate was lowered to 5 percent. On April 1, 1939, it was further
reduced to 4 percent on all outstanding loans, as well as on loans made
thereafter. Effective November 10, 1950, the board raised the rate back
to 5 percent, apparently in response to congressional criticism that the
Corporation was not covering its business lending costs at the 4 percent
rate, and also to bring RFC rates into line with bank rates. RFC applied
37Thecirculars published by the RFC from time to time relative to loans to
industry have contained only general statements such as "Interest shall be at
prevailing rates for the character of loan applied for," or "interest shall be at
such rates as may be fixed from time to time by this corporation."
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the standard rate to its portion of loans made in cooperation with com-
mercial banks (regardless of the bank's rate), as well as to the. loans it
made independently.
A comparison of the quarterly movement of commercial bank rates on
short-term business loans in the $10,000 to $100,000 size bracket with
the RFC rate for the period appears in Chart B-2. The Fed-
eral Reserve series on short-term loan rates in the $10,000 to $100,000
bracket was chosen for comparison because the great majority of RFC
loans fell into this size class.38 The chart illustrates the relative in-
sensitivity of the RFC rate to changes in money market conditions.
CHARTB-2
Average Interest Rates on Short-Term Commercial Bank Business
Loans of Size $]O,000—99,999, Quarterly 1936—1953,
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1936 '37'38'39'40'41'42'43'44'45'46'47'48'49'50'51'52'53
Bank data through1 948 ore from "New Statistics of Interest Rates on Business
Loans," by Richard Youngdahl, "Federal Reserve Bulletin," March1 949, Table
1, p. 231; after 1948, from various issues of. the "Bulletin." They give estimated
average rates on loans of one year or less made to businesses by bOnks in nineteen
cities: New York, Boston, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit,
Chicago, Baltimore, Richmond, Atlanta, New Orleans, Dallas, St.Louis, Minne-
apolis, Kansas City, Seattle, Son Francisco and Los Angeles.
Therelationbetween the levels of the two curves has no significance, be-
causethe bankcurvereflectsrates on short-term loans carrying limited credit
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The attention of Congress was called to the propriety of RFC lend-
ing rates in June 1947 when the Comptroller General submitted his first
report on the audit of RFC and its subsidiaries for the fiscal year ending
mid-1945. Therein, he pointed out that the RFC act "has not contained
the general requirement that the Corporation apply such interest rates
to loans made by it as would be necessary to cover all of the costs of
operation and all of the risks of. loss."89
The interest rate policy of RFC was one •of the principal points of
inquiry during late .1947 by the subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking. and Currency under the chairmanship of Senator Buck.
Officials of RFC vigorously defended the policy of a standard rate of
interest undifferentiated as between borrowers, and the adequacy of the
4 percent figure. They argued that it would be impracticable to vary the
loan rate according to size, degree of risk, or maturity, because, as RFC
Chairman Goodloe put it, "distinctions would be a matter àf opinion which
in most cases would satisfy neither the borrower nor anyone else."4°
.They said that because RFC's funds were provided by the Treasury at a
fixed rate of interest, the rate it charged for relending this money could
not fairly be carried geographically. Concerning the adequacy of the 4
percent rate then current, Chairman Goodloe stated that "the differential
between the rate of interest which RFC pays the Treasury and the rate
which it charges borrowers should be sufficient to pay the Corporation's
overhead and to set up reserves required by good accounting practices.
Our present rate of 4 percent has, in the past, been sufficient to accomplish
these purposes."4'
The standard loan rate policy was not challenged by the Committee on
Banking and Currency in its 1948 report to the Congress. The committee
acknowledged that discriminatory pricing by RFC would probably en-
counter administrative difficulties and borrower dissatisfactions. It sug-
gested that the advisory committees of bankers and businessmen ap-
pointed by RFC to advise the managers of each loan agency might be
requested to establish loan rates for their particular areas, but left a
decision on this matter up to the Board of Directors of RFC.
•The committee did challenge Chairman Goodloe's assertion that the 4
percent rate had been adequate to cover all costs of business lending,
pointing out that RFC accounting did not fully reflect the true cost of
lending, and that the net result of each lending program could not be
determined. It instructed RFC thereafter to maintain its accounts so that
risk whereas the RFC curve covers rates on term loans carrying higher risks.
For loans having identical characteristics, bank rates would undoubtedly have
exceeded the RFC rate.
89 House Doe. 316, 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 11, 1947. Letter from the Comptrol-
ler General of the United States transmitting a Report on the Audit, of RPC
and Affiliated Corporations for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1945, p. 16.
40 Hearing8 on S. Res. 132 (cited in footnote 20), Part I, p. 65.
41.Loc.cit.
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the financial results realized in the business lending field could be de-
termined, and it recommended amendment of the RFC Act to require
that loans should bear an interest rate "reasonably calculated to enable
the Corporation to operate without loss," with a similar recommendation
on fees charged for deferred participations.42 The RFC Act of 1948,
however, while providing for regular congressional review of operations,
did not include any directive on interest rates or participation fees (see
page 426 above).
The RFC loan rate policy was again subjected to close scrutiny during
1950 by the subcommittee on the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency headed by Senator Fuibright. One focal point of the subcom-
mittee's attention was whether RFC lending operations had been con-
ducted on a self-sustaining basis. It was brought out that RFC lending
activities as a whole were conducted at a loss of about $6.5 million during
the fiscal year 1949, if RFC were charged with the interest paid by the
Treasury Department on the full amount of funds employed, whereas it
earned its published profit of 'about $5.2 million on a basis of employment
of some $600 million of "cost-free" capital and surplus.43 Lending opera-
tions had been self-sustaining from the standpoint of RFC but they had
not been self-sustaining from the standpoint of the taxpayer. Obviously,
interest had to be paid by the Treasury Department on funds utilized by
RFC in business loan operations, and this interest must be taken into ac-
count in calculating the full cost of RFC operations. RFC officials took the
view that Congress had deliberately provided the Corporation with inter-
èst-free capital funds from the Treasury and in addition had permitted
the Corporation to retain (interest-free) earned surplus from previous
operations,44 so that the program was self-sustaining if RFC merely earned
sufficient income to cover its other costs of lending. RFC officials regarded
the use of interest-free capital funds as a congressional subsidy to small
borrowers enabling the Corporation to charge a lower rate. They argued
that if Congress had intended otherwise, it should have said so.
To clear up this ambiguity in the statute, the Comptroller General had
recommended in February 1950 that Congress enact legislation requiring
RFC to pay interest at current costs to the Treasury on all funds used
in loan operations, to pay that part of the government's costs of civil
service retirement and disability benefits for RFC employees, and to pay
42 Senate Report 914 (cited in footnote 16), pp. 14, 15, and 21.
Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
81st Cong., 2nd sess., May 8 and 9, 1950, on A Study of the Operations of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation pursuant to S. Res. 219. Analysis of Income
and Costs, p. 3.
44 The 1948 act limited the interest-free Treasury funds used by RFC to $100
million; originally, $500 million had been provided as capital stock, of which $175
million was retired in April 1941 as required by a previous enactment. Originally,
there was no provision regarding earned surplus; the 1948 act provided that
earned surplus in excess of $250 million be turned back to the Treasury.
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"all other costs incurred by other governmental agencies for the Corpora-
tion's account or benefit where it is practicable and economically feasible
to measure the benefits and related costs."45
RFC officials conceded before the Fuibright Subcommittee that the
single, standard rate of charge for business loans meant that profits on a
few big loans covered losses on many small loans, and they forecast
higher rates on loans to small firms if this policy was changed. A member
of the RFC Boardof Directors said:."Ten percent of our loans carry the
cost for ninety [percent]. That is the way it has always been, and that
is the way it has to be if you are going to continue to make small loans."46
Manifestly, it would be impossible for RFC or any other lending institu-
tion to put each individual loan on a self-sustaining basis. Yet RFC's
officials failed to explain why it would not be feasible to classify loans
into a limited number of groups with respect to amount or maturity, as is
done by some commercial banks, and to vary the loan rate between groups.
This would have avoided the subsidy effect of the single standard rate.
Senator Fuibright questioned the desirability of the standard rate
policy, and reiterated the suggestion made in the Buck Subcommittee
hearings, that loan rates might well vary with size of loan and as between
Federal Reserve districts, and urged that RFC rates should be higher
than comparable commercial bank rates to discourage business firms from
applying to the RFC.47 But up to the end, RFC persisted in the standard
loan rate policy.
COMPARISON OF RFC AND COMMERCIAL
BANK LOAN RATES
The standard loan rate policy of RFC has been at variance with the
business loan pricing policies of American commercial banks. In practice
banks vary their rates with a number of factors, chief of which are (1)
size of the loan, (2) term to maturity, and (3) size of the borrowing
firm. Size of loan is important, because a large portion of the administra-
tive expense of lending is fixed irrespective of the amount of a loan.
Administrative expense per dollar falls rapidly as the amount of a loan
rises, and administrative expense is a large component of the gross interest
rate charged. Size of borrowing firm is another determinant of loan rate
because of its positive correlation with the degree of risk. Other things
being equal, a loan of given amount and maturity will carry more risk
of nonrepayment if made to a small firm than if made to a large enter-
45 House Doc. 468, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., February 1950. Letter from the
Comptroller General of the United States transmitting the Report on Audit of
Reconstrnction Finance Corporation and Subsidia.ries for the fiscal years ending
June 30, 1946 and 1947, p. 9.
46 Analysis of Income and Costs (cited in footnote 43), p. 71.
47 Hearin.gsbeforea subcommittee, of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
81st Cong., 2nd sess., June—July 1950, on A Study of the Operations of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation pursuant to S. Res. 219. Lending Policy, p. 349ff.
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prise, because the relative burden of the debt is greater to the smaller
firm and the mortality rate of small enterprises is higher. Of the three
factors, the amount of a loan is undoubtedly the most important single
determinant of lOan rate. Commercial banks therefore commonly scale
their interest charges sharply upward, in successive brackets, as loan
size falls.48
Available information concerning the size structure of commercial bank
interest rates on business loans is computed on the basis of outstanding
balances (as of November. 1946) rather than by original amount, and, for
that reason among others, does not afford a precise measure of differences
between bank rates and the RFC standard loan rate from the standpoint
of loan applicants. Nevertheless, Table B-si is suggestive on that point.
The RFC rate far undershot the bank rates on business term loans with
$10,000 or less outstanding, and a classification by original amount would
undoubtedly widen rather than diminish the difference shown. The figures
show bank rates and the RFC standard 4 percent rate coinciding for term
loan balances of about $50,000 size (Chart B-a)and since most B.FC
loans were less than that in original amount (in 1945 and 1946, for
example, 90 percent of them), it is evident that, in general, RFC loans
were made at rates well below those of commercial banks.
TABLE B-Si
Average Interest Rates on Different Sizes of Outstanding Commercial
Bank Loans to Business, November 20, 1946, Compared





F RFC RATE OF
RAGE BANK RATE
Short- Intermediate Short-. Intermediate
SIZE OF LOAN Term and Long- Term and Long-
BALANCE Loans Term Loans Loans Term Loans
Less than $500 7.0% 8.9% —3.0
$500—999 6.5 7.7 —2.5 —3.7
1,000—4,999 5.5 5.9 —1.5 —1.9
4.8 5.1 —0.8 —1.1
10,000—24,999 4.3 4.6 —0.3 —0.6
25,000-49,999 3.9 4.2 0.1 —0.2
50,000-99,999 3.5 3.8 0.5 0.2
100,000—499,999 ..2.6 3.0 1.4 1.0
500,000—999,999 • 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.6
1,000,000 and over 1.8 2.1 2.2 1.9
All loans 3.0% 2.8% 1.0 1.2
From "The Structure of Interest Rates on Business Loans at Member Banks,"
by Richard Youngdahl, Federal Reserve Bnlletin, July 1947, Table 16, p. 816.
48 Cf. Richard Youngdahl, "The Structure of Interest Rates on Business Loans
at Member Banks," Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1947, pp. 803—819.
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CHARTB-3
Comparison of RFC Business Loan Rate with Averageinterest
Rates on Outstanding Commercial Bank Business Loans,
1946, by Size of Loan Balance
Remembering the high-risk character of RFC's portfolio, one would
guess that on the average the RFC loans of sizes smaller than $50,000
were priced not only below bank loans of comparable size but also below
the cost of RFC, so that the Corporation must either have sustained
considerable loss or have met the losses on many small loans out of inter-
est income from a relatively few, large ones. This subsidy effect was
testified to by the Controller of RFC before the Fuibright Subcommittee
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Size of loan balance
3 5 6
Interest rate (percent per annum)
From Table B-51. Bank rate averages are plotted at midpoints of closed size
classes and at $5 million for loans $1 million and over.APPENDIX B
in 1950: "Our break-even point on a one-year loan is $150,000; on a
10-year loan it is $50,000. Since our average loan js around 5 years,
our break-even point on the average would be between $75,000 and
The break-even point would have been even higher if RFC
had been required to pay interest on the full amount of funds employed in
business lending operations.
DEFERRED PARTICIPATION FEES CHARGED BY RFC
As was the case with direct loan rates, the statutes were silent regard-
ing the amount of RFC's participation fees. Initially, the fees charged
for such credit insurance were graduated according to the duration of the
Corporation's obligation. For agreements to purchase participations for
periods up to one year, the fee was 1/2 of 1 percent of RFC's agreed par-
ticipation for each quarter-year, or 2 percent per annum. For agreements
running more than one year but not more than two years, the fee was 2
percent of RFC's agreed portion for the first year, plus 1 percent for
the second year. Fees for agreements running more than two years were
subject to negotiation.5°
In May 1935 the fee schedule was altered by raising the charge on
agreements running between one and two years from 1 percent for the
second year to 2 percent of RFC's agreed participation.5' This action, in
effect, made RFC's charge a flat 2 percent per annum on the daily bal-
ances of the Corporation's outstanding commitment to purchase a par-
ticipation in a disbursed loan, a rate maintained until 1938.52
In April 1938 the Corporation announced a new schedule of fees,
graduated according to the of an outstanding bank loan that
it was obligated to purchase: if not more than 50 percent, the fee was
1 percent per annum of RFC's commitment; if more than 50 percent,
but not over 75 percent, the fee was 11/2 percent; if more than 75 percent,
but not more than 90 percent, the fee was 2 percent.53 That is, the new
schedule reduced the charge made by RFC in all cases where the propor-
tion of a loan guaranteed by RFC was 75 percent or less. In comparison
with the former arrangements, it provided an inducement to commercial
banks to carry a larger proportion of the risk on business loans. Clearly,
the amount of risk of nonpayment carried by RFC varied directly with
both the duration of its guaranty and the proportion of the loan guar-
anteed, so that a scientific schedule of premiums to be charged for carry-
ing such risks should have reflected both factors. Yet the new fee schedule
considered only the second.
49 Analysis of Income and Coats (cited in footnote 43), pp. 150f.
50RFCCircular No. 15, August 1934, pp. 2—3.
5'RFCCircular No. 15 (revised) May 1935, Sec. E, p. 3.
52 B.FC. Circular No. 15 (revised) December 1036, p. 2, and (revised) April
1937, p. 2.
53 RFC Circular No. 15 (revised) April 1938, p. 1.
507APPENDIX B
As of September 1939, deferred participation fees were cut in half
for each size of commitment specified in the 1938 schedule.
Another charge was made in March 1945, when RFC introduced blanket
participation agreements. Under such agreements banks purchased pro-
tection at a charge of 3/4 of 1 percent per annum of RFC's commitment if
it covered more than 50 percent of an outstanding loan, and a charge of
1/2 of 1 percent per annum where RFC's commitment was less than 50
percent.54 This represented a further reduction in the Corporation's loan
guaranty rates. By 1945, fees were little more than one-third of those of
ten years earlier.
The propriety of RFC's deferred participation fees was one of the
issues posed for inquiry by the Buck Subcommittee in 1947. John D.
Goodloe, Chairman of the Corporation, testified with respect to the BPA
program: "Our experience leads me to believe that the participation fees
collected under this program will more than cover expenses and losses. A
survey of 500 such loans chosen at random shows that the collateral
pledged averaged $1.83 per dollar loaned, and that 20 percent of all
the loans were additionally secured by guarantees."55 The small participa-
tion fees were attacked, however, not because they might fail to cover
RFC costs, but because they provided a strong financial inducement to
commercial banks to seek RFC participations rather than those of other
banks.56 They caused RFC to encroach upon credit functions formerly
performed by private institutions. While the extent of encroachment was
open to question, the existence of an inducement could not be doubted.
The Buck Subcommittee in its report to Congress did not condemn the
BPA agreement or the principle of loan guaranty by RFC but did recom-
54 RFC Circular No. 25, March 1945, p. 1.
55 Hearings ... onS. Res. 132, Part 1 (cited in footnote 20), p. 37.
56 Henry T. Bodman, an RFC director, placed the following hypothetical illus-
tration before the Buck Subcommittee: Consider a $100,000 loan by a bank at 4
percent interest, in which RFC takes a deferred participation of 75 percent of
the amount for a % of 1 percent annual fee:
Bank collects from borrower interest of $4,000.00
Bank pays RFC "insurance" premium of 562.50
Leaving the bank a net interest income of $3,437.50
Since the RFC guaranty is, in a broad sense, equivalent
to a government obligation of $75,000, from the point
of view of the bank, the yield of which is 11/4 percent or:937.50
The balance is $2,500.00
This balance represents an effective income of 10 percent per annum to the bank on
the $25,000 it has risked on the credit of the borrower. If the lending bank had
sold a 75 percent participation in the loan to another bank, the other bank would
have been paid 75 percent of the interest income of $4,000, leaving on.iy $1,000
to the lending bank, or 4 percent on its money risk. (Hearings ... onS. Res. 132,
80th Cong., 1st sess., Part 2, January 1948, pp. 272 and 453.)
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mend revisions of the RFC Act to require that "fees charged for deferred
participations be at rates which will give reasonable assurance that those
operations will be conducted without loss," and the RFC's interest in such
participations be limited, to 65 percent in loans of $100,000 or less, and
to 50 percent in loans over The committee apparently con-
cluded that if a bank carried a sufficiently large portion of the loan, it
would not relax its ordinary credit standards. In any event, RFC aban-
doned the BPA program in January 1947,andthe deferred participation
fee schedule of September 1939 again became effective.
As of November 10, 1950, at the same time that the direct loan rate
was raiscd from 4 to 5 percent, RFC sharply increasçd the fee for de-
ferred participations to a flat 2 percent. The reasons for this action were
probably the doubts expressed at the Fuibright Subcommittee inquiries
about the self-sustaining character of the lower rates, objections to the
encroachment of RFC activities upon those of commercial banks, and the
rising structure of business loan rates during 1950. Thus by 1950 the
course of participation fees had come full circle, and returned to the level
at which they were originally set in 1934. Like direct loan rates, they
had been cut from the original level, then restored; but the amplitude of
the swing in participation fees had been much greater. The wide changes
in prices of RFC credit insurance apparently did not reflect changes in
costs, or even a systematic study of costs, a subject to which attention
is now directed.
COSTS AND REVENUES OF RFC BUSINESS LENDING
AND LOAN GUARANTY OPERATIONS
The problem of costing a business lending operation is difficult at best.
In fact, no accurate determination of the profitability of a lending opera-
tion may be made until after the operation has been wound up and all
loans have been finally terminated. The problem of cost calculation be-
comes more complex when, as has been the case with RFC, the business
lending operation is only one of a series of lending, purchasing, selling,
and investing activities conducted by the same organization, requiring
allocation of joint expenses to separate programs. A further complication
arises from the fact—noted previously—that RFC was provided with
cost-free capital on which the Treasury Department paid interest, and
such interest has been a cost of RFC lending operations from the point
of view of the public. Moreover, RFC did not maintain its records in a
manner which permits ready comparison of the results of its lending
operations with those of private banks.
57 Senate Report 974 (cited in footnote 16), pp.21f.
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Nevertheless, the Fuibright Subcommittee's inquiry into RFC's. costs
of business lending during 1949—1950, and the Reports on Audit of the
RFC by the General Accounting Office after 1945, produced data which
permit useful estimates of costs for the fiscal years 1946 and thereafter.
These data for five successive years during which the business lending
program bulked large in the totality of RFC activities afford a basis for
generalizations concerning the costs of RFC's lending.
RFC reported a net income from its combined lending programs in
each year of the period 1946—1950, after provision for losses. Reported
net income for the five years amounted to roughly $100 million, an aver-
age of about $20 million per annum. Deducting from the reported figures
the estimated amounts of interest paid by the Treasury Department on
cost-free funds employed by RFC, as well as the estimated amount paid
by the Treasury as the government's contribution toward retirement in-
come of RFC employees, the adjusted net income was found by the sub-
committee to have been positive in three years and negative in two years.
In amount, adjusted net income for the five-year period was estimated at
approximately $21 million, or upwards of $4 million per annum. RFC
apparently covered its full expenses and earned a small net income on its
combined lending programs during the postwar period. The net income
was negligible, however, in proportion to the resources employed, forming
about 0.3 percent per annum of the average total—some $1.6 billion—of
assets employed in all lending programs during the five-year period.
A special study made for the Fuibright Subcommittee provides a state-
ment of the operating results of the business loan program for the fiscal
year 1949 and the first nine months of the fiscal year 1950. During fiscal
1949, according to the subcommittee's estimates, if full expenses including
interest on cost-free capital and surplus employed in business lending
operations are charged against the gross income from business loans, RFC
had a deficit of more than $8 million in its business lending operations, and
during the first nine months of fiscal 1950 it had a deficit of $5.6 million
(Table B-52).
The relation of costs to revenues was even less satisfactory for deferred
participation loans than for direct loans during 1949—1950. Although with
adjustment for the cost of Treasury funds both operations resulted in
losses, relative to the gross revenue, the amount of the losses from de-
ferred participation was much larger. On the basis of the subcommittee's
estimates, the operating deficit for loan guaranty was 117 percent of the
total income; for direct loans, only 38 percent of the total income. De-
ferred participation fees would have had to be about double those charged
during the 1949 and 1950 fiscal years in order to make the operation







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































priced RFC's loan guaranty services. The sharp increase of charges to
2 percent, effective in November 1950, approximately equated costs and
revenues on this calculation.
In regard to direct loans, it appears from Table B-52 that over the
twenty-one months covered, a gross income of $24,774,000 and a deficit
of $9,446,000 was realized at the 4 percent loan rate. The gross income of
$34,220,000 which would have been necessary to place direct business
lending on a break-even basis according to the subcommittee's analysis
could have been produced with a standard interest rate of between 51/2
and 6 percent per annum on all outstanding loans, large and small.
COSTS AND REVENUES FOR RFC LOANS
OF DIFFERENT SIZES
Even if, as the Fuibright Subcommittee's analysis suggests, a standard
loan rate of between 5.5 and 6 percent would have enabled RFC to break
even on all direct loans to business firms during the fiscal years 1949 and
1950, there would have remained great disparities in operating results
as between loans of different sizes. RFC did not maintain the records
necessary for an accurate costing of loans of different sizes, but special
studies for the subcommittee afford a basis for. estimating the profit or
loss realized by RFC on loans of different amounts.
During fiscal 1949 and 1950, RFC calculated its average cost of ac-
quiring a direct business loan at $1,368, its average cost per annum
servicing a loan at $907, and the average annual provision for loss at
0.66 percent of loan disbursements.58 Such costs undoubtedly varied to
some extent with size of loan, but, lacking information, it is here assumed
that they were constant. The principal element of variable cost was in-
terest paid by the Treasury Department on money employed by RFC.
The average Treasury borrowing rate during -1949—1950was approxi-
mately 17/8 percent, which may be adjusted upward to 2 percent in order
to allow for contributions by the Treasury to the retirement fund for
RFC employees. This information enables one to estimate roughly the
total cost incurred by RFC on loans of different amounts. Gross revenues
collected by RFC may be computed by applying the standard 4 percent
rate to outstanding loan balances. The difference between gross revenue
and total cost is net profit or loss per loan.
Estimates were made of the amount of profit or loss realized by RFC
on loans of different amounts at the standard 4 percent rate, on the as-
sumptions that all loans were fully amortized and matured in five years,
that all expense and cost was payable at time of making the loan, and
that simple interest was charged. On these simplifying assumptions, and
without attempting adjustment for variability of cost as among different
sizes of loan, it appears that RFC lost about $5,876 on each loan of
58 AnallJsi8 of Income aud Co8t8 (cited in footnote 43), pp. 150f.
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$1,000 it put on its books, and lost very little less than that on each
loan of $5,000 (Table B-53).59 With interest on capital and surplus
figured among costs, not until loans reached about $200,000 did RFC
avoid loss. As the amount rose above $200,000, the net profit per
increased steadily. The profit of $21,000 on a loan of $1 million almost
sufficed to cover losses on four loans of $5,000. The standard 4 percent
rate clearly produced profits on the relatively few large loans sufficient
to cover losses on many small loans.
On the assumptions that have been made, the break-even interest rate
for a loan of $1,000 would have been unconscionable; even for a loan of
$5,000 it would have been about 40 percent. A rate of interest of 3.5
TABLE B-53
Estimated Costs, Revenues, and Profit or Loss Realized by RFC
on Business Loans of Different Sizes
(standard interest rate of 4percenton a. 5-year amortized loan)
Acquisition P'rovi.9ion .
and ServiceInterest for Total
• Profit
Loan Size Costsa Costeb Lossesc Cost Reveiwed or Loss
$1,000 $5,903 $ 60 $33 $ 5,996 $ 120 $_5,876
5,000 5,903 300 165 6,368 600 —5,768
10,000 5,908 600 330 6,833 1,200 —5,633
25,000 5,903 1,500 825 8,228 3,000 —5,228
50,000 5,903 3,000 1,650 10,553 6,000 —4,553
75,000 5,903 4,500 • 2,475 12,878 9,000 —3,878
100,000 5,903 6,000 3,300 15,203 12,000 —3,203
150,000 5,903 9,000 4,950. 19,853 18,000 —1,853
200,000 3,903 12,000 .6,600 24,503 24,000 —503
250,000 5,903 15,000 8,250 29,153 30,000 847
300,000 5,903 18,000 9,900 33,803 36,000 2,197
400,000 5,903 24,000 13,200 43,103 48,000 4,897
500,000 5,903 30,000 16,500 52,403 60,000 7,597
1,000,000 5,903 60,000 33,000k 98,903 120,000 21,097
Basic information on acquisition and service costs and loss provision from Fuibright Subcom-
mittee hearings, of Income and Costs (cited in text footnote 43), pp. 150f., relating to
the twenty-one-month period ending March 31, 1950. Acquisition and service cost data are
averages for all loans, and are here applied equally to each size of loan since information on
variability of costs with loan size is lacking.
a Acquisition cost of $1,368 plus annual service cost of $907 times five (five years being the
modal maturity of RFC business loans). For simplicity, all costs are assumed to be incurred
at date of making the loan.
hCalculatedat rate of 2 percent per annum on average outstanding loan balance.
C Calculated at rate of 3.3 percent of original loan amount.
d Calculated at standard rate of 4 percent per annumaverage outstanding loan balance.
This startling result is borne out by testimony of RFC director Harvey
Gunderson: "There is no way for a corporation which operates with our checks and
balances to make a $1,500 GI loan and make any money on it. I am sure we would
be better off if we just wrote them a check and called it a day." p. 84.
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percent would have been sufficient to cover costs for loans of over $406,-
000 in amount. Because costs per dollar could not fall below the basic
Treasury borrowing rate, adjusted for retirement fund payments by
the Treasury on behalf of RFC, 2 percent would have formed a floor
below which loan rates could not fall.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RFC BUSINESS
CREDIT CHARGES
What have been the major economic effects and implications of RFC's
credit pricing policies? One effect has been to provide a stronger induce-
ment to business firms to obtain RFC loans, and to commercial banks to
obtain RFC guarantees of their business loans, than would have existed
if RFC had pursued a policy of full-cost pricing of its credit services.
Although the Corporation sought vigorously to place loans and loan par-
ticipations with private institutions, and to avoid lending that could have
been undertaken privately, these efforts were counteracted to some extent
by its own pricing policies.
The standard rate policy subsidized small firms at the expense of larger
firms, and offered a stronger inducement to the marginal small business
to seek RFC credit than was offered to the medium or large firm. This
result appears to have been recognized and deliberately sought by the
management of RFC.
An inflexible rate policy had the effect of making RFC credit relatively
more attractive at times when loan rates from private agencies were high
and firm than when private rates were relatively low. Because high and
rising money rates are ordinarily associated with periods of prosperity,
and falling rates with contractions in business, the inflexible interest rat.e
policy of RFC had the effect of tending to expand governmental credit
to business at times when counter-cyclical policy would have contracted
it, and vice versa. One essential instrument for coordination of federal
credit programs with other policies for economic stabilization would be
a loan rate flexible through time.
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The Business Loan Guaranty and Insurance
Program of the Veterans' Administration,,
1945-1 955
Origin and Purpose
THE Veterans' Administration was authorized to guarantee home, farm,
and business loans to veterans by Title III of the Servicemen's Readjust-
ment Act of 1944, popularly known as the GI Bill of Rights.1 Under this
statute, far-reaching benefits were conferred upon men and women who
had served in the armed forces of the United States during World War
II, and a later law included veterans of the Korean conflict.2 Loan guar-
antees were but one part of a vast program of public aids to veterans. By
mid-1955 VA had guaranteed over four million home, farm, and business
loans in original principal amounts totaling $30 billion; VA-guaranteed
home loans were a major factor in the postwar housing market.
The dominant purpose of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, ex-
pressed in public and congressional discussions, was to aid the civil
re-establishment of returning veterans, whether disabled or not. The
principal motives underlying other federal business credit programs—
such as assistance to small businesses, reduction of secular or cyclical
unemployment, closure of gaps in the structure of private finance, aid to
depressed industries, areas, or economic groups—were not at the fore-
front of the VA loan program, although they may have been in the
background. Approximately sixteen million young men and women were
to be re-established in civilian life, after service to the nation in time of
crisis. It was believed that a complete program of benefits should be
provided to them in the public interest, because the destiny of the nation
was inseparable from their welfare.3
The great range of benefits provided is seen in reviewing the several
titles of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act. Title I provided hospitaliza-
tion and domiciliary care, and payment of disability claims and pensions.
Title II granted educational and vocational training benefits. Title III—
with which this study is concerned—made available governmental loan
guarantees for the purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business.
Title IV created rights and services, 'for the placement of veterans in
1P.L.846, 78th Cong., June 22, 1944.
2VeteransReadjustment Assistance Act of 1952 (P.L. 550, 82nd Cong., July
16, 1952).
3AnnuaLReport of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 1944, p. 1.
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employment. Title V granted weekly cash readjustment allowances to
unemployed veterans.
As these benefits were extended, the aggregate expenditures the
Veterans' Administration for all purposes rose from $828 million during
the fiscal year 1944 to a peak of $9.8 billion during fiscal 1950, after
which they fell to between $5 billion and $6 billion annually through June
30, J954•4 Outlays from 1944 to that date totaled over $60 billion. Over
the same period the VA assumed contingent liabilities totaling nearly $13
billion on loans to veterans of about $24 billion.5 Net expenditures by VA
on lenders' claims paid under those guarantees totaled only $21 million
up to mid-1954.6 Business loans were far outweighed by home loans;
cumulatively to mid-1954, they formed only about 1.2 percent of the
amount of liability assumed by VA on home, farm, and business loans
combined.
The business loan guaranty plan in the GI Bill of Rights apparently
was based upon a belief that, without support, the creditworthiness of
many veterans desiring to acquire businesses would be inadequate. It was
designed to support the credit of persons who, through long service at
military pay, had been deprived of an opportunity to accumulate sub-
stantial amounts of savings or to establish credit or employment records.
It was also expected to facilitate the postwar flow of private capital into
private enterprise.7
VA business credit aid was confined to guarantees or insurance and did
not include the power to make loans directly. An early version of the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act, passed by the Senate, did include that
power. It directed VA upon approval of another federal agency to lend
veterans up to $1,000 for the purpose of making "the usual required
downpayment" in connection with home, farm, or business financing; VA
would have had no discretion in approving or disapproving loans. Later,
the present plan—partial guaranty by VA of loans made by other lenders
—was substituted;8 the guaranty was thus intended to take the place of
what was normally required as a down payment.9 The record of con-
gressional discussions is not explicit on the reasons for omitting the
direct lending power, but they may perhaps be inferred from consider-
ing, for the business program alone, what could have been entailed by a
direct loan program. Under a power to lend for business purposes to
4 Report of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 1954, p. 283.
5 Ibid., p. 97. 8 Ibid., p. 99.
Cf. GI Loans—The First Ten Years, Decennial of the Loan Guaranty Pro-
gram, Veterans' Administration, June 22, 1954, p. 2.
8 In 1950 the agency received authority to make direct loans for home purchase
or construction, or for construction or improvement of a farm house, if credit
was unavailable through private channels.
9 Cf. Report of Committee on World War Veterans Legislation, H.R. 1418,
78th Cong., 2nd sess., May 5, 1944.
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veterans "unable to obtain necessary credit from private sources on
reasonable terms"—the formula usually applied to government lending
agencies—VA could have been plunged into the banking business on a
national scale. The number of loan applications could conceivably have
been vastly greater than was ever before handled by a federal business
lending agency. Unprecedentedly in federal lending to business firms, VA
would have been concerned with a very large number of very small enter-
prises, and in time might have become through foreclosure the proprietor
of numerous firms. The VA was unequipped with personnel, facilities, or
experience to become a banker for business. The preferable course was to
utilize existing banking facilities, and through VA guaranty or insurance,
to stimulate the supply of private business credit to veterans.
The business loan program of VA differs from its farm and home pro-
grams in making no charge for the guaranty or insurance service. The
public subsidy implied in that feature of the laW had two purposes: to
reduce the cost of credit to veterans; and to induce lenders to make funds
to veterans tha,t they would not otherwise supply. Congress be-
lieved that credit should be available to a veteran who aspired to entre-
preneurship and who had a reasonable prospect of success. At the time
the act was formulated, fear of postwar unemployment was strong, adding
to the desire that veterans be helped to establish their own businesses.
Though but small in terms of the total liabilities and expenditures of
the Veterans' Administration credit programs, the guaranty or insurance
of business loan is a novel undertaking, of interest for the particular
segment of the business population reached—that is, new and very small
firms—and for its effect on the practices of business financing institutions.
Statutory Provisions
Rather than trace in detail the numerous amendments of the law under
which the VA business credit program operated, we summarize the pro-
visions in effect about the end of 1954, noting the principal changes up
to that time.'°
ELIGIBILITY
Veterans of World War II honorably discharged after having served
for ninety days or more after September 16, 1940 and before July 25,
1947,11 and veterans of the Korean conflict who served after June 27, 1950
10Majoramendments to the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 were
made by Public Law 268, 79th Congress, approved September 4,1946, and
numerous changes have been enacted in a series of laws approved during 1947
and 1948. See Veterans' Administration, Lender3 Handbook, VA Pamphlet 4-8,
especially the December 1948 revision.
ii.Theoriginal act referred to the "termination of the war." This was estab-
lished as July 25, 1947 by Public Law 239, 80th Congress, approved on the same
day. In cases where a veteran has been discharged because of service-incurred
disability, the period of service can be less than ninety days.
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and before a date to be determined by Presidential proclamation or con-
current resolution of Congress, are eligible for loan guaranty benefits.'2
An eligible veteran who applies for a loan within ten years after the
official end of the conflict in which he participated is entitled to have it
automatically guaranteôd by the government in an amount not exceeding
50 percent of the loan, provided that the guaranteed amount does not
exceed $4,000 in the case of loans secured by real estate or $2,000 in the
case of other loans.'3 Veterans going into joint ventures may pooi their
guarantees.
The authority given VA in 1950 to guarantee secondary loans need not
be considered here, since in practice it affected the home loan, not the
business loan part of the program.
PURPOSES
A business loan may be guaranteed if the proceeds "are to be used for
the purpose of engaging in business or pursuing a gainful occupation, or
for the cost of acquiring for such purpose land, buildings, supplies, equip-
ment, machinery, tools, inventory, stock in trade, or for the cost of the
construction, repair, alterations or improvement of any realty or per-
sonalty used for such purposes or to provide the funds needed for working
capital." The proceeds of business loans may also be used to refinance
business indebtedness (but, as a general rule, only if that indebtedness is
delinquent) or to pay delinquent taxes or assessments oh business prop-
erty.
Besides specifying the purposes as above, 'the law requires (1) that
the property in question be "useful in and reasonably necessary for the
efficient and successful pursuit of the business"; (2) that the "ability and
experience of the veteran and the conditions under which he proposes to
pursue such business or occupation are such that there is reasonable
likelihood that he will be successful"; and (3) that "the purchase price
paid or to be paid by the veteran for such property or the cost of con-
struction, alterations, or improvements, does not exceed the reasonable
value thereof as determined by proper appraisal made by an appraiser
designated by the Administrator."4
12 For veterans of World War II who served again after June 27,1950, what-
ever entitlement benefit remained from earlier service was canceled by the law
extending coverage to Korean veterans (P.L. 550, 82nd Cong., July 16, 1952) and
a new guaranty privilege granted.
13 The original act required that application for loan benefits must be made
within two years after separation from military service or after termination of
the war, whichever was the later. The time span for application was lengthened
by amendment during 1946. The guaranty maxima for home loans were raised to
60 percent and $7,500 by the Housing Act of 1.950,butthese loans require prior
approval by the Administrator.
14 See Lender'a Handbook (VA Pamphlet 4-3, revised December 1948), p.
citing 38 USE 694c. "Reasonable value" is interpreted by regulation to mean
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It is apparent that the proceeds of a VA-guaranteed loan may be used
for almost any business purpose, in contrast to loans of the RFC, Federal
Reserve Banks, or other federal business loan agencies, which. limit pur-
poses in various ways. Nevertheless, the law does not leave wide open the
privilege of obtaining a VA-guaranteed loan for business purposes. The
limitations set—that "a reasonable likelihood" of success in business
should be shown, and that property expenditures should not exceed "rea-
sonable values" for the assets acquired—are more accurately described as
conditions of eligibility than as "credit standards." A veteran who meets
those conditions is entitled to a loan guarantee by the Administrator, pro-
vided that he can find a lender willing to make a loan within the maximum
interest rates specified by the law. He must still convince a lender of his
ability to repay the loan.
TERM TO MATURITY
The law left tile term to maturity of a guaranteed business loan up to
the lender and the veteran, within general limits of thirty years for loans
secured by realty (other than farm realty) and ten years for other
loans.15 VA regulations impose the additional limitation that the maximum
maturity may not exceed the economic life of the property securing the
loan. Any loan for a term in excess of five years must be amortized in
accordance with established procedures. itegulations require at least an
annual payment against the outstanding loan balance, and a final pay-
ment not more than twice the average of preceding installment payments,
excepting in the case of constructionloans or extended loans. Loans may
be repaid before maturity without penalty. As a loan is repaid, the amount
of the 'VA guaranty is reduced proportionately to the remaining loan
balance outstanding.
COLLATERAL SECURITY
Real estate loans (except those for repairs or improvements) must be
secured by a first lien on the realty.' Loans for purchase, alteration, im-
provement, repair, or production of tangible personal property must be
secured "to the extent legal and practicable," and a loan for working
capital or other capital, merchandise, or good will or other intangible
assets may be made without a lien. Loans of $1,000 or less for alteration,
repair, or improvement of real property need not be secured. If over
$1,000, such loans must be secured by a first or second lien, and if the
market prices current at time of acquisition of property. The original law had
referred to "reasonable normal value" which was construed by many appraisers
to indicate pre-World War II price levels, and therefore proved to be unduly
restrictive. Cf. GI Loans—the Fir.9t 10 Years, op.cit., p. 4.
15 The Housing Act of 1950 increased the maximum term for GI business loans
secured by real estate from twenty-five years to thirty.
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expenditures on property exceed 40 percent of its reasonable prior value,
the security must be a first lien. Because loans may be as much as 100
percent of the appraised value of the property offered as security—a loan
ratio much beyond the usual standards of prudence—the VA must place
a major reliance for repayment of sums borrowed upon the moral charac-
ter and ability of the veteran.
INTEREST RATES
The original legislation prescribed a maximum rate of interest of 4.
percent per annum on the unpaid principal balance of all VA-guaranteed
loans. However, this was found to be too low and inflexible a limit to
make many loans attractive to banks and other lenders, particularly under
conditions of active demand for credit and rising money An amend-
ment effective December 17, 1947 permitted the interest rate on insured
non-real-estate loans to rise to a maximum of 3 percent discount on the
original amount of one-year notes payable in equal monthly installments,
or 5.7 percent per annum on the unpaid balance of an interest-bearing
note. An amendment of August 10, 1948 also permitted the Administrator,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to approve of rates
up to 41/2 percent per annum on guaranteed loans, "if he finds that the
loan market demands it."6 This amendment represented an interesting
deviation from the customary federal policy of prescribing an inflexible
maximum loan rate.17 It was due to the inability of VA to make direct
loans to veterans on its own initiative, and its need for finding private
lenders willing to carry that part of the risk of nonrepayment which was
not assumed by VA. The interest rate on guaranteed real estate loans
remained at 4 percent until May 5,1953when, with credit stringent in
the mortgage loan markets in most sections of the country, the Adminis-
trator of Affairs authorized an increase to 41/2 percent. Up
until September 1, 1953 the VA paid to the lender a "gratuity" equal
to 4 percent of the guaranteed or insured portion of each loan, but not
exceeding $160, which amount was credited to the veteran's loan account.
It was believed that the VA should prepay approximately the first year's
interest due on the part of a loan for which it was responsible, as an
additional aid to the veteran.
PROCEDURE IN CASE OF DEFAULT
In the event of default or to avoid imminent default, the terms of re-
payment of any VA-guaranteed business loan may be extended by written
agreement between the lender and the veteran-borrower, without the
16 P.L. 901, 80th Cong.
17Statutorymaxima for interest rates under some of the titles of the Na-
tional Housing Act have been fixed at 5 or 6percent,but actual rates have been
adjusted from time to time at various points below the maxima.
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approval of the VA. If an extension is proposed for some other reason, or
if the extension will result in the release of an obligor, the prior approval
of VA must be obtained.
Failing extension of maturity, when a default has continued (a') 60
days in nonpayment of an installment, (b) 90 days in failure to coniply
with some obligation other than periodic payment, or (c) 180 days in
nonpayment of taxes, the lender is required to file a notice of default with
VA within the next 45days.
A claim for guaranty may be submitted at any time after default has
continued for three months (in the case of an extended loan or a term
loan, after one month). A claim for insurance may be submitted after
three months' default, provided the holder has established the net loss
by liquidating all of the available security. It is important to distinguish
between a claim for insurance, which represents the net amount due the
holder after the property has been sold, from the guaranty claim, which
may be filed before sale of the property.
Before the holder forecloses or liquidates security for a guaranteed or
insured loan, VA must be notified. The notice may be given at any time
after default has continued for three months, and action may be taken
thirty days after notification. If the property has been abandoned, waste
is occurring, or other circumstances warrant immediate action, the holder
may act without advance notice but must report to VA within ten days
the action taken and the reasons for it.
Within thirty days after receiving notice of default, notice of intention
to foreclose, or a claim for the guaranty, the VA may require the lender to
assign the loan and the security therefor to the VA or to another lender
designated by the VA, upon paying the original lender the full amount
of the outstanding loan balance. If the VA does not exercise this right,
the usual result is a sale of the property by the lender. Because the rights
of VA are subordinate to those of the lender, the lender has first claim
against the proceeds of sale for the satisfaction of the unguaranteed por-
tion of the unpaid loan balance.
To illustrate, suppose a default and property sale in the following cir-
cumstances: VA has guaranteed the legal maximum of 50 percent of a
loan, the proceeds of which were used to purchase property appraised at
100 percent of the amount expended (i.e. the loan/value ratio was also
at the legal maximum); and no repayment whatever has been made by the
debtor before default. Even if the property sells for as little as one-half
of its original appraised value, plus liquidation expenses, the lender will
still have recovered all of the unguaranteed portion of.his loan. In other
words, the effect of the VA guarantee from the point of view of the lender
would essentially be to reduce the maximum loan-value ratio from 100
percent to 50 percent, which brings such loans within the range of the
credit standards ordinarily applied in mortgage lending. Hence it appears
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that for the institutions advancing the funds the potential losses on VA-
guaranteed business loans are greatest with respect to non-real-estate
loans, particularly where loans for working capital or to acquire intangible
business assets are unsecured or are secured by property with low resale
value.
LOAN INSURANCE
The original law of 1944 provided only for loan guaranty. An important
amendment effective December 28, 1945 (P.L. 268, 79th Cong.) permitted
supervised lenders to elect VA insurance against losses in lieu of loan
By agreement between a lender and VA, the lender may be
insured against loss up to is percent of the aggregate amount of eligible
loans made by him. Purchased loans meeting the conditions of eligibility
are also insurable if, with the loan report, the lender submits to the
Administrator evidence of an agreement, made before the loan was closed,
to purchase such loans subject to their being insured by VA. The VA
maintains a current account in the name of each insured lender, crediting
it with the appropriate amounts available for the payment of losses on
insured loans made or purchased, and debiting it with the appropriate
amounts on account of transfers to other lenders, or payment of losses. The
pattern of FHA Title I loan insurance was followed. The 15 percent
premium necessarily represented an estimate of the amount needed for
reserve, rather than an actuarial calculation.'8
The loan insurance provision greatly expanded potential operations
under Title III, and in the business loan part of the program was widely
used. It enlarged the amount of government-supported credit available
to any one veteran, and also made the extension of such credit more at-
tractive to lenders. It permitted a veteran to obtain several loans up to a
total—in the case of non-real-estate credits—of $13,333, before he had
used up the $2,000 maximum legal VA guarantee, whereas previously
$4,000 was the maximum obtainable19 (15 percent of $13,333 equaling
$2,000, which is the ambunt of the available guaranty.) Under it the
lender was in a position to recover 100 percent of any loan subsequently
defaulting or resulting in a loss instead of the previous maximum of 50
percent covered by VA guarantee, if his insurance account was adequate.
The insurance provision, was especially attractive to lenders making a
large volume of VA loans, because the probabilities were then high that
their insurance accounts would have sufficient credits to repay the bank
in full for any losses. In effect, a large number of good loans could carry
the full amount of a small number of bad loans in a lender's. portfolio.20
18 The reserve originally called for in FHA loan insurance, 20 percent of the
loan amount, was. found excessive and reduced to 10 percent.
Cf. Banking, July 1946, p. 37.
20 It has been shown algebraically that an insured mortgage affords the lender
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The reduction of the balance amount of an insured loan by installment
payments, or the final payment of a loan, does not reduce a lending institu-
tion's reservoir of insurance credit. Hence institutions doing a large
volume of insured lending to veterans may in the course of time accumulate
insurance coverage equivalent to 100 percent or more of the unpaid balance
of all loans in their portfolios.
It should be emphasized that even under the most favorable conditions,
loan, insurance does not enable a lender to recover all of the costs incurred
in connection with a bad loan, although reasonable foreclosure costs are
recoverable along with unpaid principal and interest. Even if the insur-
ance account of a lender enabled the VA to repay 100 percent of the
principal and interest, the lender must still incur administrative expense
in arranging for loan extensions, attempting to collect sums due, reducing
its claim to judgment, and foregoing interest on the amount of the unpaid
balance during the period elapsing between the sate of the property
securing the loan and the payment of the claim. Hence it is vitally im-
portant to lenders that loans be set up soundly at the start, and 100 per-
cent loan insurance by no means obviates this need.
AUTOMATIC GUARANTEE AND PRIOR APPROVAL LOANS
Originally, VA-loan guarantees were available only to lenders who had
referred loan applications to the Administrator for prior approval, but
the very large number of applications received after demobilization began
in 1945 resulted in delays in granting credits to veterans. By amendment
to the law in 1946, lenders subject to examination and supervision of an
agency of a federal or state government (such as commercial banks and
insurance companies) were empowered to make loans with an automatic
guarantee without prior reference to the VA. Nonsupervised lenders
(such as individuals, or commercial finance companies in some states)
continue to require prior approval.21 Because supervised lenders must
bear the risk of ineligibility of a loan, many of them, despite the avail-
ability of automatic guarantee, have continued to seek the Administrator's
more protection than a guaranteed mortgage up to $8,000, provided portfolio
defaults do not exceed 30 percent. In addition, as amortization proceeds, insured
mortgages will absorb still higher percentages of defaults at an increasingly faster
rate (e.g. after 17 percent amortization has taken place, insured mortgages are
preferable unless defaults exceed 35 percent). Moreover, business and other loans
may be merged into a common insurance account for the lender, which is desirable
in 'helping to underwrite the (usually) more hazardous business loans. See the
article by Jullan R. Fleischman, "Guaranteed vs. Insured GI Loans," Savings
ani Loan News, August 1946, p. 7. In fact, the number of business loans made
on a guaranteed basis up to mid-1955 was considerably smaller than the number
insured. Insured loans comprised 60.8 percent of all business loans closed up to
that date (Loan Guaranty, June 1955, p. 57).
21home loans guaranteed under Section 501(b), which permit the higher
guarantee, prior approval by VA is also required.
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approval before making loans.22 However, the proportio.n of business loans
made with prior approval fell from 35 percent in 1946 to less than 10
percent in 1952.
A SECONDARY MARKET FOR VA REAL ESTATE LOANS
The attractiveness of VA-guaranteed home loans to commercial banks,
savings and loan associations, and other lenders was, materially increased
by the secondary market supports initiated in 1946. As of August of that
year the RFC wasauthorizedto purchase VA-insured or -guaranteed
loans, either directly or through a subsidiary,23 and in 1948 the Federal
National Mortgage Association was given power to purchase VA-protected
mortgage loans.24 It is noteworthy that this legislation applied only to
home and farm loans and did not provide secondary markets for business
loans to veterans, even if secured by real estate. Thus the further. legisla-
tive measures taken by Congress in that connection need not concern us
here.
Administ ration
ORGANIZATION OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
The business loan insurance and guaranty program was administered
during most of the period under study by the Finance Office of VA, one
of the agency's major operating divisions.25 The Finance Office handled
payments of all benefits to veterans and their dependents, made disburse-
ments for services and supplies furnished, paid all VA administrative
expenses, and administered guarantees and insurance of loans. Each major
funetion of the Finance Office was assigned to a director, loan insurance
and guaranty being the responsibility of the Director of the Loan Guar-
anty In turn, division chiefs were in charge, respectively, of
home, farm, and business loans.
After the Servicemen's Readjustment Act became effective on June
22, 1944, regulations were drafted and forms were designed and printed.
In November 1944, four field offices were equipped with loan guaranty
divisions to serve the entire United States. As demobilization of the.
armed forces proceeded during 1945, a flood of applications for loan
22 Annual of the Veterans' Admini8tration, 1946, p. 42, and Finance,
Guaranty of Loans, December 1952, p. 71.
23 P.L. 656, 79th Cong., August 7, 1946.
24 P.L. 864, 80th Cong., July 1, 1948.
25 On June 80, 1953 the Executive Office of the President authorized the VA
to proceed with a plan for reorganization of its central office along "major
purpose" lines in lieu of the "functional line" type of organization previously in
effeet. Three major departments were established: the Department of Medicine
and Surgery, the Department of Insurance, and the Department of Veterans
Benefits. Loan guaranty and insurance operations were assigned to. the last-
named department. Annual Report of the of Veterans' Affairs,
1958, p. 4.
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guaranty benefits made apparent a need for decentralization of authority
in order to reduce the time elapsing between receipt of an application and
disbursement of a guaranteed loan, and for a large number of additional
field offices with facilities for processing applications.
Between November 1944 and June 30, 1945, loan guarantee divisions
were established in 22 additional field offices, making a total of 26 offices
so equipped at mid-1945.28 In addition, revised administrative procedures
for expediting action on applications were first tested, and then installed.
The aim was to process loan applications within forty-eight hours of
receipt, excluding an additional four or five days required for verification
of eligibility at the New York office.27 The number of field offices equipped
for loan guaranty service was further increased to 74 by mid-1946. By
mid-1947 the new standard administrative procedures had been installed
in all field offices, and the time required for processing loan applications
had been reduced by as much as 25 percent.28 The 1946 amendment ex-
tending to supervised lenders automatic guaranty (without prior referral
of loan applications to VA) further accelerated loan disbursements. It
was said that "Under this new arrangement, a loan can be completely
processed in a week at the maximum, or if the veteran is known to the
bank, the loan can be granted on the spot. Prior to the 'automatic guar-
antee' procedure, a month might elapse between application and disburse-
ment."29
Field offices equipped with loan guaranty service have full authority to
approve or disapprove of most applications for loan guaranty or insur-
ance without reference to Washington. Because veterans move from one
region to another and may apply for loan guaranty benefits at different
locations and for different purposes, itis necessary for the Veterans'
Administration to maintain at a single location a record of each veteran's
available but unused benefits under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act,
known as the veteran's "entitlement." All entitlement records for the
nation are maintained at the Readjustment Accounting Control Division
(RACD) of VA located in New York City. Field offices obtained from
RACD a statement of a veteran's entitlement before issuing certificates
of eligibility to lenders,
APPLICATION FOR AND ORIGINATION OF LOANS
Applications for business' loan guaranty or insurance where the prior
approval of VA is required or sought are made jointly by the veteran and
the lender. On a single form, the veteran applies to the lender for a loan,
26 Annual Report of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 1945, p. 28. See
also Banking, April 1946, p. 63.
27 Annual Report of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 1946, p. 43.
28 Annual Report of the Admini.sfrrator of Veterans' Affairs, 1947, p. 57.
29 Cf. Banking, July 1946, p. 87.
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and both then apply to the Administrator of Veterans Affairs for insurance
or guaranty. The standard form of application requires the following
information: (1) general purpose, amount, and terms of the proposed
loan; (2) description of prior lien, if any, on the property to be acquired;
(8) estimated disbursements of the loan for various purposes, along with
expected total cost to the veteran of business property to be acquired, and
sources of other funds to finance its acquisition; (4) description of the
security offered for repayment; (5)statementof business experience
and plans of the veteran applicant, including an estimate of business in-
come and expense for the next twelve months, if the loan is to be used
to establish a new business, or a recent balance sheet and operating state-
ment, if the loan is to be used to expand or refinance an existing business.
Credit reports and financial data are submitted to the regional office of
VA, so that it may determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of
repayment.
In the case of loans processed on an automatic basis, the credit function
is performed by the lending institution and reported to VA. The same in-
formation is given as for prior approval loans, excepting that in lieu of
(5) above, the lender certifies to VA that the conditions of eligibility for
guaranty have been met by the veteran. Obviously, the lender assumes a
greater risk and responsibility with automatic than with prior approval
loans. However, once the evidence of guaranty or insurance is issued, it
is incontestable except for fraud or material misrepresentation.
The changes in procedure adopted in December 1945, which greatly
expedited the credit process, are shown by the following comparative
summary of steps:
Original Procedure: Veteran discusses loan with bank officer. Veteran
and bank fill out form of application for certificate of eligibility for the
veteran and send it to the regional office of the VA. Certificate of eligi-
bility is returned to the bank, and enclosed with itis the name of a
qualified appraiser who is to appraise the real property involved. The
bank obtains a credit rating report on the veteran from an approved credit
rating agency. The bank completes arrangements to make the loan and
applies to the VA for a certificate of guaranty. The VA sends the guaranty
certificate to the bank. The funds may then be paid out to the veteran.
Revised Procedure: Veteran discusses loan with bank officer. Bank
may accept the veteran's honorable discharge certificate as verification of
eligibility for loan. Bank proceeds with credit appraisal, and requests
the VA to assign an appraiser. After receiving appraiser's report, bank
may pay out loan. After making the loan, the bank sends to VA the
veteran's honorable discharge certificate, the note or evidence of debt
signed by the veteran, the appraiser's report, and the loan closing state-
ment of the bank. VA endorses the discharge certificate with the amount of
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the loan made and the portion of the guaranty right used and remaining
for the veteran. VA endorses the note, indicating the guaranty reserve
covering the loan, and returns to the bank the discharge certificate and
the note, retaining the appraiser's report and the closing statement. The
discharge certificate is returned to the veteran.
Loans may originate in a number of ways, but it is the standing instruc-
tion of VA to the veteran that he "find his own lender." While the loan
guaranty and insurance offered to lenders without charge was designed
to help veterans obtain credit, it may not be sufficient inducement to
lenders to advance funds at the maximum interest charges specified by the
law. VA does not assume responsibility for finding a lender nor assure
a veteran desiring a loan that he will obtain one. Nevertheless, it assists
veterans coming initially to its field offices, by supplying application forms
advising the veteran how to make his loan application a bankable proposi-
tion. VA has recommended the following steps in arranging for a loan :30
"(1) find the property you want, (2) go to a bank or other lending agency,
(3) present your plan and original discharge papers, (4) property is
checked by an approved appraiser,31 (5) certificate of reasonable value
goes, to lender, (6) if loan is approved, you get the money."
On occasion, VA offices have suggested banks or other lending institu-
tions which might be disposed to consider a veteran's application. When
competition among lenders for VA-guaranteed or -insured loans has been
active (as appears to have been the case at times during 1945 and 1946)
the VA offices have refrained from directing veterans to particular lenders,
in order to avoid the criticism of putting other lenders under a competitive
handicap. But at other times VA has not hesitated to direct them. In some
instances VA offices referred veterans to government lending agencies;
RFC, for example, made a number of VA-guaranteed business loans to
veterans unable to get credit from private sources. The ability of VA
itself to advance funds, when it could be established that private credit
was not available at the specified rates of interest, applied only to loans
fOr home purchase or construction, or for construction or improvement
of a farmhouse, not to business loans.
The VA has been flexiblein assenting to different procedures of loan
origination. For example, a large proportion of business loans—especially
in the Pacific Coast region—have been utilized by veterans to purchase
automobiles or trucks for business purposes. In many such cases, the
automotive dealers making the sales have supplied veterans with applica-
tion forms, and, acting as authorized agents of the lender (the bank or
30 Veterans' Administration, GlAaranteed Loans for Veterans, Pamphlet 4-1,
(revised), November 1949.
31 Officers of banks and other supervised lending institutions are frequently
designated as appraisers of assets other than real estate, so that with personal
property loans it is usually the lending officer who makes the appraisal.
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commercial finance company acquiring their installment receivable paper),
have completed applications for VA-protected loans jointly with veterans.
Where the lender involved was a supervised institution utilizing the
automatic guaranty provision, a loan might be closed without any personal
contact of the lender or the VA with the veteran.82
It would be useful to know what percentage of veterans seeking VA
business loans have been unable to obtain them because they we-re deemed
by lenders to lack experience or reasonable likelihood of success in busi-
ness. The VA offices do not prejudge the creditworthiness of a veteran nor
deter any veteran from applying for a loan, although they may later
reject formal applications on the ground that legal requirements includ-
ing likelihood of success have not been met. A considerable number of
veterans have desired business loans which never reached the stage of
formal application—and therefore do not appear in VA statistical records
—because they could not find a lender willing to extend credit. The fact
that some veterans have obtained VA business loans from the RFC
indicates that VA loan guaranty or insurance was not a sufficient induce-
ment to private lenders in all cases. One large bank reported that its
officers deterred many veterans from borrowing to go into business, in
order to prevent them from dissipating their own savings, as well as
public funds, in trying to operate businesses which probably would have
turned out unsuccessfully. -
PARTICIPATIONOF PRIVATE LENDERS
The success of VA loan guaranty or insurance in aiding veterans was
heavily dependent upon the cooperation of commercial banks and other
lending institutions. The VA was a passive agency in the credit process;
private lenders were to be the makers of loans. Did private lenders enter
into the program actively?
There is strong evidence that commercial banks and other lending in-
stitutions were aggressive in seeking and making VA loans during the
initial years of the program, when good will toward returning servicemen
was high and there was a strong, general disposition to aid them in their
re-establishment in civilian life. The Federal Reserve survey of business
loans held by member banks at November 20, 1946 indicated that although
82 Similarly, in connection with loans to purchase homes in residential real
estate tracts under development, it may be the tract developer instead of the
lender who completes with the veteran an application for a VA-protected loan,
as part of the total plan for financing purchase of a new home. Ordinarily the
tract developer first obtains a "certificate of reasonable value" from VA based
upon an appraisal of the prices fixed for the homes, and he also obtains from a
lender a commitment to purchase from him VA-guaranteed or -insured loans. He
is then able to proceed; but the lender or the VA must still pass upon the bor-
rower's credit rating, ability to pay, and eligibility.APPENDIX C
VA-protected loans were but a small fraction of the total, their occur-
rence was widespread: "Guaranteed or insured lending to G.I.'s for
business purposes was general among the member banks in all Federal
Reserve Districts. About a third of all of the member banks had some
of these business loans. A substantial proportion of the banks in each
size group engaged in this type of lending, although it appeared to be
more common among the large than among the small banks."33 During
1945 the American Bankers Association organized a Committee on
Service for War Veterans.34 This committee prepared and circulated a
Manual of Procedure for Maldng GI Loans, conducted questionnaire sur-
veys of bankers' attitudes toward such loans, and sought amendments to
the law designed to augment the volume of insured and guaranteed loans,
for example, the automatic guaranty of VA loans and the provision of a
secondary market for them. It conferred frequently with officials of the
VA, and sought procedures for obtaining more uniform appraisals, which,
during 1946, was said to be "the most troublesome factor in the veterans'
credit situation."35
Many commercial banks established separate loan offices staffed by spe-
cialists in VA loans. In various cities—for example, Philadelphia, Roches-
ter, Houston—banks jointly established centers where veterans could dis-
cuss their plans and make loan applications, in some instances staffed to
provide information and counsel on housIng, business, job placement, and
other matters as well as loans. These actions36 illustrate the receptiveness
of commercial bankers to the VA credit program during the demobilization
period. Profit was certainly not the only, or even the major, motive of
bank extension of VA business loans, considering the relatively long
risks, high administrative costs per dollar of credit, and limited interest
return. A desire to cultivate public good will and help veterans re-establish
themselves was equally important.
After 1946, there was some diminution of banking interest in VA bñsi-
ness loans. Even from the start there were certain rural areas in which
local bankers were reluctant to make them. Business loans were generally
more hazardous than home or farm loans; most of them did not have a
first lien on realty, and therefore had no secondary market. In many small
communities local bankers had been accustomed to charging 6 to 8 percent
or more on small business loans, and were not attracted by credits offering
a maximum of 5.7 percent, even when the VA insured the loans or guar-
anteed half of their amount. For small banks in small communities, the
33 Cf. Tynan Smith, "Security Pledged on Member Bank Loans to Business,"
Federal Reserve Bnlletin, June 1947, pp. 676f.
34 Cf. Banking, October 1946, p. 56.35 Cf. Banking, November 1946, pp. 117f.
36 See Banking, September 1945, p. 62; February 1946, p. 39; March 1946, p. 36;
July 1.946, p. 36; and August 1946, pp. 47, 89.
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number of VA business loans that might be developed was insufficient to
make the VA loan insurance device attractive.
Savings and loan associations, although active in the home loan part
of the program, scarcely participated in VA-protected business lending
because only a small fraction of the loans were eligible for negotiation or
purchase by them.
By late 1947, RFC had made a total of 3,924 GI business loans aggre-
gating $16,483,000, instances where veterans had been unable to find
private sources of credit in their In a study covering 2,910
business loans authorized by RFC from June 1946 through September
1947 after they had been declined by banks—of which 1,852 were GI
loans—the agency found that in 22 percent of the cases, or about one-
third of •those concerning veterans, the bank's refusal resulted from a
stated policy not to make GI loans.37
EVOLUTION OF BANK CREDIT STANDARDS
Commercial banks made the great majority of all VA business loans. To
most commercial banks the veteran's business loan posed a new type of
credit problem, namely, the making of term loans to new or very small
businesses that would be amortized out of earnings. This is a fact that
deserves great emphasis. Since 1935, commercial banks have developed a
large volume of term loans to medium-sized and large business enter-
prises.88 They have traditionally made numerous small short-term business
loans maturing within a year and based primarily on the personal credit
or collateral security of the small businessman rather than upon an
estimate of the earning power of the enterprise.39 Most banks regarded
these loans essentially as personal rather than business loans. VA busi-
ness loans were novel in applying the term-loan principle to very small
enterprises, including new as well as established firms.4°
Faced with a new type of credit problem, commercial banks gradually
evolved procedures and credit standards as a result of experimentation
and observation. The law and regulations of VA did not go beyond the
general criteria that the borrower show experience and reasonable like-
37 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
U.S. Senate, 8Oth Cong., 1st sess., on S. Res. 132, "A Resolution for an Inquiry
into the Operation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Its Sub-
sidiaries"; Part 1, December 11, 1947, p. 34.
88 For descriptions of the development of bank term lending, see Term Lend-
ing to Business (1942) and Finance and Banking (1947), by Neil H.
Jacoby and R. J. Saulnier (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial
Research Program).
39 Cf. Charles H. Schmidt, "Member. Bank Loans to Small Business," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, August 1947, p. 963.
40 From the standpoint of the lender, the difference between new and estab-
lished firms in the very small business field is not important, because the fortunes
of the enterprise are so heavily determined by the single owner-manager.
530APPENDIX C
lihood of success in business. It was up to the banks to interpret these
general requirements in terms of specific rules and standards.
During the initial phase of the VA program, which lasted from 1945
up to about mid-1947, commercial banks did not have well-formulated
credit standards for veterans' business loans, and were inclined to be
liberal in making them. Because many young veterans had not had any
business experience, loans were often made to men who had only a techni-
cal proficiency in a certain trade or occupation. For example, a young
veteran who acquired skill as a radio technician in the army, would be
considered to have sufficient experience to obtain a loan to open a radio
repair shop. His skill in repairing radios, however, may not have been
matched by business acumen in purchasing parts, maintaining records,
marketing his services, and controlling expenses. Many VA business loans
were made to enable veterans to purchase Army surplus trucks for the
purpose of entering the commercial trucking business. These appeared
to be sound loans, especially since many veterans had learned truck opera-
tion and repair in military service and the trucks were purchased at
apparently low prices. Experience showed, however, that commercial
trucking was a business requiring talents additional to those of truck
driver arid mechanic; also, military vehicles were ill-adapted to many
commercial transportation needs. Hence, many of these loans turned out
unfortunately for the bank, the VA, and the veteran.
At the beginning, banks also lacked experience with respect to the
amount of the veteran's own funds that he should be expected to invest in
a business. Certain banks advanced nearly the entire amount of money
required by a veteran for equipment, stock of goods, and working capital.
If the venture did not immediately succeed, a veteran could simply "walk
away" from it after the working capital had been exhausted, leaving the
bank with a liquidation problem, though the veteran would remain liable
to the VA in the event it had to pay a claim by the bank.
Another question was the maturity of loans. The law permitted maturi-
ties up to ten years for non-real-estate loans, provided the loan was
amortized. During the initial phase of the program, many banks set up
business loans on a five-year basis, or for even longer periods. Repayment
experience however, was often unfavorable on business loans of such long
terms.
Through trial and error, banks gradually learned what credit standards
should be met in order to make VA business loans bankable. One banker,
writing from considerable experience, recommended the following rules :41
(1) Insist on a down-payment by the veteran out of his own resources
of about 10 percent of the property purchased with a loan, so that the
4i Earl R. Parsons, "We're Learning a Lot about GI Loans," Banking, July
1946, pp. 86f.
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veteran will have an equity of his own to protect. (2) Set up an ámortiza-
tion schedule for repayment of the loan as soon as possible—within two
or .three years. Veterans may always apply for new loans, after the initial
loan has been repaid, if they have unused benefits left. (3) Make sure
the veteran has enough working capital for business operations and funds
for personal and family living expense before granting a loan to purchase
business equipment. Loans to provide both equipment and working capital
are unsound. (4) Be certain the veteran is physically able to carry on the
business for which he requests a loan. If he is receiving a disability com-
pensation, get a signed statement from him permitting the VA to show
you his service record. (5)Becertain that the veteran does not exaggerate
the true profit potentialities of his business, and study the business pe-
riodically to provide him with management counsel. (6) Limit loans to
veterans with business experience in the type of enterprise they plan to
enter, or to those whose background indicates they will succeed.
About mid-1947, after the initial flood of loan applications arising from
demobilization had passed and. as experience with. VA business loans
developed, there is evidence that bank credit standards were generally
raised, and loan applications were more critically scrutinized by banks
and VA offices. This change was not solely the product of repayment
difficulties, but also reflected the rise in alternative loan opportunities
open to banks. In addition, some bankers felt they had perfected the
technique of making small business term loans profitably, and preferred
to do so without VA participation; for a loan properly set up they con-
sidered VA guaranty or insurance unnecessary. In many cases, banks
could charge a higher interest rate on nonguaranteed loans than the 5.7
percent maximum under the GI statute; the veteran was often willing to
pay a higher rate in order to conserve his guaranty benefits for a home
loan, to avoid payment of appraisal fees, or to obtain funds more rapidly
with less red tape.42
One large branch-system bank with extensive experience in VA business
lending came to apply the same credit standards to its VA business loans
as to other small term loans .to business. Its requirements of any .small
business term borrower were: (1) He must invest in the enterprise an
amount equal to the loan of the bank, thus insuring that the bank would
not be, in effect, the senior "partner" in the enterprise. (2) He must have
had business experience as well as technical proficiency in the trade or
mechanical art used in the business. (3) The loan must be amortized
within a maximum period of three years.
42 Public Law 139, effective September 1, 1951, permitted a veteran to deduct
guaranty or insurance entitlement used for business or farm loans from the
$7,500 maximum home loan guaranty, with the remainder available for a home
loan guaranteed under Section 501(b) of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act.
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A Statistical Summary, 1945—1955
BUSINESS LOANS IN THE TOTAL VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION LOAN PROGRAM
Table C-i presents a cumulative summary of the number, original
amount of loans, and original amount of the VA liability on loans, for
home, farm, and business loans combined, and for business loans sepa-
rately, by fiscal years ending June 30, 1945 through 1955. The relatively
small role of business loans in the total veterans' credit program is ap-
parent. Through mid-1955 business loans formed only 5.3 percent of the
number of loans closed, and only 2.0 percent of the original cumulated
amount of loans closed, and only 1.1 percent of the cumulative amount of
TABLE C-i
Cumulative Summary of Home, Farm, and Business Loans Made with
VA Guaranty or Insurance in Fiscal Years 1945—1955
ORIGINAL VA LIABILITY
FISCAL NUMBER ORIGINAL As % of AVERAGE
AVERAGE
VA LIA-
ENDING OF LOANS AMOUNT AmountAmount SIZE BILITV
JUNE25 CLOSED (000) (OOO) of Loans OF LOAN PER LOAN
CUMULATWE TOTALS—HOME, AND BUSINESS LOANS
1945 12,228 $55,209 $19,645 35.6% $4,515 $1,607
1946 188,417 82,276 393,978 45.2 4,629 2,091
1947 823,548 4,458,034 2,077,608 46.6 5,413 2,523
1948 1,343,642 7,420,871 3,487,292 47.0 5,523 2,595
1949 1,622,873 8,773,513 4,170,185 47.5 5,406 2,570
1950 2,020,603 10,938,750 5,248,360 48.0 5,414 2,597
1951 2,558,613 14,630,906 7,370,093 50.4 5,718 2,881
1952 2,983,267 17,943,871 9,266,056 51.6 6,015 3,106
1953 3,299,949 20,723,544 10,870,824 52.5 6,280 3,294
1954 3,632,518 23,947,972 12,726,702 53.1 6,593 3,504
1955 4,203,668 30,001,134 16,153,207 53.8 7,137 3,843
CUMULATIVE LOANS
1945 738 a a a a a
1946 16,215 $47,820 $20,300 42.5% $2,949 $1,252
1947 68,172 213,106 81,384 38.2 3,126 1,194
1948 94,455 299,433 114,538 38.3 3,170 1,213
1949 107,244 337,629 127,130 37.7 3,148 1,185
1950 119,316 369,155 134,942 36.6 3,094 1,131
1951 136,836 410,718 145,168 35.5 3,002 1,064
1952 190,767 514,407 162,898 31.7 2,697 854
1953 205,450 552,365 169,578 30.7 2,689 825
1954 214,544 577,685 174,092 30.1 2,693 811
1955 221,014 598,723 178,114 29.7 2,709 806
Data for 1945—1954 are from Reports of the Administrator of Veterans'





VA liability. Earlier, the percentages for business loans were somewhat
higher, though not large; through mid-1947, about 8 percent by number, 5
percent by amount of loan, and 4 percent by amount of VA liability. But
the greet diversity of small business ventures posed specially difficult
tasks of credit appraisal and administration, both for lenders and for the
VA, which made business loans more important in the administration of
the whole program than the ratios suggest.
Up to mid-1955a cumulative total of.about 221,000 VA business loans
had been disbursed in an aggregate original amount of nearly $600
million. The average original amount of the loans made over the preceding
ten and one-half years was about $2,700 and the average original amount
of the VA liability was about 30 percent thereof, or $810. Business loans
in comparison to all loans were of smaller average size, and VA's liability
on them covered lesser fractions of the loan amount (Table C-i); and the
contrast increased, through time. Business loans made in fiscal years
through 1949 averaged between 56 and 64 percent as large as all loans
combined, but after mid-1951, less than one-third as large. The portion
of the loan amount for which VA carried liability averaged between 29
and 39 percent through 1949, then less than 20 percent after 1930 (Table
C-6). The smaller average size of business loans reflects the legal limita-
tion of $2,000 on the amount of the VA guarantee on non-real-estate loans
(most business loans were of that type), whereas the limit was $4,000
on real estate loans until 1950 when it was raised to $7,500 for home
loans. The smaller portion of the loan amount for which VA protection
was utilized by veterans obtaining business loans reflects the relatively
wider use of insurance (where VA's protection could not cover more than
15 percent of the loan amount) rather than guaranty in that part of the
program.
For business loans and for all loans combined, the VA credit program
expanded rapidly during the fiscal years 1945—1947 as demobilization and
veteran readjustment to civilian life proceeded. It advanced at a slower
rate in fiscal 1948 and at a still slower pace in fiscal 1949 when business
activity underwent a mild recession. Then the combined program gained
new momentum, especially during fiscal 1951 as economic activity in-
creased after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The expansion of the
combined credit program during fiscal 1948—1951 was greater than that
of the business loan program by itself, the cumulative original amount of
all loans combined doubling between mid-1948 and mid-1951, whereas
the amount for business loans rose by only 40 percent. This reflected the
strong demand of veterans for homes, the availability (until repeal by the
Housing Act. of 1950) of VA-guaranteed secondary loans while the
primary loan was insured by FHA, and the establishment of a 100 percent
secondary market for VA-guaranteed real estate loans, as well as a more
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ample supply of low-cost housing.43 Again between 1951 and 1955 the
cumulative loan amount of the combined program doubled, whereas for
business loans the amount rose by only 23 percent. The comparatively
small demand for business loans may reflect veterans' preferring to use
their VA entitlements for home loans, and increased availability of busi-
ness credit without VA participation.
A summary of the default and loss experience up to mid-1955 on home,
farm, and business loans guaranteed or insured by the VA clearly indicates
the much greater hazard inherent in lending to small business enterprises
than was present in home and farm loans, nearly all of which are secured
by marketable real estate (Table C-2). Of the more than 3.9 million home
loans reported closed, the VA had paid claims on about 22,300 loans, or
0.57 percent of the number; and the amount of claims paid formed less
than one-tenth of one percent of the original amount of all loans closed.
The record was somewhat less favorable for farm loans and strikingly
unfavorable for business loans. Up to June 1955 the VA had paid claims
on 12,600 of the 221,000 business loans closed, or percent of the
number; and the amount of those claims was 1.65 percent of the original
amount of all such loans closed. Because business loans had a much
shorter average maturity than home loans, it is undoubtedly true that
the critical period for repayment of home loans has not yet arrived. How-
ever, the percentage of the number of outstanding loans in default (in-
cluding loans awaiting payment of the lenders' claims) at mid-1955 affords
a limited preview of relative losses in the future; and the default ratio
for home loans was just under 1.1 percent whereas it stood at nearly 10
percent for business loans.44
The loan insurance principle was applied much more extensively to VA
business loans than to VA home or farm loans, because of the smaller
average size of business loans and the infrequency with. which they were
secured by real estate. Through May 1951 less than one-half of 1 percent
of home loans were insured, about 7.0 percent of farm loans, and nearly
40 percent of business loans (Table C-3). Although the number and
dollar volume of home loans far outweighed business loans, nearly two-
thirds of the initial amounts of insurance credits on the books of the VA
at May 25, 1951 were on account of business loans. This appears to
indicate that the loan insurance principle finds its widest application in
a credit field marked by large numbers of small loans, with respect to
each of which risks and uncertainties are considerable.
48 Cf. T. B. King, "The Revival of the GI Loan," Savings and Loan News,
November 1950, p. 27.
44 A more significant comparison would lie between the default and claim
on GI business loans and the portfolio experience of lenders with
conventional small business term loans. Requisite data are not available, but a few
banks which have had extensive experience with small business term loans report




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Relative Importance of Insured Loans among Home, Farm, and.
Business Loans Made with VA Credit Support, to Mid-1951
(dollar figures in thousands)
LOAN
PROGRAM







Home 2,328,961 8,960 0.38% $ 8,488 29.6%
Farm 60,657 3,943 6.50 1,356 4.7
Business 134,290 52,966 89.44 18,798 65.6
Total 2,523,908 65,869 2.61% $28,642 100.0%
Numbers of loans closed and loans insured are from Finance, Guaranty of Loans,
Veterans' Administration, May 1951, p. 81. Other data, from a special tabulation
supplied by the Veterans' Administration.
The preceding observation is borne out by an analysis of the insured
loan accounts of both active and inactive lenders that were on the, books
of the VA at May 25, 1951. Although information is lacking on the total
number of lending institutions participating in the VA loan programs, it
is apparent that only a minor fraction of them (696)' utilized loan insur-
ance at all, and that oniy about 40 percent of this number were active
lenders (Table C-4). These 273 active lending institutions accounted for
more than nine-tenths of the insurance credits outstanding on the books
of the VA. Hence, the data bear out the a priori expectations—that VA
business loan insurance proved to be attractive to a relatively small num-
TABLE C-4
Number of Private Lenders Participating in the VA Business
Loan Insurance Program through May 25, 1951 and













Lenders reporting 696 100.0% $23,724 100.0%
From a special tabulation by the Veterans' Administration, June 18, 1952.
"Active lenders" are defined as lenders who made' one or more new loans during
the preceding six months.
537APPENDIX C
her of lending institutions with relatively large individual loan volumes.
Only when a lender could develop a considerable volume of VA business
loans would the amount of his insurance reserve expand to provide ample
protection against loss. Although the largest number of banks participat-
ing in insured loans were institutions with total assets under $25 million,
by far the largest proportion of credit was disbursed by a few large banks
each with assets of $100 million or more.45
ANNUAL VOLUME OF VA BUSINESS LOAN OPERATIONS
Up to mid-1955, a cumulative total of 235,320 applications for business
loans had been received by VA offices, of which 221,950 or 94 percent
were approved. Of the number of loan applications approved, 221,014
loans were reported closed and disbursed (Table C-5). The high per-
centage of approvals is indicative of the careful screening of applications
by commercial banks and other lenders.
By mid-1955 nearly 165,000 loans, or 75 percent of those disbursed,
had been repaid in full. An additional 12,621 loans, representing 5.7
percent of the number disbursed, had been terminated by payment of a
claim by the VA. The balance of 43,771 loans, representing not quite 20
percent of the total number disbursed, were outstanding at mid-1955.
TABLE C-S
Applications for VA-Guaranteed or -insured Business Loans, and Loans Made,
Extinguished, and Outstanding, 1945—1955
LOANS CLOSED
LOANS TERMINATED
By By Payment LOANS
CALENDARAPPLICATIONSAPPLICATIONS AND DIS- Repaymentof ClaimOUTSTANDING





















1948 17,893 16,596 17,817 15,763 2,604 68,422
1949 13,271 12,695 11,995 14,914 2,057 63,446
1950 13,448 11,699 11,819 . 11,451 1,161 62,653
1951 48,566 42,789 42,491 10,319 589 94,236
1952 25,618 29,961 30,638 13,317 791 110,766
1953 11,853 12,213 12,473 41,798 1,339 80,102
1954 7,262 7,113 7,157 29,464 1,180 56,615
1955b 3,424 3,274 3,250 15,601 493 43,771
Total 235,320 221,950 221,014 164,622 12,621 ..
Computed from data in Finance, Guarantyof Loan8 (Veterans'Administration), 1946—1950
Supplement, and from December issues of Loam Guaranty, 1951—1954, and the June 1955 issue.
aNotavailable. b To June 25.
45 Data by letter from the Veterans' Administration, April 23, 1953.
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Applications received reached a peak of 51,100 during the calendar
year 1946; applications approved reached their peak of 44,764 during
the same year. Terminations by payment of lenders' claims were most
numerous in 1948, whereas repayments of loans in full were highest dur-
ing 1953, following the 1951 increase in lending mentioned below. By the
beginning of 1948, it appears that the VA business loan program had
reached a plateau, with between 60,000 and 70,000 loans outstanding at
year ends through 1950, and the annual number of new loans closed just
about offsetting the number of loans terminated (Table C-5). A sharp
increase occurred in number of loan applications during 1951, apparently
resulting from veterans' efforts to get longer credit terms for the purchase
of automobiles than were available elsewhere, under Federal Reserve
restriction of consumer credit by means of Regulation W. During the
ten months ended May 25, 1952, some 47,634 VA business loans were
closed, of which no less than 43,446 loans, or 91.2 percent of the total,
were auto
Tables C-6 and C-7 give annual dollar amounts and average size of
loan and of VA liability for the business credit program through 1954
and part of 1955, for all loans closed and for loans repaid. The average
size of loans closed decreased by more than one-sixth in 1949, and again,
more sharply, in 1951; then rose in 1953 and later. The smaller average
size of loans during the middle years may be attributed in part to greater
'caution on the part of lenders as experience with GI loans developed, and
also to changes in the business purposes for which loans were made,•es-
pecially in 1951—1952 when Regulation W was operative. The average
amount of liability assumed by VA also decreased in 1949 and again in
1951, representing less than 20 percent of the amounts of loans made
from 1951 through 1954. Primarily the decreasing percentages of VA
liability reflect a relative increase in use of VA insurance, under which
the public liability was limited to 15 percent of the aggregate amount
of a lender's loans, whereas in loan guaranteeing it could cover as much
as 50 percent of the amount of a loan.
DEFA.ULT AND LOSS
The proportion of outstandings loans that were in default (or on which
payment of claims was pending) rose from 1.4 percent at the end of
1946 to 6.0 percent at the end of 1949, during three years when defaults
were numerous and many loans terminated with loss, as evidenced by
VA's payment of a lender's claim (Tables C-S and C-9). The sharp rise
in the default ratio in 1953 and 1954 reflects mainly the decrease in num-
ber of outstandings as many loans were repaid.
Up to mid-1955 the cumulative number of business, loans for which
46Special.tabulation provided by the Veterans' Administration, June 18, 1952.
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TABLE C-6
VA-Guaranteed or -Insured Business Loans Made, 1945—1955: Number,











DEC. 25 NUMBER (000) (000) Percent OP LOAN PER LOAN
].946a 44,485 $136,049 $ 53,297 39.2% $3,058 $1,198
1947 38,889 126,045 47,344 37.6 3,241 1,217
1948 17,817 58,450 21,347 86.5 3,281 1,198
1949 11,995 32,290 9,468 29.3 2,692 789
1950 11,819 82,351 8,572 26.5 2,737 725
1951 42,491 82,729 14,968 18.1 1,947 352
1952 30,638 64,855 11,199 17.3 2,117 366
1953 12,473 83,646 • 5,882 17.5 2,698 472
1954 7,157 21,316 8,870 18.2 2,978 541
1955b 3,250 10,991 2,166 19.7 3,382 667
Total 221,014 $598,723 $178,114 29.7% $2,709 $ 806
Computed from data in Finance, Guaranty of Loans (Veterans' Administration), 1946—1950
Supplement, and from December issues of Loan Guaranty, 1951—1954, and the June 1955 issue.
a Cumulative from the beginning of the program.
b To June 25.
TABLE C-7
VA-Guaranteed or -Insured Business Loans Repaid in Full, 1945—1955:











DEC. 25 NUMBER (000) (000) Percent OF LOAN PER LOAN
1946a 2,231 $4,664 $1,962 42.1% $2,091 $ 879
1947 9,764 20,926 8,182 39.1 2,143 838
1948 15,763 86,185 13,722 37.9 2,296 871
1949 14,914, 38,921 14,638 2,610 981
1950 11,451 84,051 12,887 37.8 2,974 1,125
1951 10,319 82,929 12,348 87.5 8,191 1,196
1952 13,317 36,109 11,867 32.9 2,712 891
1953 41,798 95,686 19,752 20.6 2,289 473
1954 29,464 62,298 18,089 21.0 2,114 444
1955b 15,601 35,336 7,337 20.8 2,265 470
Total 164,622 $397,101 $115,778 29.2% $2,412 $ 703
Computed from data in Finance, Guaranty of Loans (Veterans' Administration), 1946—1950
Supplement, and from December issues of Loan Guaranty, 1951—1954, and the June 1955 issue.
a Cumulative from the beginning of the program.
b To June 25.APPENDIX C
TABLE C-8
Default Experience on VA-Guaranteed and -Insured Business Loans, 1945—1955
DEFAULTS DURING YEAR
LOANS OUTSTANDING AT YEAR END
Ratio of Cured
YEAR Defaults to Reported In Defaulta
ENDING ReportedCured or
DEC. 25 in, DefaultWithdrawnAnnualCumulative TotalNumberPercent
1946 1,105b 122b 11.0%b 11.0% 41,875 586 1.4%
1947 6,231 1,628 26.1 23.9 68,972 8,076 4.5
1948 7,345 3,727 50.7 37.3 68,422 3,936 5.8
1949 3,427 3,347 61.7 43.9 63,446 8,797 6.0
1950 .3,082 2,476 80.3 48.7 6,653 3,153 5.0
1951 8,439 2,042 59.4 50.1 94,236 3,900 4.1
1952 4,976 2,988 60.0 51.7 110,766 5,038 4.5
1953 4,408 2,027 46.0 31.0 80,102 6,024 7.5
1954 2,989 2,706 90.5 54.0 56,615 5,076 9.0
1955c 612 922 150.7 55.5 43,771 4,260 9.7
Total 89,614 21,985 55.5% ..
Computed from the 1946—1950 Supplement and various monthly issues of Finance, Guaranty
of Loan8 (Veterans' Administration; now titled Loan Guaranty).
a Also includes loans on which payment of lender's claim was pending at year end.
b Cumulativefrom the beginning of the program.
c To June 25.
TABLE C-9
VA-Guaranteed or -Insured Business Loans Terminated by Payment of
Lender's Claim, 1945—1955
RATIO OF NET AVERAGE
YEAR CLAIMS CLAIMS PAID TO FILED AMOUNT SIZE OF
ENDING FILED AFTER CLAIMS PAID CLAIM
DEC. 25 DEFAULTa PAID Annual Cumulative (000) PAYMENT
1946b 474 379 80.0% 80.0% $ 311 $ 821
1947 2,563 . 2,028 79.1 79.3 2,088 1,030
1948 2,855. 2,604 91.2 85.0 2,847 1,093
1949 2,008 2,057 102.4 89.5 2,049 996
1950 1,049 1,161 110.7 92.0 706 608
1951 596 589 98.8 92.4 194 329
1952 924 791 85.6 91.8 301 380
1953 1,412 1,339 94.8 92.1 363 420
1954 1,158 1,180 101.9 93.0 593 503
1955c 640 493 77.0 92.3 210 426
Total 13,679 12,621 92.3% .. $9,862 $ 781
Computed from the 1946—1950 Supplement and various monthly issues of Financo, Guaranty
of Loans (Veterans' Administration; now titled Loan Guaranty).
a Includes claim subsequently withdrawn.
b Cumulative from the beginning of the program.
CToJune 25.
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defaults were reported to VA offices was 39,614, or 17.9 percent of the
221,014 loans closed and disbursed up to that time. In other words, per-
haps as many as one out of every six loans made became delinquent in some
respect.47 More than half of the defaulting loans were later removed from
default status (Table C-8). A cumulative total of 17,629 loans, or 8
percent of the cumulative number disbursed, had remained delinquent,
most of which were terminated before mid-1955 by payment of lenders'
claims, with 4,260 still outstanding in default or in process of claim
payment. The ratio of loans withdrawn from default status to the number
reported in default rose substantially during the first five years of the
program, so that by the end of 1950 the number of defaulted loans rein-
stated to current status was nearly half as large as the total number of
defaults reported up to that date. Presumably, this reflected an improve-
ment in administrative technique by the VA and by lenders, and an in-
creasing disposition to work out modifications and extensions of original
loans which got into difl3culties.
Up to mid-1955, 13,679 claims against the VA had been filed by lenders
after default, and claims had been paid on 12,621 loans or 92 percent of
those originally filed (Table C-9). The remainder had either been with-
drawn or were still pending payment as of that date. During the early
years of the program, VA processing of claims lagged materially behind
claims filed,48 giving rise to complaints from lenders. Beginning in 1949
VA offices processed and paid more claims than were filed, and by 1951
they had worked off most of the backlog. A comparison, annually, of the
average size of claim payments on loans ending in loss with the average
amount of VA's liability on loans that were fully repaid is of interest
(Tables C-9 and C-7). In the early years, losses occurred whereliability
was comparatively heavy; after 1949, the reverse was usually true.
Up to June 25, 1955, claims had been paid on 5.7 percent of all loans
closed and disbursed up to that time, and for every claim paid there
were 13 loans that had been paid in full up to the same date. The total
amount of claims paid was $9,862,000, which was 1.6 percent of the
$598,723,000 original amount of loans disbursed. VA statistical records
show only the original amounts of loans repaid in full, so that it is neces-
sary to estimate the total amount of repayments up to June 25,
41 The statement is only approximate, because repeated delinquencies of the
same loan are not taken into account.
48 Note, that part of the difference, in Table C-9, between claims filed and
claims paid would be accounted for by claims withdrawn.
49 Loans fully repaid amounted to $397.1 million by mid-1955. Assuming that
loss loans averaged equal in size to loans repaid in full, the total original amount
of the 12,621 loans on which claims had been paid by that date would be about
$30.4 million, and the total original amount of loans terminated, $428 million. Sub-
tracting that amount from the cumulative amount of all loans closed and dis-
bursed, $599 million, gives an estimate for the total original amount of loans still
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Repayments may be estimated roughly at about $480 million, so that the
ratio of the amount of claims paid to the total amount of repayments was
about 2 percent. It would be desirable to compare the default and loss
ratios for VA business loans with those for small business loans made by
private lending institutions, but adequate data for the latter are not
available. Fragmentary evidence suggests that defaults and losses on VA
business loans were relatively higher than those on conventional small
business term loans.50 The hazards involved in extending small term loans
to very small and new business enterprises were undoubtedly larger than
those which commercial banks had previously been accustomed to carry.
VA LOANS IN THE SMALL BUSINESS LOAN MARKET
The slight importance of VA activity—from the quantitative stand-
point—in the small business credit market can be gauged by means of the
commercial and industrial loan survey conducted by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System among member banks in November
1946. (Reliable data for nonmember banks and other lenders to small
business are lacking.) The Federal Reserve study embraced a nationwide
sample of 2,000 member banks, each of which submitted detailed informa-
tion on a sample of its business loans outstanding.5' For purposes of the
survey, small businesses were defined as manufacturing and mining con-
cerns with total assets under $750,000; wholesale trade concerns with
total assets under $250,000; and retail trade, service, construction, public
utility, transportation, and other concerns with total assets under $50,000.
On that definition, loans to small firms were estimated to number 514,-
000, or three-fourths of all outstanding member bank loans to business.
Their total amount was estimated at $2.9 billion, or 22 percent of the
business loans held by member banks at the end of 1946, and the average
balance outstanding at $5,600. VA-guaranteed or -insured business loans,
of which there were an estimated 16,000 totaling $54 million,52 formed
about 3 percent of the number, and just under 2 percent of the outstanding
outstanding in mid-1955, $171 million. Then, assuming that on the average, half
of the indebtedness on the outstanding loans had been paid off, $85.6 million of
such payments may be added to the $397.1 million of loans repaid in full to give
the estimate for total repayments up to mid-1955: some $480 million.
50 For example, a large bank that made many thousands of small term loans
to business, all under $10,000 in amount, during the period covered by the VA
business loan program, found that its ratio of losses charged off to the amount
of repayments was well under 1.0 percent. Its delinquency ratio (ratio of amount
of loans in default to amount of loans outstanding) was about 3 percent, despite
a definition of delinquency more rigorous than that used by the VA.
51 Cf. Charles H. Schmidt, "Member Bank Loans to Small Business," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, August 1947, pp. 963ff.
52 "Security Pledged on Member Bank Loans to Business," by Tynan Smith,
Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1947, p. 665.
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amount, of member bank loans to small business. The importance of the
VA business credit program lies in the particular segment of the market—
new and extremely small enterprises—into which it extended the use of
term loans, rather than in its size.
Characteristics of the Loans
The distinguishing characteristics of VA-protected business loans are
thrown into relief by comparing them with loans of commercial banks to
small business enterprises, to the extent that different categories of
analysis in the available data allow. Commercial banks are undoubtedly
the most important institutional source of credit for very small businesses.
Moreover, banks were the preponderant makers of VA business loans, as
Table C-bshows.
Commercial banks made nearly 95 out of every 100 VA business loans
during the three and a half years ending in mid-1951, and advanced more
than 90 percent of the credit provided. Savings and loan associations, real
estate and mortgage companies, mutual savings banks, and life insurance
companies made comparatively insignificant numbers of guaranteed busi-
ness loans, .but those they made were larger on the average than those of
commercial banks—in the case of all but the savings and loan associations,
about twice as large. Next to commercial banks in importance stood
individual lenders, who collectively accounted for 2.8 percent of the loans
and for 5.1 percent of the amount of credit advanced. Such VA business
loans as were made by commercial finance companies presumably are in-
cluded in this small volume of credits.
TABLE C-b
Number. and Amount of VA-Guaranteed or -Insured Business Loans






OF LOANS Number Amount
Commercial banks 51,947 $184,451 94.3% 90.1%
Savings and loan
associations 489 1,464 0.9 . 1.0
Real estate and
mortgage companies 523 2,771 0.9 1.9
Mutual savings banks 563 2,678 1.0 1.8
Insurance companies 32 242 0.1 0.2
Individuals and other .
lenders 1,521 7,574 2.8 5.1 .
Total, 55,075 $149,180 100.0% 100.0%
From a special tabulation provided by the Loan Guaranty Service of the
Veterans' Administration. The exact period covered is from December 25, 1947
through June 25, 1951.
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-
Informationon the size distribution of VA loans by original amount is
not available. The best approximation is a distribution by purchase price
of the business property financed by the loan, available for a five-month
period in late For the great majority of loans made up to the end
of 1947 the loan financed 90 percent or more of the purchase price; use
of purchase price therefore overstates only moderately the original
amount of loans (excepting loans over $s,000 in amount, for which the
ratio of original amount of loan to purchase price fell well below 90 per-
cent).
In comparison with the generality of member bank loans to small busi-
ness outstanding in November 1946, VA-protected loans show a much
greater concentration within the range of $1,000 to $5,000 (Table C-i 1).
The explanation is obvious. On loans not secured by real estate VA's
guarantee, by. law, could not exceed $2,000 or 50 percent of the loan
amount; most VA-protected loans were of that type, hence tended toward
amounts close to or below $4,000.
TABLE C-li
Size Distributions of Business Loans Guaranteed or Insured by
VA, 1947, and of Outstanding Member Bank Loans to
Small Businesses, 1946
NUMBER OF LOANS 1'ERCENTAOE .
.
Member Member
SIZE OF LOANa VA-ProtectedBank VA-Protected Bank
Less than $1,000 2,051 143,300 18.2% 27.9%
$1,000—4,999 10,219 228,800 65.6 44.5
5,000—9,999 2,384 66,700 15.3 13.0
10,000—24,999 849 48,200 5.5 9.4
25,000 and over 61 27,300 0.4 5.3
All loans .15,564 514,300 100.0% . 100.0%
VA data refer to business loans closed during five months of 1947 (those ending
May 25, June 25, August 25, September 25, and October 25) with VA guarantee
or insurance, from a special tabulation by the Veterans' Administration. Bank
data refer to loans to small businesses outstanding on November 20, 1946, from
"Member Bank Loans to Small Business," by Charles H. Schmidt, Federal Re-
serveB'wlletin,August 1947, Table 6, p. 970.
a For VA-protected loans, refers to purchase price of assets acquired; for mem-
ber bank loans, to original amount.
5S The succeeding materials on contract length, type of security, and repayment
method for VA-protected loans also refer to limited periods in 1947. No doubt
the pattern of loan size underwent some change over time, and terms to maturity
may have tended to shorten in later years; but the available data are believed




Perhaps the most significant distinguishing characteristics of VA busi-
-nessloans was their relatively long term of final maturity. More than
three-quarters of the member bank loans to small business were written
to mature within one year or less or were payable on demand; in con-
trast, only about one out of a hundred VA-protected business loans had
a maturity of less than ten months (Table C-12). Looking at the maturity
scale from the opposite direction, only 22 percent of the small business
loans held by banks had maturities over twelve months, whereas 99 per-
cent of VA business loans called for final payments ten months or more in
the future.
It should be recognized that the actual maturities of loans may differ
considerably from their original maturities because of extensions and
renewals, and that a considerable number of demand or short-term bank
loans to small businesses were term loans in practice. However, the term
of the formal loan contract is not incidental. The making of a term loan
compels lender and borrower to estimate the long-term earning and debt-
repaying capacity of the firm at the outset, and requires a different method
of credit appraisal than the making of a short-term loan. The VA program
brought banks into a relatively new type of credit operation—term lending
to new and very small enterprises. Probably for this reason, commercial
banks as well as other lenders wrote VA business loans for terms well
within the statutory maximum. Whereas the Servicemen's Readjustment
Act permitted amortized loans to run as long as ten years even if un-
•secured, and for twenty years (currently, thirty years) if secured by real
estate, it is noteworthy that 74 percent of all VA loans made during the
three-month sample period matured within less than five years.
TYPE OF SECURITY
Nearly three-quarters of VA business loans in the sample period were
secured by chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts on the personal
property purchased with the proceeds of the loan (Table C-13). About
one-sixth were secured by real estate. Less than 10 percent were other-
wise secured, or unsecured. The distribution for member bank loans to
small businesses outstanding in November 1946 shows, in contrast, a
preponderance of unsecured loans (38 percent) and of loans secured by
inventory, or various types of claim, or endorsement (32 percent).
Veterans were, of course, in the great majority of cases unable to offer
any other collateral security than the property they purchased with the
proceeds of a loan, and, lacking a record of successful experience in op-
erating the business they were entering, they were rarely eligible for
unsecured personal credit. Although the law permitted VA guarantee on






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Distributions by Type of Security for Business Loans Guaranteed or Insured
by VA, 1947, and for Outstanding Member Bank Loans

























Other and nonreported . 9.5 Otherb . 32.0
Total 100.0% Total 100.0%
VA data refer to 6,569 business loans closed during two months of 1947 (those ending
June 25 and July 25) with VA guarantee or insurance, from a special tabulation by the
Veterans' Administration. Bank data refer to an estimated 514,300 loans to small businesses
outstanding on November 20, 1946, from "Member Bank Loans to Small Business," by Charles
H. Schmidt, Federal Reaerve Bulletin, August 1947, Table 16, p. 977.
a Covers loans involving deferred participation by RFC or the Federal Reserve Banks, or
VA guarantee or insurance, where the federal protection was the primary security; otherwise
such loans were classified according to major collateral.
b Refers to loans secured by stocks and bonds, life insurance, inventories, accounts receivable,
assignment of claims, endorsement or co-maker, and miscellaneous other security.
to purchase an interest in real property pledge real estate, and that loans
to purchase •or improve personal property be secured "to the extent
legal and practicable." Lenders did acquire liens on the business property
in the great majority of cases. VA business loans were term loans,54 unlike
most of the traditional bank loans to small firms. The greater hazard of
nonrepayment involved in distant maturities naturally would have led
lenders to take whatever collateral was available, irrespective of the legal
inj unction.
METHOD OF REPAYMENT
VA business loan agreements have overwhelmingly called for repay-
ments in equal monthly installments: that was the method in more than
94 out of every 100 VA-protected loans made in the sample period (Table
C-14). Since the law required amortization only for loans in excess of
five years' maturity and the regulation specified a payment "at least once
annually," this probably reflects the favorable experience of lenders with
monthly installment payments against FHA Title I loans and consumer
That is, loans maturing in more than one year. The VA has customarily used
the phrase "term loan" to designate a "straight" or unamortized loan in distinc-
tion from an amortized or serial-payment lan.
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TABLE C-14
Distributions by Repayment Method for Business Loans Guaranteed or Insured
by VA, 1947, and for Outstanding Member Bank Term Loans
to Small Businesses, 1946
METHOD OF RE1'AYMENT
VA-Protected
Loans METHOD OF REPAYMEXP
Member Bank
Term Loan8
Monthly installments 94.3% Equal installments 86.8%
Quarterly installments 1.1 Unequal installments 4.3
Semiannual installments 1.8 Serial notes 2.4
Annual installments 2.2 Several notes 0.2
Unamortized 0.8 Single payment 6.1
Not reported 0.2 Unclassified 0.2
Total 100.0% Total 100.0%
VA data refer to 6,569 business loans closed during two months of 1947 (those ending
June 25 and July 25) with VA guarantee or insurance, from a special tabulation by the
Veterans' Administration. Bank data refer to an estimated 114,800 term loans to small busi-
nesses outstanding on November 20, 1946, from "Member Bank Loans to Small Business," by
Charles H. Schmidt, Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1947, Table 8, p. 972.
credits. The monthly payment has become a deep-seated convention in
consumer financing. The available information on repayment provisions
in the generality of bank term loans to small business is of interest as
showing the extent to which regular amortization of credits extending
more than one year had become common banking practice by 1946, but
does not make clear whether monthly, quarterly, or annual payments pre-
dominate.
Characteristics of the Borrowing Businesses and
of the Business Population
What were the probable effects of the VA business loan program upon
the business population of the country, its aggregate size, its geographical
distribution, and its type-of-business composition?
SIZE OF THE BUSINESS POPULATION
Between March 31, 1944 and March 31, 1949 there was a net increase
of 913,000 in the total number of operating firms, in the, nation.55 This
30 percent rise during a five-year period was due to the previous wartime
shrinkage in the business population and to generally favorable business
profits and opportunities during the postwar years. From the beginning
of VA credit activity (June 1944) through March 1949 a' total of 104,000
VA-protected business loans were closed; and data for the latter half
of. 1947 and the calendar year 1948 indicate that perhaps one-third,or
35,000 of the 104,000, were used by veterans to establish new enterprises
55 See Table C-16, below.
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(Table C-is). On the extreme assumption that none of these veterans
would have established a new business without VA credit, the indicated
ratio of new enterprises financed under VA loan guaranty or insurance to
the increase in the business population would be only 3.8 percent. Evi-
dently, the impact of the VA program upon the aggregate size of the
business population was slight.56 In view of the fact that many veterans
were in the age group that normally accounts for a large proportion of
new enterprise formations, it is likely that far more veterans established
new businesses without VA loans than did so with them.
Evidence of the fact that many veterans intended to, and probably did,
enter business (i.e., purchase, resume, or start a business) without VA
loan benefits is provided by the results of a questionnaire survey of a
sample of 20,000 officers and enlisted men made by the Army Service
Forces during mid-1944.57 Eleven percent of the men had fairly definite
plans to enter business by themselves or with a relative, and more than
80 percent of them had experience in the line they intended to enter.
Most planned to invest not more than $4,000, and about 60 percent stated
they possessed at least half of the necessary capital. Only one-sixth stated
they planned to borrow from banks and loan companies, and one-tenth
from friends. Bearing in mind the fact that this sample covered a soldier
TABLE C-15
Distribution by Purpose for Business Loans
Guaranteed or Insured by VA, 1947, 1948
. FIVE MONTHS OF 1947 CALENDARYEAR 1948
Number Number
BUSINESS PURPOSE of Loans Percent of Ijoans Percent
Establish new business 5,415 5,170 26.9%
Purchase going concern 4,108 26.6 4,401 22.9
Repairs to equipment 164 1.1 139 0.7
Purchase equipment and
other assets for .
going concerns 5,767 87.3 9,525 49.5
Total 15,454 100.0% 19,235 100.0%
From special tabulations by the Veterans' Administration for months ending
May 25, June 25, August 25, September 25, and October 25, 1947; and for the
period December 25, 1947 through December 25, 1948.
56 Table C-15 suggests that the proportion of VA-protected loans used for
starting a new business may have been higher in earlier than in later years; but
even assuming a proportion as high as two-fifths for the period through March
1949, the ratio of new firms financed under the VA program to the increase in
the business population would be only 4.6 percent.
Cf. D'Alton B. Myers, "Postwar Business Plans of G.I.'s," Domestic Corn-
merce, January 1945, p. 11.
550APPENDIX C
population of about 14 million, it appears that entry into business was
contemplated by some 1.5 million men. If even as few as one-quarter of
them actually did follow their plans, it would mean that up to March
1949 three veterans entered businesses without VA assistance for every
one who entered with VA loan aid.
In 1947 and 1948 (and probably later, as well) the majority of VA-
protected business loans were used by veterans to purchase going con-
cerns or to buy equipment, inventory, and other assets for businesses they
already operated. The latter purpose was the most frequent, motivating
37 percent of the loans in five months of 1947 and half of the loans
in 1948.
LINES OF TRADE
•Over 40 percent of the operating business firms in the United States
in 1944 and 1949 were engaged in retail trade, and over 20 percent in
the service trades (Table C-16). If the count were confined to small firms,
probably those two industry groups would bulk even larger. They also
were the groups in which most of the net increase in the total number
of firms between 1944 and 1949 occurred: 33 percent in retail trade,
22 percent in services, with a large increase also in construction firms—
19 percent of the total increase—though in 1944 that group had repre-
sented only 5 percent of the business population.
TABLE C-16
•Industry Distributions of. the Number of Operating Businesses,





Increase March 31,March 31,Increase
TYPE OP 1944 1949 .1944—1949 1944 .1949 1944—1949
Manufacturing 242.0 308.1 66.1 8.0% 7.8% 7:2%
Wholesale trade 143.1 202.4 59.3 4.7 5.1 6.5
Retail trade 1,379.8 1,684.7 304.9 45.7 42.8 33.4
Service industries 647.6 849.0 201.4 21.4 21.6 22.1
Contract construction149.1 323.4 174.3 4.9 '8.2 19.1
Transportation, .
finance, arid all
othersa 460.6 567.7 107.1 15.2 14.4 11.7
Total 3,022.2 3,935.3 913.1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Computed from Table 7 in "State Estimates of the Business Population," by Betty C.
Churchill and Murray F. Foss, Survey of Current Business, December .1949, pp. 15f.
a Includes mining and quarrying, communications and other public utilities, and insurance
and real estate firms.
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Among member bank loans to small business outstanding in November
1946, those that had been made under VA protection were distributed indus-
trially about as the foregoing census would suggest, with 63 percent in
the retail and service groups combined (Table C-17). A disproportionately
large fraction of 'the generality of the bank loans went to manufacturing
firms, whereas the fraction of VA-protected loans going to that industry
group corresponded more closely to its proportion in the business popula-
tion and in the net number of new firms. VA loans to service industries
(21 percent of the total) matched that group's importance in the popula-
tion and in the increase during the postwar years, whereas only 12 percent
of the generality of member bank small business loans went to such
firms. A disproportionately large fraction of VA loans, on the other
hand, appears in the combined groups "utilities, transportation" and "all
other,", probably reflecting numerous loans to aid veterans' local trucking
enterprises. Neither the proportion of the bank loans generally nor of
the VA-protected bank loans going to construction firms matched that
group's increase of population during the postwar years.
The industry distribution• for loans by all types of lender that were
made under VA protection during 1949 and 1950 shows an even greater
concentration in the retail and service groups than was observed for
VA-protected member bank loans outstanding in .1946 (Table C-17);
but differences in the classification systems make the comparison doubtful.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
Areas where the share of the business loans made up to mid-1949 under
VA guaranty or insurance was larger than the fraction of the business
population they included were: northern New England (Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont); Minnesota and the Dakotas; and most of the
Mountain states (Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New
Mexico). Areas where the share of VA business loans was small in rela-
tion to the business population were: most of the southeast (North
Carolina and Tennessee; Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida);
also Illinois; Ohio and West Virginia; and New Jersey. The, geographical
distribution of VA-protected business loans to mid-1949 was not appar-
ently related to differing rates of gain in business population (Table
C-18). For example, of seventeen states where the number of firms in-
creased between 1944 and 1949 by 39 percent or more (against a national
average of 30 percent), only three (Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon) re-
ceived a fraction of VA-protected loans that was markedly larger than
their share of the business population. The rest had shares of VA loans
that either were low compared to the business population or were not
much out of line (North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana,
Kentucky, Arkansas, Texas; California, Washington, Idaho, Nevada).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Distributions by Region and State for Number of Business Loans Made to Mid-1949
with VA Guaranty or Insurance, and for Number of Businesses in 1948, with




NUMBER OP DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS LOANS CLOSED






MARCH 1948 Number Percent
England 24.1% 6.91% 9,988 9.32%
Connecticut 24.9 1.46 1,150 1.08
Maine 22.9 0.74 1,471 1.38
Massachusetts 23.4 3.44 4,557 4.27
New Hampshire 21.5 0.44 1,407 1.32
Rhode Island 29.0 0.55 765 0.72
Vermont 25.8 0.28 583 0.55
Middle East 23.9 25.90 29,050 27.19
Delaware 20.9 0.28 150 0.14
District of Columbia 9.5 0.58 1,518 1.42
Maryland 23.6 1.27 1,152 1.08
New Jersey 22.4 3.61 1,328 1.24
New York 22.3 13.07 17,850 16.71
Pennsylvania 27.2 6.18 6,483 6.07
'West Virginia 44.6 0.96 569 0.53
South East 43.0 15.23 11,751 10.98
Alabama 39.1 1.33 917 0.86
Arkansas 45.0 1.00 1,104 1.03
Florida 70.9 2.09 1,142 1.07
Georgia 41.3 1.62 1,885 1.76
Kentucky 43.4 ' 1.33 1,208 1.13
Louisiana 41.8 1.23 892 0.83
Mississippi 39.2 0.81 451 0.42
North Carolina 41.6 1.78 917 0.86
South Carolina 36.1 0.88 1,073 1.00
Tennessee 32.6 1.50 720 0.67
Virginia 36.8 1.66 1,442 1.35
South West 48.7 7.44 7,827 7.81
Arizona 67.3 0.48 1,137 1.06
New Mexico 46.8 0.40 685 0.64
Oklahoma 33.9 1.38 1,238 1.16
Texas 47.4 5.17 4,757 4.45
Central 20.3 , 26,216 24.54
Illinois 12.2 6.75 5,049 4.73
Indiana 23.8 2.50 2,260 2.12
Iowa 20.1 1.92 2,841 2.66
Michigan 24.3 4.00 3,711 8.47
Minnesota 21.1 2.01 8,340 3.13
Missouri 13.9 2.77 3,441 8.22
Ohio 28.6 4.91 2,580 2.41
Wisconsin 26.0 2.50 2,994 2.80




INCREASE IN PERCENTAGE VA-PROTECTED










North West 5.58% 8,900 8.33%
Colorado 28.7 0.92 1,552 1.45
Idaho 40.0 0.39 412 0.39
Kansas 20.9 1.43 1,918 1.80
Montana 24.1 0.46 887 0.83
Nebraska 20.4 0.97 994 0.93
North Dakota 18.1 0.87 1,161 1.09
South Dakota 23.6 0.44 996 0.93
Utah 36.9 0.39 655 0.61
Wyoming 36.1 0.21 825 0.30
Far West 56.0 11.61 18,177
California 59.2 8.54 9,176 8.59
169 0.16 Nevada 44.9 0.15.
Oregon 46.]. 1.21 1,763 1.65
Washington 48.6 1.71 2,069 1.94
United States 802% 100.00% 106,844 100.00%
VA data from Annual Report of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 1949, Table 88,
p. 236; other data from "State Estimates of the Business Population," by Betty C. Churchill
and Murray F. Foss, Survey of Current Business, December 1949,pp. 14ff. (change in business
population refers to March 31 dates).
for the disproportions in the distributions of VA loans and of the business
population. Partly, no doubt, the geographical pattern of VA loans reflects
differences in the availability of private banking services and the willing-
ness of banks to make such loans.
Effectson the Amount and Cost of Credit
The primary objectives of the VA business credit program were, first,
to lower the price of credit to every veteran desiring to enter business for
himself and possessing a reasonable likelihood of success, and, secondly,
to obtain for veterans more liberal credit terms, such as credit with smaller-
than-normal equity on the part of the borrower. One important criterion
for judging the success of the program is therefore the extent to which
the program actually succeeded in (a) increasing the number of veterans
able to obtain business credit, and (b) reducing the cost of business
credit to veterans who would have been able to negotiate loans without
VA assistance.
How high an interest rate would veterans have had to pay for loans
of the sizes, maturities, collateral security, and other characteristics of
VA business loans, without VA guaranty or insurance? One need merely
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recall the observed characteristics oi VA business loans to realize that,
up to the time of the VA program, very small term loans to new and small
enterprises •were not generally available from commercial banks. Neither
were they generally available from commercial finance companies, which
dealt with many small. enterprises, but not with many firms as small as
those into which veterans entered. It follows that the program. did suc-
ceed in increasing materially the number of veterans able to obtain busi-
ness credit from financial institutions. VA guaranty of up to 50 percent
of the amount of a loan (and later VA insurance of up to 100 percent
of individual loans where the lender had sufficient insurance credit in
his account), combined with the desire of banks to aid returning veterans,
did induce banks to make many loans which were formerly considered
beyond the pale of sound banking practice, and to make them at a moderate
rate of interest, as prescribed by the law.
Analysis of the probable effects of VA guaranty or insurance upon the
cost of business credit to veterans requires an understanding of the com-
ponents of interest rates charged by banks for business credit. In theory,
three important components enter into the gross interest rate charged
for a business loan: (1) pure interest on riskiess assets, (2) costs of ad-
ministration of a loan, which rise rapidly per dollar loaned as loan sizes
diminish, (3) risk premium to compensate for the hazard of nonrepay-
ment of principal and interest and to provide a reserve out of which
losses may be met. VA loan guaranty or insurance served to reduce the
third component; it did not affect the other two. If the amounts of pure
interest and of costs of administration may be estimated roughly, it will
be possible to calculate the importance of VA guaranty in reducing the
total interest rate charged on a loan. A loan of $3,000 maturing in three
years may be considered as representative of VA business loans during
1946 and 1947, the most active years of the program.58
"Pure interest" on riskiess assets, judged by. yields of government
securities with three-year maturities, was about 11/2 percent per annum
during 1946 and 1947. Scattered information suggests that the average
cost of administering VA loans of $3,000 was at least 2/2 percent per
annum. The sum of these two items, 4 percent, may be taken as the
minimum basic return to a commercial bank, without allowance for risk
premium; the risk premium may be regarded as the difference between
the interest rate charged and 4 percent per annum.
A small business loan to a veteran at 6 percent would involve a 2
percent risk premium component. If VA guaranteed repayment of half
the loan, it would reduce the appropriate risk premium by at least one-
half,, or to 1 percent, and in the case of a lender who had built up an
adequate insurance reserve it might reduce it by 100 percent, or be the
58 See Tables C-6 and C-12, above.
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a 2 percent annual rate of interest. A bank might therefore
be expected to make guaranteed or insured loans at 5 percent which it
would not have made without guaranty except at 6 or 7 percent. Similarly,
an 8 percent unguaranteed loan would have a risk premium component
of 4 percent, and VA guaranty would rçduce the bank's loan rate by at
least half this amount, or 2 percent. The bankwould be expected to make
the same loan on a guaranteed basis at 6 percent that it would have
made without guaranty at 8 to 10 percent. It is noteworthy that the
relative reduction in loan rate caused by VA guaranty rises as the risk-.
premium component rises. VA guaranty provided a relatively larger in-
centive to banks toward riskier than toward safer loans.
An indication of the amount of reduction in loan rate caused by VA
guaranty is provided by a consideration of interest rates charged on
member bank term loans to business that were outstanding in late 1946.
The average interest rate charged varied according to the amount of the
loan and the size of the borrowing firm; for three size classes of small










Less than $500 9.0% 6.9% 6.8%
$500—999 7.8 6.0 4.9
1,000—4,999 6.0 5.6 • 5.0
5,000—9,999 5.2 5.0 4.8
10,000—24,999 4.8 4.5 4.8
.25,000—49,999 .4.5 4.3 4.2
50,000—99,999 .. 4.2 4.0
100,000—499,999. .. 4.3 8.9
500,000—999,999 .. .. 3.8
Loans of all sizes 5.4% 4.4% 4.0%
a Size of loan refers to unpaid balance; hence the results somewhat understate
the differences between rates on loans of larger and smaller original amount.
Since the enterprises of VA borrowers by and large were of smaller size
and subject to greater risk than those included in the smallest size class
of bank term borrowers, it seems likely that the charge on three-year
loans of $3,000 to very small firms, if banks had made them without
guaranty, would have been at least 10 percent per annum.6° On the
59 From "The Structure of Interest Rates on Business Loans at Member Banks,"
by Richard Youngdahl, Re8erve Bulletin, July 1947, Table 16, p. 816.
60 On small amortized business term loans, banks ordinarily quote rates of
discount on the borrower's note. Thus 5 percent discount on a loan maturing
within three years and repayable in equal monthly installments would be equivalent
to approximately 91/2 percent interest.APPENDIX C
assumptions made previously, regarding administrative cost and pure
interest, such loans would have about a 6 percent risk-premium component.
VA guaranty would have reduced this by one-half, or 3 percent, enabling
a bank to make a loan at 7 percent with VA guaranty for which it would
have charged 10 percent.without it. However, the law limited the bank's
charges (on insured non-real-estate loans) to percent.This limitation
undoubtedly made numerous VA loans unattractive as bank portfolio
holdings, even with VA insurance, and was a restrictive factor in the
program to enlist broad banking participation in' making business credit
available to veterans. The statutory differential of 1.7 percent between
the maximum charge for real estate loans and that for non-real-estate
business loans understated the true difference in costs and risks.
558